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“I can't remember anything 
Can't tell if this is true or dream 
Deep down inside I feel to scream 
This terrible silence stops me 
 
Now that the war is through with me 
I'm waking up, I cannot see 
That there's not much left of me 
Nothing is real but pain now 
 
Hold my breath as I wish for death 
Oh please, God, wake me 
 
Back in the womb it's much too real 
In pumps life that I must feel 
But can't look forward to reveal 
Look to the time when I'll live 
 
Fed through the tube that sticks in me 
Just like a wartime novelty 
Tied to machines that make me be 
Cut this life off from me 
 
(Metallica 1988) 
Hold my breath as I wish for death 
Oh please, God, wake me 
Now the world is gone, I'm just one 
Oh God, help me 
Hold my breath as I wish for death 
Oh please, God, help me 
 
Darkness imprisoning me 
All that I see 
Absolute horror 
I cannot live 
I cannot die 
Trapped in myself 
Body my holding cell 
 
Landmine has taken my sight 
Taken my speech 
Taken my hearing 
Taken my arms 
Taken my legs 
Taken my soul 
Left me with life in hell” 
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Executive Summary 
 
In post-conflict situations, landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) have a devastating 
effect on the population, blocking sustainable development. Poorly trained soldiers and rebellion 
started to use landmines in internal conflicts for offensive purposes, or for terrorizing of civilians, in 
densely populated areas. The cost of the placement of a landmine is very low, the cost of the 
removal are very high. The annual number of casualties in the whole world is between 15.000 and 
20.000 civilians. Even a suspicion of the presence of landmines can already have a devastating 
effect on communities and their social-economic well being. 
 
Partial through strong lobbying by many NGOs, the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on banning landmines was 
established relatively quick. This treaty is nowadays ratified by 151 countries, including the 
Netherlands. The humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector was developed to undertake mine risk 
education/awareness, de-mining (clearance of landmines and ERW, survey and marking), victim 
assistance and social rehabilitation, stigmatization of the use of landmines, and stockpile 
destruction. The UNMAS set up the International Mine Action Standards guidelines.  
 
As a donor country for development cooperation, the Netherlands is also funding HMA. The central 
aim of the Dutch HMA policy is the clearance of landmines and ERW, in order to limit casualties and 
advance socio-economic development. Cost-effectiveness, use of local labour, quick transfer to 
national capacity are seem as important. Emphasize is lied on de-mining, The Netherlands started 
financially supporting HMA in 1992, and was the eighth largest contributor for the period 1996-2004. 
The Netherlands was (co-)funding programs in 20 countries, and some programs that are not specific 
for a country. 
 
This research describes the evaluation of the HMA programs that are funded by the Netherlands for 
the period 1996-2004, specifically on their embeddedness into a broader development strategy. 
Embeddedness is defined as the extent in which other humanitarian objectives and programs are 
attached, combined or integrated with HMA programs. Embeddedness has attracted increasingly 
attention, because landmines and ERW have a direct threat to individuals and communities, but also 
indirectly by being a barrier for short-term emergency interventions and long-term development 
efforts. Nevertheless the Netherlands does not directly mention embeddedness of HMA in neither its 
HMA policy paper nor in its 2003 macro policy paper on development cooperation. 
 
Seven countries are selected for research, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, 
Eritrea, Laos, and Mozambique, on the basis of the extent and duration of funding, and interesting 
landmines and ERW features. The funded programs in those countries are mainly in line with the 
Dutch policy priorities.  
 
Embeddedness in a broader framework for sustainable development of the funded programs was an 
issue in different extents. The available information gives clues that embeddedness became more 
important during the years, for both donors, as recipient countries and NGOs.  
 
Exact information on socio-economic outcome and impact of the programs is not available, so the 
valuing on the criteria was very qualitative and reliant on the reports of NGOs and UN organizations. 
A strict judgment on the value of the embeddedness is therefore not possible. Embeddedness was 
quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice. Most embeddedness of HMA is on 
relief, recovery, rehabilitation and development. The impact of HMA is often safe and sustainable 
return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities. 
 
It is recommended to get better insight into the socio-economic impact of HMA activities. A good 
strategy and/or method should be sought in cooperation with other donors, relevant UN 
organizations, and NGOs. 
 
 
 
Word count: 29.879 
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1 Introduction 
 
Landmines are often used in conflicts, for defending armies or rebellions against enemy forces. In 
the post-conflict situation, landmines have a devastating effect on the population, blocking 
sustainable development. Humanitarian mine action (HMA) is an important aspect of the 
development cooperation. Therefore the title of this project is “Evaluation of Embeddedness of 
Humanitarian Mine Action Programs Funded by the Netherlands, for the Period 1996-2004”. 
 
This project report is written for the master project as an important part of the graduation for the 
master International Public Management and Policy at the department of Public Administration of 
the Erasmus University Rotterdam. This project report is the presentation of my findings of the 
evaluation study, in particular on embeddedness of HMA in a broader development strategy. The 
research was undertaken as part of an internship at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA). 
 
This report has the following outline: the second chapter deals with the background of the landmine 
problem and the Dutch HMA policy. Chapter three analyses the problem of this research. The fourth 
chapter shows the research design of the evaluation. In chapter five seven countries are discussed 
and the HMA programs funded by the Netherlands are given. The embeddedness of HMA is discussed 
in chapter six, which findings are compared to existing research in chapter seven. The report ends 
with conclusions and recommendations in chapter eight. 
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2 Background of the Landmine Problem and HMA Policies 
 
This chapter describes all the background information that is needed to understand the landmine 
problem and the Dutch HMA policies. First the way landmines are used is described; secondly the 
size of the landmine problem is sketched, followed by the anti-landmine process towards the 
Ottawa Treaty. Fourthly the concept of HMA is explained, and the chapter is ended by an overview 
of the Dutch policy. 
2.1 The Use of Landmines 
 
Landmines were traditionally used for defensive purposes by state armies by well-trained personnel. 
From the Vietnam War, poorly trained soldiers started to use the low-cost landmines in internal 
conflicts for offensive purposes, and in densely populated areas. Landmines are not widely used by 
professional state armies nowadays (Lawson 1997, p.18; Rutherford 2000, p.81-83). 
 
Landmines have three military roles (TK 24 292 1995-2001, p. nr.1 p.6-7): 
1. Hindrance: in armed conflicts to build a barrier or to strengthen an existing barrier, in order to 
stop or slow down enemy forces. Infrastructures such as roads and bridges are too valuable to 
destroy, because they can be of use in the future. For this purpose ATMs were used, in 
combination with APMs to prevent enemy forces from easy clearance. Nowadays anti-handling 
devices are often used in stead of APMs to protect the ATMs; 
2. Protection: to prevent enemy intruders and protect own forces and installations at military 
camps; 
3. Strategic/Geopolitical: landmine fields are laid at borders of countries for protection. This is 
especially in countries with long, difficult to protect borders as Sweden and Finland (in the past 
against the Soviet treat. Remarkable detail is that Finland is the only EU country that did not 
sign the Ottawa Treaty yet). 
 
Landmines are indiscriminate on soldiers or civilians. They are also specifically used as a weapon of 
terror against civilians in internal conflicts, both by rebellions and armies. Aim is to chase away 
civilians and to prevent refugees to return, to make access to water and agricultural area 
impossible, and to destabilize social life and disrupt socio-economic life (Rutherford 2000, p.82; TK 
24 292 1995-2001, nr.1 p. 8-9).  
2.2 The Size of the Problem 
 
Estimates say there are between 30 and 300 million landmines present world wide. At least 84 
countries are affected with landmines and and/or explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly 
developing countries. An estimated area of 200.000 km² (about 5 times the size of the Netherlands) 
contains landmines and ERW worldwide, and can not be used for any other purpose. Even a 
suspicion of the presence of landmines can already has a devastating effect on communities and 
their social-economic well being. The negative effect of landmines on the population differs per 
country or region. Social economic problems are distorted traditional patterns of living and the 
hindrance of economic development, i.e. isolation of land, roads, markets etc, medical care for the 
growing number of disabled and their rehabilitation. In post-conflict era, peace-building is difficult 
and refugees refuse to return to their home ground (Danida 2001b, p.5; ICBL 2005b, p.4-5, 27; MvBZ 
2004e).  
 
In an article of Lawson in 1997 (p.18-19, 22) the following facts about the size are presented: 
− About every twenty minutes there is a new landmine victim; 
− The deadly casualty rate of landmines is higher than nuclear and chemical weapons combined; 
− Twenty new landmines are placed in comparison with every landmine cleared; 
− The clearance rate in 1997 gave a duration of 1.100 years to clear all landmines worldwide (with 
an assumed 110 million placed landmines); 
− In Angola 1 out of 334 of the population is an amputee, were in the U.S. it is 1 out of 22.000; 
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− For about every 5000 landmines cleared, one de-miner is killed and two are injured; 
− The production costs for an APM are about US$3, clearance of an APM costs up to US$800; 
− Over 70% of the casualties are civilians, of which about 25% are children; 
− Many minefields were never mapped; 
− Under certain weather conditions and soil type, landmines can move kilometres. 
2.3 Anti‐Landmine Process 
2.3.1 Pre‐ICBL 
 
During the Cold War most NGOs did not have access to landmine-infected areas, were unaware of 
the humanitarian and development problems caused by landmines, or could not assess the problem 
properly. Many governments were unaware too. In the 1970s the ICRC started with arguing that the 
use of landmines was not legitimate in relation with international humanitarian law, by stating that 
“landmines cause superfluous injury unnecessary suffering (damaging effects disproportionate to 
the military purpose) and that they are of an indiscriminate nature (no distinction between civilians 
and combatants)” (Rutherford 2000, p.80-81). The landmine issue came on the political agenda 
which resulted in the Landmines Protocol (Protocol II) of the CCW1 of 1980, later amended at the 
CCW Review Conference in May 1996 in Geneva. Both the original Protocol II and the Amended 
Protocol II were not far reaching enough to have a considerable probability of solving the 
humanitarian problem (Rutherford 2000, p.80-81, 86; TK 25 925 (R 1614) 1998-2005, p. nr.3 p.20). 
2.3.2 The Role of NGOs Grows 
 
Until 1994 the use of landmines was considered legal by all states. Belgium was the first state to 
have legislation banning the use of APMs. An undeniable very important role in setting the agenda 
for the recognition of the landmine problem as a humanitarian problem instead of a political or 
defensive issue and a ban was played by the coalition of NGOs called International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL, founded in 1991). The ICBL2 is a network nowadays of over 1,100 local, national, 
regional and international NGOs with a human rights, mine clearance, humanitarian, children’s, 
veterans’, medical, development, arms control, religious, environmental, or women’s background. 
The coordinator of the ICBL, Jody Williams, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Several 
scholars suggest that the agenda was set through norm diffusion facilitated by the NGOs (Danida 
2001b, p.22; Rutherford 2000, p.74-76). 
 
Two roles were played by the NGOs (Rutherford 2000, p.76, 80, 92-93): 
1. Cognitive agenda setting: The NGOs used intense media and public attention to get the issue on 
the international political agenda. This was done by showing stories and impressive statistics of 
victims of explosions caused by landmines. An example of a statistic was the claim that 
landmines caused more victims than biological, chemical and nuclear weapons together; 
2. Norm agenda setting: The NGOs helped with the way the issue was uttered and codified by 
international law by changing how the legality of landmines and the effects of the use were 
alleged by governments. The use of landmines was labelled illegal under existing international 
law. This was primarily based on the proportionality principle of the 1977 Protocol II of the 
Geneva Convention: 
• The military value of use of landmines was becoming more and more contested, and the 
humanitarian costs were considered to outweigh military benefits; 
• The time-delay feature. As the American senator Patrick Leahy stated that the use of 
landmines is “mass destruction in slow motion”. 
 
The NGOs were playing a winning game, despite the disappointing Amended Protocol II of the CCW 
in 1996. The UK was together with the U.S. an important opponent of a total ban of APMs. With the 
                                                 
1 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed 
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
2 The ICBL was found in 1992. The original members are the Handicap International (HI), Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), the Mine Advisory Group (MAG), Medico International (MI), Physicians for Human Rights (MHR), and 
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF). 
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help of deceased Princess of Wales Diana, the British NGO successfully influenced the policy of the 
UK, leaving the U.S. on its own. Also in other countries NGOs were successfully mobilizing the 
public, helped by political figures such as Nelson Mandela. The U.S. went to Ottawa with several 
requests, still thinking that they could get a consensus that would be satisfactory for them. The US 
argued the strategically need at battle fields, e.g. at the Korean peninsula. The U.S. completely 
failed to get its requests granted (Rutherford 2000, p.97-105). 
2.3.3 The Ottawa Treaty 
 
After the reviewing conferences on the 1980 CCW in 1995 (Vienna) and 1996 (Geneva), it turned out 
that only 40 countries were in favour of a total ban on landmines. The Canadians, under the lead of 
minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, hosted a meeting in Ottawa in October 1996 for the 
interested and more progressive governments who were in favour3. This meeting was very 
successful, 50 countries, several IGOs and NGOs participated, and 24 countries sent an observer. 
The Ottawa Treaty was signed on September 18, 1997, in Oslo, and came into force on March 1, 
1999.  A minimal of 40 countries ratifying countries were needed, nowadays 151 countries already 
ratified (Brinkert 2003, p.782; Danida 2001b, p.22; ICBL 2006a; Rutherford 1999, p.37; Rutherford 
2000, p.76-77, 107; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.13; TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.3). 
 
The Ottawa Treaty turned out to be insufficient with regard to ERW. Many victims were injured or 
killed by ERW (AXO and UXO), not only by landmines. Therefore the Protocol V of the CCW was 
created to cover ERW and cluster bombs in international law (TK 28 600 V 2002-2003, nr.63 p.2; TK 
29 200 V 2004-2005, nr.61 p.1-3). 
2.3.4 The Multilateral Treaty Making Process 
 
The resulting Ottawa Treaty is far more successful than other conventions dealing with arms such as 
the CCW. Traditionally conventions are negotiated with a strong diplomatic consensus with much 
influence of the major state powers and just a small indirect influence of NGOs. The positive 
opinions about the Ottawa Convention can be summarized by stating that “[t]he Ottawa Convention 
was born out of a desire to make multilateralism work” (Petritsch 2004). The 1899 First 
International Peace Conference in The Hague was very similar to the Ottawa process, and both were 
very different in comparison with other treaty making processes. Thus it can not be said that the 
Ottawa Process was a completely new matter. The Hague Conventions were seen as internationally 
binding also for non-signatories (Rutherford 1999, p.36-37).  
 
Table 2-1: “Standard” vs “alternative” multilateralism in the weapon banning treaty making 
Issue “Standard” “Alternative” 
Invitation International organization International political leader  
Negotiation procedure Consensus Majority voting ⇒ less chance for 
one member to weaken the treaty 
Verification measures Yes ⇒ for security reasons, e.g. in 
case of nuclear weapons 
No/minimal ⇒ if no direct 
national security threat. 
Verification difficult to carry out. 
More attractive to sign. 
Purpose State self interest, security Peaceful international society 
Negotiation duration Fast-track Long, slow, even decades 
Support major powers Yes No 
Participation Limited to states Support of NGOs and public opinion 
Rules Complicated, inconsistent, subject to interpretation and flexibility Clear, simple and consistent 
Examples CCW, CWC Hague Conventions, Ottawa Treaty 
Source: (Rutherford 1999, p.37-41) 
 
                                                 
3 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, 
and Switzerland were included in the initial ‘core-group’. 
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Table 2-1 shows a comparison of two ways of multilateral treaty making with regard to the ban of 
weapons, where “standard” is such as the CCW and many other weapon banning treaties, and 
“alternative” as the Hague Conventions and Ottawa Treaty. A Ottawa/Hague model for treaties on 
banning any kind of weapons is only possible is states have no real direct need for the weapon for 
national security reasons or if weapons do not have a widespread legitimate use (Rutherford 1999, 
p.47-49). It was argued that the support of (international) NGOs for the Ottawa Treaty gave the 
“international civil society” legitimacy and enforced the “democratization of international law” 
(Andersson 2000, p.92). 
2.3.5 The Non‐Signing Countries 
 
The U.S., Russia and China, and many Northern African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries have not 
signed and ratified the treaty yet (see Appendix 3). For many countries there are obvious reasons: 
− China is still placing landmines to protect its borders. China claims that it needs landmines for 
self defence. China is a member of the CCW Amended Protocol II (ICBL 2005a: China); 
− Finland is the only EU country that did not sign, however Finland does effectively support the 
ban of APM. Finland has large minefield at the long border with Russia, as a self defence 
system. To replace the landmines with another effective system takes a lot of time and money 
and the defence budget is recently decreased (ICBL 2005a: Finland); 
− Russian forces are still using APMs in primarily Chechnya, but also Dagestan, Tajikistan and on 
the border with Georgia. Russia still sees APMs as useful and does not see good alternative, 
although it is investing in research on alternatives. The stockpile of APMs is considerable, and 
Russia does not think that it can reduce the stockpile within the time given in the treaty (4 
years). Russia did ratify the CCW Amended Protocol II in 2005 (ICBL 2005a: Russia); 
− The U.S. has tactical and geopolitical reasons, which they unsuccessfully tried to negotiate into 
the Ottawa Process (Rutherford 1999, p.40): 
• The U.S. has strategic minefields on the Korean peninsula at the Demilitarized Zone; 
• The U.S. wanted a postponement of the date that the treaty enters in force; 
• The U.S. wanted a change in definition of the APM, more intensive verification measures, 
and a withdrawal clause from the treaty in cases of national emergency.  
The U.S. too has the opinion that APMs are needed for defensive purposed and that there in no 
good alternative. Research is done on alternatives. APMs without self-destructing or self-
deactivating system can be used until 2010 in Korea, or with presidential authorization only. 
The U.S. is a member of the CCW Amended Protocol II (ICBL 2005a: USA). 
2.4 HMA 
2.4.1 The Funding 
 
The largest contributors for the period 1996-2004 were the U.S., European Commission, Japan, 
Norway, Canada and the Netherlands (see Table 2-1).  
 
Table 2-2: Funding of top 10 donors for 1996-2004 
Ranking Donor party Total funding 1996-2004 Funding 1996-2004 per capita* 
1. United States $ 571,1 million $ 1,91 
2. European Union (EC) $ 249,3 million $ 0,55 
3. Norway $ 203,5 million $ 44,14 
4. Japan $ 148,0 million $ 1,16 
5. UK $ 130,5 million $ 2,15 
6. Germany $ 121,3 million $ 1,47 
7. Canada $ 119,3 million $ 3,60 
8. The Netherlands $115,2 million $ 6,99 
9. Sweden $ 101,7 million $ 11,28 
10. Denmark $ 90,6 million $ 16,62 
Total (only top 10) $ 1.850,5 million  
* Number of inhabitants for 2006, actual numbers per annum will probably be slightly higher 
Sources: (CIA 2006; ICBL 2005b, p.61-66) 
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For the period 1996-2004, the U.S. was by far the largest contributor, the Netherlands was the 8th 
largest. If the numbers are looked at per capita, Norway, Denmark and Sweden were the largest 
contributors.  
 
Top 10 donors 1996-2004
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
$70
$80
$90
$100
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
x 
U
S$
 m
il
li
on
U.S.
EU
Norway
Japan
UK
Germany
Canada
The Netherlands
Sweden
Denmark
 
Figure 2-1: Top 10 HMA donors for 1996-2004 (ICBL 2005b, p.61-66) 
 
Figure 2-1 shows that the contributions were growing since 1996, from a total of US$ 90,6 million in 
1996 to a total of US$ 346,0 million in 2004 for the top 10 donors4. Most money in 2004 was 
contributed to Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Angola, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sudan. 
Internationally, a totalled amount of US$ 376 million was funded for HMA in 2005, a decrease of 
almost 6% compared to 2004 (US$ 399 million, slightly more than the contribution op the top 10 
donors), but second highest ever (ICBL 2005b, p.5, 60; ICBL 2006a, p.6; MvBZ 2004e).  
2.4.2 The Sector 
 
All activities concerning de-mining and related subjects are called mine action. There was critic in 
the mid-1990s on de-mining and mine awareness practices in the field. Emphasize was mainly on 
technique and not on the affected population. This led to the Guidelines for Mine Action 
Programmes from a Development-Oriented Point of View (Bad Honnef Guidelines) after an 
international NGO conference in 1997. After 1997 the sector increasingly professionalized and 
standardized (Harpviken 2003, p.777-778). 
 
The HMA sector has its origin in Afghanistan, were de-mining was done for the first time not (only) 
by national army forces. The United Nations was the leading actor, and as consequence of the 
demand for standardization after success and failures, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was 
founded in 1997, after the founding of the Ottawa Treaty. Changes and shifts in HMA procedures, 
practices and norms, and the streamlining of HMA in a broader context of sustainable development 
and capacity building, made that in 2000 the first edition of the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) was published by the UNMAS. Other actors are national organizations, IGOs and NGOs, such as 
the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD). The latter is supporting UN with 
                                                 
4 donors are defined here as state parties and the EU, not NGOs and other private organizations 
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the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Many countries affected by 
landmines, have a national HMA authority, let by the government, to handle with HMA issues. In 
most cases a national HMA centre (MAC; in an early phase run by the UN) acts as a national operator 
(Brinkert 2003; Danida 2001b, p.6-7, 64; GICHD 2004, p.21-27, 64, 118). 
 
HMA is aimed on reducing the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines and ERW. 
HMA consists of five groups of activities (GICHD 2004, p.1; TK 27 162 2000, nr.8 p.5): 
1. Mine risk education or mine awareness of the local population; 
2. Humanitarian de-mining. The UNMAS sees a minimal of 99,6% accuracy as a norm for de-mining. 
According to many actors, this is the most important issue, for some even the only issue; 
3. Victim assistance and social rehabilitation; 
4. Advocacy to stigmatize the use of landmines and support a total ban on anti-personnel 
landmines; 
5. Stockpile destruction. 
 
Related are data management, training of mine clearing workers, and technological research on 
better detection and clearance techniques (TK 27 162 2000, nr. 8:1). 
 
Humanitarian de-mining refers to the following activities (GICHD 2004, p.64): 
1. The research on nature and size of the mine field (survey); 
2. Designing of a common action plan; 
3. Clearance of landmines and ERW;   
4. Marking mine fields; 
5. Ex post inspections; 
6. Involvement of the local community in de-mining activities; 
7. The transfer of de-mined land. 
 
The IMAS function as a framework for the development of national HMA standards (GICHD 2004, 
p.2). The most important guidelines are (MvBZ 2004e): 
1. The promotion of awareness of the presence of landmines and ERW and lowering the risks 
during the interaction between population/users and the area concerned; 
2. The research into the location and size of minefields and their marking and clearance; 
3. The assistance to casualties and their rehabilitation and reintegration; 
4. The stigmatization of the use of landmines, and the support for a total ban on landmines; 
5. Local capacity-building through education and training, leading to the transfer of mine 
clearance tasks to a national agency (institution building); 
6. Quality control of the above-mentioned activities. 
2.4.3 Socio‐economic Aspects 
 
In the Danida (2001b, p.125-128) evaluation on HMA the narrowness of the term “humanitarian” 
mine action was questioned. The term humanitarian has a short-term meaning. Many other aspects 
were relevant for HMA, particularly human rights and freedoms, which was a basis for development 
assistance/cooperation (long-term) leading to poverty reduction, economic growth and welfare. 
Other socio-economic impacts were (Danida 2001b, p.117-122; UNDP/GICHD 2001, p.23): 
− less accidents and casualties; 
− feeling of security, strong sense of relief, and reduction of stress; 
− improved mobility and trade access, and access to social services such as health and education; 
− employment in mine action for local population; 
− reuse of land area; 
− peace-building and confidence-building; 
− for the environment: both positive such as no killed animals and negative such as disposal 
through burning or detonation in open; 
− spreading of sexually transmitted diseases by de-miners. 
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2.5 The Policy of the Netherlands 
2.5.1 The Funds 
 
As a donor country for development cooperation, the Netherlands is also funding HMA. The 
Netherlands started financially supporting HMA in 1992. Despite a first reserved attitude, the use of 
landmines by the Dutch army was banned in 1996 after a major political change in the defensive 
policy. A small reserve capacity was kept for research and experiments, and education of de-mining 
personnel. Production was forbidden by law since 1996. As stated above, the Netherlands is one of 
the larger contributors since 1996. The total governmental budget for Development Cooperation in 
the Netherlands for 2005 was €4.2 billion (0,83% of GDP and 3% of governmental expenditure), 
where HMA counted for less than 1% of the Dutch Development Cooperation budget. The 
Netherlands signed (1997) and ratified (1999) the Ottawa Treaty. The ratification process was 
experienced as slow, although the Netherlands had a leading role in the realization of the Ottawa 
Treaty (Commissie Draagvlak en Effectiviteit Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 2006, p.8; ICBL 2005b, 
p.5, 60-61; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.1, p.4:1). 
 
Table 2-3: Funding of HMA by the Netherlands 
Year Amount 
2006 €12.6 million (planned) 
2005 $19.3 million 
2004 $10.2 million 
2003 $11.0 million 
2002 $15.8 million 
2001 $12.5 million 
2000 $18.5 million 
1999 $9.6 million 
1998 $22.0 million 
1997 $9.6 million 
1996 $11.2 million 
1992-1995 +/- €6.3 million 
Total 1996-2004  $120.4 million* 
* The total number differs slightly from Table 2-2, due to data from different sources 
Sources: (ICBL 2006a, p.61; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.1 p.17; TK 30 300 V 2006, nr.117, p.3; UNMAS 
2006: The Netherlands) 
2.5.2 Policy priorities 
 
The central aim of the Dutch HMA policy is the clearance of landmines and ERW, in order to limit 
casualties and advance socio-economic development. Cost-effectiveness (e.g. by priority-setting) 
and the use of local labour are the main issues. A quick transfer of the de-mining operation to 
national capacity is seen as important. Programs to be funded have to meet the IMAS guidelines. 
Dutch priorities with regard to subsidies are (MvBZ 2004e; TK 27 162 2000, nr.8 p.4-6): 
− Emphasize on de-mining; 
− Countries that have a bilateral aid relation with the Netherlands or where the de-mining 
activities support human rights, peace building, and good governance; 
− Continuance of already subsidized programs is prefered above new activities, for optimum use 
of previous investments; 
− Capacity strengthening and training for quickly transferring of de-mining activities to national 
governments. The use of local civilians for employment is strongly encouraged, because it 
increases employment and the speed of transferring, and makes the funding more sustainable. 
Use of expert of the Dutch Ministry of Defence is possible, for establishing or providing 
assistance at training facilities; 
− Manual de-mining by local labour is preferred above mechanical de-mining, although support of 
manual de-mining by mechanical de-mining is favoured if necessary.  
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It should be noted that embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable 
development was not mentioned as top-priority in the Dutch HMA policy. Coherence with existing 
plans for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the post-conflict community (with regard to 
healthcare, the return of refugees and displaced persons, education, etc.) was nevertheless strongly 
asked for (MvBZ 2004e). 
2.5.3 Minimal requirements of recipient country 
 
The Netherlands in principal only funds programs in countries that signed and ratified the Ottawa 
Treaty and is being observed (except for Afghanistan that signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty in 
2002). Exceptions on this rule are possible when there are good plausible reasons, e.g. of country is 
lacking a recognised central government authority. International organizations that are funded are 
a.o. GICHD, HALO Trust, ICRC, UNDP, and UNMAS (ICBL 2004: The Netherlands; MvBZ 2004e). 
2.5.4 Funding Channels 
 
The Netherlands only funds NGOs (not commercial), and those who are not involved with illegal 
trade of anti-personnel landmines and/or arms. Other expectations are (MvBZ 2004e): 
− Subscription to the UNMAS guidelines; 
− Demonstration of knowledge of HMA. Allowing certain activities to be performed by other, 
qualified organizations is an alternative; 
− Participation in mechanisms for international standardization, coordination and cooperation, as 
well as in local coordination arrangements.  
− If research is funded, information should be made available to the coordinating agencies.  
2.5.5 Other important aspects 
 
Other important aspects of the Dutch policy on landmines and ERW throughout the years are: 
− The Netherlands is stimulating other countries to sign and ratify the Ottawa Treaty and the 
protocol of the CCW (TK 29 200 V 2004-2005, nr.2 p.49); 
− Stockpile was reduced to 5,000 landmines (and is still lowering), to be kept for education and 
research (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.15 p.3; TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.5; TK 29 200 V 
2004-2005, nr.2 p.49); 
− The Netherlands was not in favour of the principal of “the polluter pays” concerning ERW, 
which was a common opinion with other countries. Protocol V of the CCW on ERW was ratified 
on 25 July 2005 (TK 27 400 V 2001-2002, nr.53 p.6; nr.58 p.3; TK 29 848 (R 1775 2004-2005, nr.3 
p.5); 
− The Netherlands does not have its own mine clearing NGO. Financing the setting up of a new 
HMA NGO is more costly than financing an existing mine clearing NGO. Dutch NGOs are never 
funded by the MFA, to avoid unfairness, nepotism etc. The Ministry of Defence has 80 staff 
members that can be used for de-mining and mine education (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.25 p.6); 
− In 1999 large funds were reserved for a research project on improving mine clearance 
techniques. This was done by the TNO research institute. The objective was to create a 
prototype, but the project failed in an early stage. The acquired knowledge is shared with other 
research institutes from abroad in such as the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EC, and with 
the International Test and Evaluation for Humanitarian De-mining (ITEP) organization of several 
NATO countries with projects on equipment, systems and methods (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.18; 
nr.20 p.10; nr.24 p.1-3); 
− From 2004, funding of HMA activities was placed in a Stability Fund (previously called Peace 
Fund), in order to get fast and flexible stability-advancing activities on peace, safety and 
development. ATMs also still play an important role (TK 30 075 2005-2006, nr.1 p.17); 
− A total of 822 horizontal effect weapons were bought as an alternative for APMs. Those weapons 
have advantages concerning defensive purpose, but does not have the humanitarian 
disadvantages (TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.2, 5); 
− Only ATMs which are detectable, have a self-neutralization and self-deactivating mechanism are 
allowed to be purchased by the Dutch army (TK 25 925 (R 1614) 1998-2005, nr.6 p.2). 
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3 Problem Analysis 
 
In this chapter the problem of this research is analyzed in further detail. The problem is defined at 
first, followed by the aim of the project and the research question. 
3.1 Problem Definition 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Netherlands was funding HMA programs on a coherent policy 
basis from at least since 1996 under certain criteria. The question is how those funds are used and 
what the outcomes and impacts are.  
3.2 Aim of the Project 
 
The general objective of the whole project is to evaluate the funding by the Netherlands of HMA 
programs. This will be based on collected data and also on existing research and literature. My part 
of the project at the MFA will be the elaboration of a sub theme within the whole project. 
 
The academic relevance of my project is to get skills on dealing with research in an international 
environment, and communicating with professionals in the field of international public management 
and policy. The research will add a better insight in the relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, 
coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the funding of HMA in the sub theme. 
 
The practical relevance of my part of the project lies in the information based on the findings of 
the research on the specific sub theme. The findings are in the first place important for the policy 
makers to be accountable to the higher servants, public and parliament. Secondly it might be 
supportive for them, either for assessing current funding and policies and designing future funding 
and policies on HMA, especially on the specific aspect of the sub theme. 
3.3 Research Question 
3.3.1 Main Question of the Ministry’s Research 
 
The overall research question of the whole evaluation research undertaken by the IOB department 
of the MFA is about as follows: 
 
Does the Dutch policy on HMA match specific goals on relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, 
coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?  
 
This research questions is very broad. Therefore, it will be specified on a specific sub theme for 
thesis master project (partial system evaluation (OECD 1999, p.10)). Possible case studies on sub 
themes are: 
 
1. Embeddedness of HMA in the broader development policy: Is the HMA part of a broader 
development strategy for a certain area? This raises questions like: 
− How was embeddedness defined? Was it necessary to embed HMA in a broader development 
strategy? Did it have a positive influence on the effectiveness of HMA? 
− Were the HMA programs embedded in framework for sustainable development? 
− To which extend was it embedded? 
− In which way was it embedded? 
− Under which circumstances and conditions? 
 
2. Land use after clearance of the landmines: The work of de-mining organizations is primarily for 
clearing land area, and thereby preventing casualties and making the land usable again for the 
population. Before the de-mining program starts, a certain priority function was decided for use 
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after clearance, e.g. settlement or agriculture.  In practice, the actual land use after clearance 
is sometimes completely different. In many cases this does not have to be a problem (e.g. 
farming in stead of agriculture by the population), but in other cases bribery or nepotism can 
cause misuse. Questions to be asked are:  
− Was it necessary to stipulate land use priorities before the clearance is undertaken?  
− What were the priorities on land use before clearance? 
− Is the land use after the clearance the same as it was decided before?  
− If the use is different, is this a problem? 
 
3. The choice of which HMA programs to fund: The main question is: What was the best place and 
program to fund, and why? To determine this, selection criteria and directives are available. In 
practice they are often difficult to apply and/or contradicting. Questions are: 
− What criteria and directives were used? 
− Which procedures were used? 
− Were those procedures consistent and transparent? 
 
4. HMA as a way of peace-building and peace-keeping: Most of the worlds’ HMA takes place in 
post-conflict settings, with a high degree of instability. HMA might have a positive effect on the 
stability. This gives the following questions: 
− How stable was the country just after the conflict? 
− What was the extent of HMA taken place? 
− Was the peace stable? 
− Can the increase in stability be explained by the HMA activities? 
 
5. The Dutch HMA policy compared to that of other important donors: Every country might have 
its own way and reasons for funding HMA. Important questions are: 
− What were the HMA policies in other donors? 
− How much did other donors fund? 
− What were the policy arguments in the other donors? 
− What were the similarities and differences? 
3.3.2 Specific Research Question 
 
The first sub theme attracts by far the most attention and is most interesting too for the MFA. This 
sub theme has the most tangent planes with sustainable development. Therefore this sub theme will 
be the case study of this research project. 
 
To embed is referred as to as: “To become an integral part of something or to enclose closely” (The 
Peak Agents Network 2004), and “place or be placed solidly” (Dictionary MSN Encarta 2006). A 
synonym is “to be attached to” (Princeton University 2006). 
 
Landmines and ERW have a direct threat to individuals and communities, but also indirectly by 
being a barrier for short-term emergency interventions and long-term development efforts. The 
complexity of humanitarian assistance is understood by policy makers. Important issues are 
flexibility, innovation, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, safety of both operators and affected 
population, and the needs of target groups and beneficiaries. Political interests of donors, receivers 
and international organizations might conflict. In the past often incorporation of basic needs for 
target groups failed and ineffective use of resources occurred (Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 
2003, p.855-856). The Bad Honnef Guidelines were a logical development (see §2.4.2). 
 
HMA falls under humanitarian assistance, although it has some military influence e.g. the 
hierarchical structure, which in potential limits emphasize on broader humanitarian objectives 
(Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.860, 862). In the case of HMA, there can be either 
emphasize be placed on emergency relief, post-conflict reconstruction, development cooperation, 
or on a combination of two or three of those. 
 
Embeddedness should not be confused with coherence (“The need to assess security, 
developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is 
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consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights 
considerations”) and only coordination (“the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver 
humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic 
planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilising resources and ensuring 
accountability, orchestrating a functional division of labour, negotiating and maintaining a 
serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership”). Coherence 
focuses on policy level, coordination on operational issues. Embeddedness is supposed to go deeper 
and more far-reaching than coherence and sectoral coordination (ALNAP 2006, p.21, 34, 54). 
 
Embeddedness is here defined as follows: 
 
The extent in which other humanitarian objectives and programs are attached, combined or 
integrated with HMA programs. 
 
For this master project, the research question will be formulated as follows: 
 
How are the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development? 
3.3.3 Sub Questions 
 
The following possible sub questions are derived from the main research question partially based on 
the first sub theme: 
 
1. Which HMA programs were funded by the Netherlands (descriptive)?  
2. What was the funding compared to other donors (descriptive)? 
3. What is the available data for evaluation of HMA programs that are (partially) funded by the 
Netherlands (descriptive)? 
4. What was the role of the Netherlands as a donor (descriptive)? 
5. Were the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development 
(descriptive)? 
6. To which extend and in which way was it embedded (descriptive)? 
7. What were the goals, circumstances and conditions, instruments and resources of the programs 
that were embedded (descriptive)?  
8. How were those programs to be valued in terms of relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, 
coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact, taken into the account the 
circumstances, instruments and resources (evaluative)? 
9. What were the good and what are the bad practices (evaluative)? 
10. Which recommendations can be made based on the conclusions of the research (explanative)? 
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4 Research Design 
 
In this chapter the design of this research is discussed. This chapter starts with the theoretical 
framework and ends with the methods of inquiry. 
4.1 Theoretical Framework 
4.1.1 Conceptual Lens 
 
The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD says about evaluation (OECD 2002, p.21-22): 
”The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or 
policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and 
fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An 
evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of 
lessons learned into the decision– making process of both recipients and donors. 
Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy 
or program. An assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of a planned, on-going, or 
completed development intervention.”. 
 
Evaluation in policy analysis is based on descriptive, normative and meta-ethical theories. 
Evaluation produces information about the value or worth of policy outcomes. When policy 
outcomes contribute to goals and objectives, they contain value. Compared other policy-analytical 
methods, evaluation has a value focus, fact-value interdependence, present and past orientation 
and value duality (Dunn 2004, p.356-358).  
 
The functions of evaluations are threefold (Dunn 2004, p.358): 
1. Reliable and valid information about policy performance are provided; 
2. Values underlying the selecting goals and objectives are clarified and criticized; 
3. Encourage the application of other policy-analytic methods in earlier phases. 
 
Types of objectives of policies 
 
Objectives for policies can be distinct between (European Commission 1997, p.15-16): 
− Outputs (goods and services funded and directly produced by the program); 
− Impacts (socio-economic changes brought about by the program). A further distinction gives: 
• Results (initial impact of the policy); 
• Outcomes (longer-term impact of the policy). 
 
Type of evaluations 
 
According to Dunn (2004, p.359-363), there are three approaches to evaluation: 
− Pseudo-evaluation: Worth or value of outcomes is not questioned; 
− Formal evaluation: Outcomes are evaluated on formal policy-program objectives. This type of 
evaluation has a sub division: 
• Development evaluation (direct and formative): serve day-to-day needs of program staff; 
• Retrospective process evaluation (indirect and formative): evaluation after programs have 
been in place for some time; 
• Experimental evaluation (direct and summative): monitoring and evaluation of outcomes of 
direct controls over policy inputs and processes; 
• Retrospective outcome evaluation (indirect and summative): monitoring and evaluation of 
outcomes, but not with direct controls over policy inputs and processes; 
− Decision-theoretic evaluation: Outcomes are explicitly valued by stakeholders; 
 
This evaluation will be a formal, retrospective outcome evaluation. 
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Evaluation design 
 
The following characteristics are seen as important for an evaluation (European Commission 1997, 
p.9-10): 
1. Analytical: based on recognized research techniques; 
2. Systematic: careful planning and consistent use of the chosen techniques; 
3. Reliable: findings should be reproducible by a different evaluator with access to the same data 
and using the same methods of data analysis; 
4. Issue-oriented: address important issues relating to the policy, including its relevance, 
efficiency and effectiveness; 
5. User-driven: successful evaluations should be designed and implemented in ways that provide 
useful information to decision-makers, given the political circumstances, policy constraints and 
available resources. 
 
Evaluation criteria 
 
There are seven key evaluation criteria identified by the OECD-DAC for humanitarian policy 
evaluation (ALNAP 2006, p.10, 20-21; Dunn 2004, p.358; European Commission 1997, p.18; European 
Communities 2004, p.75-76; OECD 1999, p.22-23; OECD 2002): 
1. Relevance/Appropriateness: Relevance can be defined as to what extent are the policy’s 
objectives pertinent in relation to evolving needs and priorities at local (population), national 
(government) and international level (donors). Appropriateness can be defined as if desired 
outcomes (objectives) are actually worthy or valuable, in terms of increasing ownership, 
accountability and cost-effectiveness; 
2. Connectedness: The need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried 
out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account;  
3. Coherence: The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as 
humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies 
take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations (Note: this is explicitly defined 
in terms of humanitarian assistance); 
4. Coverage: Are major population groups reached with the policy or program; 
5. Efficiency: How economically are various inputs/resources converted into outputs and results; 
6. Effectiveness: How far have the policy’s impacts contributed to achieving its specific and 
general objectives, taking into account their relative importance; 
7. Impact (or utility): How do the policy’s impacts compare with needs of the target population(s). 
 
The OECD-DAC criteria in the 2006 ALNAP guide are distinct from all other OECD-DAC sources. The 
original criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) are evolved to the 
seven abovementioned criteria. All criteria seem to be more or less useful for this research (ALNAP 
2006, p.20-21). The OECD-DAC criteria are widely used by agencies similar to the IOB department of 
the MFA, such as DANIDA (Denmark), DFID (UK) and SIDA (Sweden). 
 
Other criteria are possible, the following are given by Dunn (2004, p.358): 
− Adequacy: To what extend does the achievement of a valued outcome resolve the problem? 
− Equity: Are costs and benefits distributed equitably among different groups? 
− Responsiveness: Do policy outcomes satisfy the needs, preferences or values of particular 
groups? 
 
Other possible criteria are goal-attainment (to what extend have the policy’s objectives been 
achieved?), economy, consistency, allocative/distributional effects, and acceptability (see also 
Figure 4-1) (European Communities 2004, p.39; Hansen 2005; OECD 1999, p.23). 
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Source: (European Communities 2004, p.39) 
Figure 4-1: Evaluation issues that are most relevant at different stages of the evaluation cycle 
 
When an evaluation can be undertaken 
 
There are three relevant moments, Figure 4-1 shows which criteria are relevant for what moment 
(European Commission 1997, p.15-17, 72-73, 75; European Communities 2004, p.12-13, 74-75): 
1. Ex-ante evaluation: before the policy is implemented, in order to get a good insight in the likely 
output, results and outcomes, and assess them in relation with the policy objectives; 
2. Mid-term evaluation: when the policy is already implemented, in order to see where the policy 
has to be adjusted to get the desired or even better output, results and outcomes; 
3. Ex-post evaluation: (some time) after the policy ended, in order to get a good insight of the 
output, results and outcomes of the policy. The primary interest is accountability, to investigate 
what has been achieved and at what cost (= effectiveness and efficiency). The Danish 
International Development Agency (Danida) distinguishes between end-evaluations (just after 
ending a program and for follow up) and ex-post evaluation (two or five years after termination 
of the program, in order to see lasting impacts) (Danida 2001a, p.3). 
 
In this research an ex-post evaluation will be undertaken. 
 
Two main approaches 
 
The logical framework approach 
The logical framework (logframe) approach says that are three types of objectives, corresponding to 
outputs, results and outcomes (European Commission 1997, p.16): 
− Operational objectives  ⇒ outputs;  
− Specific objectives  ⇒ results;  
− General objectives  ⇒ outcomes. 
 
Figure 4-2 gives the intervention logic of a policy; Figure 4-3 combines the key evaluation issues 
with the types of objectives. 
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Source: (European Commission 1997, p.17) 
Figure 4-2: The intervention logic of a policy  
 
 
Source: (European Commission 1997, p.20) 
Figure 4-3: Key evaluation issues  
 
The logframe approach is often used in evaluation of humanitarian action (EHA) (ALNAP 2006, p.20; 
Danida 2001a, p.66). However the weakest points of this approach are the assumptions that the 
whole process is very rational, linear, causal links are clear, and there is only one (important) actor, 
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in this for example the Netherlands as a financial contributor of programs. In practice, the whole 
process is a lot more complicated and has many actors, so more flexible approach is necessary. To 
attribute an outcome with a great certainty to an input is in many cases almost impossible. The 
approach is not appropriate when looking at overall policy goals, social ideals and higher principles 
(OECD 1999, p.13). 
 
Social-constructivist approach 
Quite often evaluators are faced by problems arising from no clearly stated goals or objectives. 
Therefore objectives for the different actors and interventions should be retrospectively 
constructed. Necessary is a framework of understanding, beliefs and assumptions. Inbuilt conflicts 
or contradictions in policy objectives are faced. The construction of a narrative history is a powerful 
tool to understand situations and structures (OECD 1999, p.13-14, 17-18). 
 
The social-constructivist approach implies that every policy has multi actors and therefore multi 
value and beliefs. Causal relations are not always clear and straight forward. Important questions 
are if assumptions or theories on the policy are right; what went wrong and why; are we doing the 
“good thing”. Especially the last question can be very political controversial and subjective. The 
main disadvantage is that this approach is vaguer and less easy to apply. 
 
The approach that is most appropriate is dependant on which data, contexts and tools there will be 
available. 
4.1.2 Actor Analysis 
 
There are many different actors involved in the whole life cycle of landmines: 
1. Weapon industry: the actors in this industry have a financial interest in the existence of use of 
landmines and other explosives. Governments can be sensible for the employment they 
generate. 
2. Armies and rebels: these actors are responsible for the creation of landmine or ERW fields. 
Often ex-rebels and ex-soldiers are later used as de-miners, as part of post-conflict 
rehabilitation; 
3. Local communities: communities are directly affected by landmine fields. Local labour is useful 
for HMA activities, and thereby (temporarily) reduces unemployment; 
4. National governments of countries with landmines: those countries are faced with landmine 
fields on their area (sometimes laid down by there own army), which has socio-economic 
consequences for their population. Some countries have their governmental de-mining 
organizations (e.g. CMAC in Cambodia). National capacity-building is an important issue of the 
Dutch policies; 
5. Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs): mainly the United Nations, under the organization of 
UNMAS or UNDP;  
6. Research and education centres: important examples are the IMAS by UNMAS, GICHD (Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining) and MAIC (Mine Action Information Center); 
7. (International) Non-governmental Organizations ((I)NGOs): They have a broad spectrum of HMA 
activities, e.g. clearance, education and awareness. An important player is the ICBL; 
8. Private sector HMA organizations: organizations with clearing landmines as a business activity. 
The Netherlands does not fund private companies for HMA activities; 
9. National governments of donors: Important are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and/or 
Development Cooperation. For countries that signed and ratified or acceded the treaty, see 
Appendix 3. The Mine Action Support Group is an information-sharing forum of donors and the 
European Commission. 
 
In Table 4-1 an oversight is given on relations and interaction between actors, both negative and 
positive aspects.  
Project Report  Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004) 
Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)  18  September 28, 2006 
Table 4-1: Possible relations and interaction between actors (both negative and positive) 
      towards     
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. x delivering landmines - lobbying lobbying lobbying - - lobbying 
2. purchasing 
landmines x 
power, 
interests 
power, 
interests, 
corruption 
- - hassling hassling - 
3. - 
resistance, 
fear,  
distrusting 
x 
calling for 
help, 
distrusting 
giving input giving input cooperating, giving input 
cooperating, 
giving input 
(indirectly) 
cooperating, 
giving input 
4. 
purchasing 
landmines, 
trying to ban 
power, 
interests 
helping, 
hassling, HMA x 
cooperating, 
giving input, 
accounting 
cooperating, 
giving input 
cooperating, 
giving input, 
funding, 
hassling 
cooperating, 
giving input, 
funding, 
hassling 
cooperating, 
accounting, 
giving input, 
hassling 
5. trying to ban 
persuading 
not to use 
landmines, 
informing 
collecting 
data and 
facts, 
informing 
cooperating, 
information 
sharing, 
informing, 
educating 
x 
cooperating 
on data and 
information 
cooperating, 
information 
sharing 
cooperating 
cooperating, 
information 
sharing 
6. trying to ban 
collecting 
data and 
facts 
collecting 
data and facts 
collecting 
data and facts 
cooperating 
on data and 
information 
x collecting data and facts 
collecting 
data and facts 
collecting 
data and facts 
7. trying to ban 
persuading 
not to use 
landmines, 
peace 
keeping 
capacity-
building, 
HMA, 
cooperating, 
supporting, 
informing, 
educating, 
accounting 
capacity-
building,  
HMA, 
cooperating, 
supporting, 
informing, 
educating, 
accounting 
cooperating cooperating, giving input x 
cooperating, 
distrusting, 
opposing 
cooperating, 
accounting 
8. - - HMA, cooperating cooperating cooperating cooperating 
cooperating, 
distrusting, 
opposing 
x cooperating 
f
r
o
m
 
9. 
employment 
concerns, 
trying to ban 
persuading 
not to use 
landmines 
funding, 
supporting 
funding, 
supporting,  
funding, 
supporting 
funding, 
supporting, 
giving input 
funding, 
supporting 
funding, 
supporting x 
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The relation from 9 towards 7 gives the funding relation between the Netherlands and a HMA NGO. 
The relation from 7 towards 9 is for the information/evaluation of the de-mining. The funding also 
goes from 9 - 6 and 6 - 7. The information for the evaluation also goes via the relations 7 – 5 and 5 – 
9. In case of a governmental HMA organization the relations are successively 9 – 4, 4 - 9 and 4 – 5/5 - 
9. The abovementioned relations are relevant for this research project.  
 
 De-mining NGO Governmental de-mining organization 
Policy/funding relation 9 – 7 9 – 5 and 5 - 7 
9 – 4 
9 – 5 and 5 – 4 
Information/evaluation 
relation 
7 – 9 
7 – 5 and 5 – 9 
4 – 9 
4 – 5 and 5 – 9 
Table 4-2: Relevant relations for this research project 
4.1.3 Analytical Framework 
 
Variables of research 
 
For the analytical framework, the following variables are identified in Figure 4-4. Not all variables 
will be discusses during this research, dependent on factor such as available data and relevance. 
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Figure 4-4: Variables of the whole research 
Selection of de-
mining programs to 
support 
Dutch humanitarian 
de-mining policy 
Areas affected by 
mines 
National organization of 
de-mining practice in 
affected countries 
- Amount of landmines 
- Amount of casualties 
- Amount of unusable hectares 
- Hindrance of the mine fields for the socioeconomic life 
- Objectives of the Dutch humanitarian de-mining policy 
- Instruments to reach the objectives of the policy 
- Starting points of the policy 
- Embeddedness of humanitarian de-mining in the broader development policy 
- Formal organization of the de-mining 
practice in the affected country 
- Existence of a national mine action plan 
and/or priority scheme 
- Coordination of national priorities and 
needs of interest organizations on 
execution level 
- Determining the national need for mine 
action in affected country 
- Involved actors in the decision making 
on assigning subsidies 
- Criteria of assigning subsidies 
- Criteria for mid-term evaluation 
- Coordination with other countries 
Execution of de-mining 
programs supported by the 
Netherlands 
- Formulation of the objectives 
- Fulfillment in national and regional needs and 
priorities 
- Attention and criteria for national capacity 
building for transfer of de-mining tasks 
- Obstacles for execution of the program 
- Monitoring of the progress of the program 
- Goal-attainment 
- Progress in solving mine problem (effectiveness) 
- Short term effects 
- Long term effects (sustainability) 
Independent variable: Intermediate variable: Dependent variables: 
Area’s affected by 
mines 
Selection of de-mining 
programs to support 
- Determining the national need for mine 
action in affected country 
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4.2 Methods of Inquiry 
 
In this section, the methods to be used are described. This will be done for either the collection as 
the analysis of data. 
4.2.1 Data Collection 
 
Data collection takes place by accessing information from on HMA programs funded by the 
Netherlands. This data will come from policy documents and papers (such as acts, guidelines, 
directives, white papers, project proposals, reports etc.) from the Parliament and mainly the 
archives and accounting systems of the MFA.  
4.2.2 Data Analysis 
 
Recently the final report of a commission, lead by the former Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs Hans 
Dijkstal, was published. The most important conclusion was that it is important for organizations to 
be accountable when funded by development aid, but that it is often difficult to measure 
effectiveness, which is a hot issue in public administration now for some time. Difficulties are 
methodological problem and gathering of reliable and useful information. The report suggest that 
organizations should be accountable by showing organizational professionalism by good governance 
principles, quality of organization management, and transparent reporting (Commissie Draagvlak en 
Effectiviteit Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 2006, p.20, 28-29; Koelé & Velthuis 2006).  
 
Descriptive 
 
Some of the sub research questions have a descriptive nature. Therefore the data will be analyzed 
and presented in a descriptive way. 
 
Evaluative 
 
A useful statistical method for the evaluation is a Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA), also called multi-
attribute utility analysis by Dunn (2004, p.365). This method can be used if enough relevant 
numerical data is available. 
 
The following steps have to be take in the Multi-Criteria Analysis evaluation process (Dunn 2004, 
p.365-367): 
1. Stakeholder identification; 
2. Specification of relevant decision issues; 
3. Specification of policy outcomes; 
4. Identification of attributes of outcomes; 
5. Attribute ranking in order of importance; 
6. Attribute scaling of importance; 
7. Scale standardization; 
8. Outcome measurement; 
9. Utility calculation: i i ijU wu=∑ : 
Ui  = the aggregate value of the i’th outcome; 
wj  = the standardized scale value or weighing factor of the j’th attribute; 
uij  = the probability of occurrence of the i’th outcome on the j’th attribute.  
10. Evaluation and presentation. 
 
For conducting a MCA, at least necessary are (Horstmeier 2003, p.11-1): 
1. Criteria to test; 
2. Balanced weighing factors; 
3. Different programs to test; 
4. Valuing in what extend every entity satisfies every criterion.  
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Criteria consist of general criteria and detailed criteria (sub criteria). Criteria are measured with 
indicators derived from policy outcomes. The weighing factors (attribute ranking) have to be 
balanced with relative importance. Afterwards the factors have to be checked, to avoid too much 
subjectivity (Horstmeier 2003, p.11-1 - 11-10). Special attention has to be given to a sensitivity 
analysis of the weighing factors. 
 
Explanative 
 
Explanative sub research questions will also be descriptive, but they are supported by the 
evaluation research outcomes. 
4.3 Summary of Choices 
 
The used criteria are the OECD-DAC criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, 
coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. The evaluation will be an ex-post, formal, 
retrospective outcome evaluation. Both the logframe and social-constructivist approach have their 
advantages and disadvantages. The approach that is most appropriate is dependant on which data, 
contexts and tools there will be available. The actors that will be used are national governments of 
countries with landmines, IGOs, (I)NGOs, and national governments of donors. The research will be 
descriptive, evaluative, and explanative. If possible a MCA will be done. 
4.4 Reflection on Research Design 
 
In this paragraph this chapter will be reflected on the proposed research design and the actual 
research. 
4.4.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Conceptual Lens 
 
The evaluation turned out to be an ex-post, formal, retrospective outcome evaluation. The used 
approach is mainly social-constructivist: it was not possible to attributed inputs to outputs in terms 
of embeddedness, due to a lack of relevant numerical data. Narrative reports are used to make a 
judgment. 
 
Actor analysis 
 
From the following actors information has been used: 
− National governments of countries with landmines: National governments for PRSPs, for other 
report: BHMAC, CMAC, and UXO Lao; 
− IGOs: UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAC, UNOCHA, and WFP; 
− (I)NGOs: HALO Trust, HI, MgM, and NPA; 
− National governments of donors: The Netherlands. 
 
These are the same actors as mentioned in Table 4-2. 
 
Analytical framework 
 
The following variables are more or less described in this research (in black): 
 
1. Areas affected by landmines: 
a. Amount of landmines 
b. Amount of casualties; 
c. Amount of unusable hectares; 
d. Hindrance of the mine fields for the socio-economic life; 
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2. Dutch HMA policy: 
a. Objectives of the Dutch HMA policy; 
b. Instruments to reach the objectives of the policy; 
c. Starting points of the policy; 
d. Embeddedness of HMA in the broader development policy. 
 
3. Selection of HMA programs to support: 
a. Determining the national need for HMA in affected country;  
b. Involved actors in the decision making on assigning subsidies; 
c. Criteria of assigning subsidies; 
d. Criteria for mid-term evaluation; 
e. Coordination with other countries. 
 
4. National organization of HMA practice in affected countries: 
a. Formal organization of the HMA practice in the affected country; 
b. Existence of a national HMA plan and/or priority scheme; 
c. Coordination of national priorities and needs of interest organizations on execution level; 
 
5. Execution of HMA programs supported by the Netherlands: 
a. Formulation of the objectives; 
b. Fulfillment in national and regional needs and priorities; 
c. Attention and criteria for national capacity building for transfer of HMA tasks; 
d. Obstacles for execution of the program; 
e. Monitoring of the progress of the program; 
f. Goal-attainment; 
g. Progress in solving the mine problem (effectiveness); 
h. Short term effects; 
i. Long term effects (sustainability). 
 
The used criteria are the OECD-DAC criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, 
coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact.  
4.4.2 Methods of inquiry 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
In the research design, it was assumed that there would be enough numerical information to 
undertake a quantitative data analysis for the evaluative part of this research. Unfortunately 
necessary data was lacking in the available information, and a MCA could not be done. Therefore 
the only option was to do a more qualitative, descriptive and explanative analysis, mainly based on 
work plans, policy memorandum and progress/final reports (see also §4.2.1).  
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5 Programs Funded by the Netherlands 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the sub questions 1-3 will be answered. This means that the programs, funds, 
countries, and involved organizations (NGOs and I(G)Os) of the financed HMA programs will be 
discussed.  
 
1. Which HMA programs were funded by the Netherlands (descriptive)?  
2. What was the funding compared to other donors (descriptive)? 
3. What was the available data for evaluation of HMA programs that are (partially) funded by the 
Netherlands (descriptive)? 
5.2 Funds 
 
Table 2-3 gave a brief oversight on how much the Netherlands funded on HMA for 1992 onwards 
2005, and a planned budget for 2006. In this paragraph more detailed information will be given. 
 
Table 5-1 shows the financial support by the Netherlands according to the information on the 
UNMAS Mine Action Investments website. All the countries that were financed are shown, as was 
other funding (see also Appendix 4): multilateral funding of the ICBL for monitoring and compliance, 
ICRC for victim assistance and UNMAS VTF, funding to HALO Trust for training of Mine Detection 
Dogs (MDD), and the program “Humanitair OntMijnen” for research and development of mechanical 
de-mining (funds went mainly to the Dutch TNO research institute). 
 
Table 5-1: Financial support on HMA by the Netherlands 
Country-related Total 1996-2004 (US$) Ranking Years of funding 
Afghanistan 16.437.779 2 9 
Albania 177.165 20 1 
Angola 19.916.200 1 9 
Azerbaijan 2.240.910 10 4 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.528.745 6 7 
Cambodia 13.901.174 3 9 
Congo 252.000 19 1 
Eritrea 9.797.512 4 5 
Ethiopia 1.000.000 14 1 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 4.331.779 8 4 
Georgia 1.436.564 13 5 
Guinea-Bissau 1.000.000 14 2 
Iraq 4.565.924 7 5 
Laos 2.421.000 9 6 
Mozambique 9.261.404 5 8 
Russian Federation 272.030 18 1 
Sudan 400.050 17 1 
Somalia 1.848.925 11 5 
Sri Lanka 465.987 16 1 
Yemen 1.578.000 12 5 
Sub-total 98.527.638   
Other 21.901.208 n/a n/a 
Total 120.428.846   
See Appendix 4 for a complete overview. 
 
It is clear that Afghanistan (13,7% of the total funds for 1996-2004), Angola (16,6%), Cambodia 
(11,6%), Eritrea (8,2%), and Mozambique (7,7%) were receiving the largest sums.  
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Table 5-2 shows the funding per HMA category. Integrated Mine Action (33,6%) and Mine Clearance 
(32,9%) represent the main share of the funds. 
 
Table 5-2: Funding by the Netherlands per HMA category in US$ 
Category Total 1996-2003* (US$) 
Advocacy & Prevention 1.090.440 
Coordination 10.347.198 
Information 2.297.000 
Integrated Mine Action 37.508.235 
Mine Awareness 6.183.972 
Mine Clearance 36.691.612 
Research & Development 10.000.000 
Victim Assistance 7.391.862 
Total: 111.512.319 
* Data for the year 2004 is not available 
See Appendix 4 for a complete overview. 
 
Some findings are in line with the Dutch priorities (see §2.5.2 and 2.5.3 for details about the 
priorities): 
− Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, and Mozambique are said to be the most contaminated 
countries in the world. It is reasonable that the need in this countries was higher than in others, 
and high cost-effectiveness will be easier achievable; 
− Mine clearance was the most important priority, and a major share of the funds were used for 
that (categories Integrated Mine Action and Mine Clearance in Table 5-2); 
− Capacity building was emphasized (categories Integrated Mine Action and Coordination in Table 
5-2). 
 
Some findings that are not in line with the Dutch priorities are: 
− Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Laos and Somalia did not sign or ratify the Ottawa Treaty yet, nor did 
Azerbaijan, Iraq and Somalia ratify the original or amended Protocol II of the CCW (ICBL 2006b).  
For Iraq (since 2002) and Somalia a strong central government was lacking. The humanitarian 
situation in Laos and human rights considerations made that Laos is nevertheless funded. Also 
Laos suffered from ERW and not landmines, what the Ottawa Treaty is about. For Azerbaijan 
and Georgia reasons for funding despite not having signed the Ottawa Treaty or the CCW 
Protocol II are unknown (MvBZ 2001b; MvBZ 2005);  
− With Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kosovo, Laos, Somalia, 
Sudan and Yemen, the Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation (according to the new policy 
starting from 2003). So this does not mean embeddedness of the donor‘s policy. Reasons for 
funding were probably that HMA activities support human rights, peace building, and/or good 
governance (MvBZ 2006h, p.47; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, nr.1, p.32). 
 
It is interesting to see if the funding pattern of recipient countries by the Netherlands is similar to 
that of other donors. Figure 5-2 shows that Dutch HMA funds to a specific recipient country differed 
strongly per year Angola was the largest receiver of HMA funds until 1999, but faced a huge decline. 
The funds for Eritrea changed largely every year, and no country received a stable amount of money 
during a couple of years. For the total funds for all donors together (Figure 5-2), there was a bit 
more stability. Afghanistan receives a growing amount of money almost every year. Other recipient 
countries are showing some fluctuation every year. For more data, see also Appendix 6. 
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Figure 5-1: Funds per recipient country for the Netherlands  
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Figure 5-2: Funds per recipient country for all donors together 
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5.3 Countries 
 
Countries where the Netherlands (co-)funded HMA programs are Afghanistan Albania, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iraq, Kosovo (Serbia/FRY), Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. Every country 
has its history concerning (civil) wars, rebels, and landmines and explosives. There are too many 
countries to analyze for this specific research project, therefore a selection is made. The countries 
that will be used in this research are chosen by the following criteria (see also Table 5-1): 
1. The extent of Dutch funding in a specific country; 
2. The duration of the funding; 
3. Interesting landmine and/or ERW related features of a specific country. 
 
The most appropriate countries regarding 1. and 2. are Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and 
Mozambique. In combination with 3., Bosnia and Herzegovina (in Europe, detailed mapping during 
the war, and direct start of HMA after the war by entity armies), Eritrea (high amount of money in a 
few years, and a sudden withdrawal of foreign organization, forced by the government), and Laos 
(mainly, and a lot of, ERW) will also be chosen.  
 
 
Figure 5-3: Selected countries for further analysis 
 
The countries will be presented in the following subparagraphs. For every country the mine-related 
history, some basic key information, the key points from the HMA plans, and the programs funded 
by the Netherlands are given. 
5.3.1 Afghanistan 
 
Basic information 
 
The population of Afghanistan is growing rapidly, not only because of returning internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). This will give pressure on the scarcely available fertile soil; therefore de-mining of 
agricultural area gives some relief. The economic growth is quite high. Appendix 5 shows some key 
basic indicators about Afghanistan. 
 
Mine/ERW-related history 
 
Afghanistan is one of the heaviest contaminated countries in the world, with both landmines and 
ERW. Afghanistan has been involved in several armed conflicts since 1978. In those conflicts all sides 
have been using APMs. Most notorious were the Soviet forces and the Afghan government (of the 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) from 1979-1992. Later in the 1990s in the fighting 
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between the Taliban and a loose coalition of opposition forces, landmines were also used, although 
the Taliban saw the use of landmines as un-Islamic. In 2001 Afghanistan was attacked by the U.S.-
led coalition. Unexploded U.S. cluster bomblets (UXOs), ammunition scattered from storage depots 
hit by air strikes (AXO), and newly laid landmines and booby-traps by Northern Alliance, Taliban, 
and Al-Qaeda fighters, posed a new threat to the population. The coalition forces documented their 
cluster bomb air raids (ICBL 1999, p.18: Afghanistan; ICBL 2002: Afghanistan; ICBL 2005a: 
Afghanistan; Strand 2004). 
 
The size of the landmine problem 
 
Landmines were planted everywhere and on various types or area, urban and rural, and form a 
major obstacle to repatriation, relief, rehabilitation, and development activities. In eight years of 
intensive mine clearance in the 1990s, 146 km2 (about the 2/3 of the municipality of Amsterdam) of 
mined area was cleared, but at least 713 km2 (about halve of the province of Utrecht) remained to 
be cleared. Estimations say that landmines and UXO cause about 100 victims per month (both 
counting for about 50%), where 150-300 was common in 2000. Casualties have been reported in 33 
of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan (ICBL 1999: Afghanistan; ICBL 2002: Afghanistan; ICBL 2003: 
Afghanistan; Strand 2004, p.19). 
 
HMA programs 
 
The core issue for Afghanistan was peace-building and reintegration (Strand 2004, p.4-7, 9): 
− The basic idea of the Afghan Mine Action for Peace (MAFP) Programme was to incorporate ex-
fighters for training and employment as community-based de-miners (Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)). They did not receive a full payment, but it gave them 
a chance for reintegration into their home community with dignity. The Area Mine Action Centre 
(AMAC) and Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META) were involved in a pilot. 
Important were local support, and after the demining is done the ex-fighters need job security; 
− The Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) was a community-based process, and focused on 
communal conflicts. Local councils, local authorities and other influential persons were 
involved, in order to build local capacity and develop own strategies in dealing with conflicts in 
their areas and mobilizing people for peace-building. The local community had to recognize the 
value and have to become self-supporting; 
− Landmines and weapons were seen as a major threat on lasting peace. 
 
Afghanistan had to reduce its stockpile before March 1 2007, due to the ratification of the Ottawa 
Convention. There was no national HMA authority yet, UNMAS’s MAPA and UNMACA are still 
responsible for issues involving HMA (ICBL 2005a: Afghanistan). 
 
Funded programs 
 
The Netherlands was a medium contributor for the period 1996-2004 to HMA in Afghanistan, 
counting for 5,5% of the total funds (see Table 5-3). The total ODA (official development aid) 
provided by Netherlands for the period 2000-2004 is US$ 338,08 million, in the same period the 
funds for HMA was US$ 10,34 million, thus counting for about 3%. The Netherlands was funding 
humanitarian aid, poverty alleviation, and reconstruction and development projects, were HMA was 
an important supporting issue. All donors together provided Afghanistan with US$ 5,5 billion for the 
period 2001-2004 (official development assistance and official aid), of which US$ 163,5 million for 
HMA, also about 3% (MvBZ 2006a; OECD 2006). 
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Table 5-3: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Afghanistan  
Country Total 1996-2004 (US$) Share Ranking 
Canada 35.575.906 12,0% 3 
Denmark 8.915.157 3,0% 9 
European Union 21.701.514 7,3% 5 
Finland 8.695.000 2,9% 10 
Germany 29.940.111 10,1% 4 
Japan 68.433.202 23,1% 2 
Netherlands 16.437.779 5,5% 6 
Norway 12.582.435 4,2% 7 
United Kingdom 11.300.939 3,8% 8 
United States 69.809.000 23,6% 1 
Total (all countries) 296.204.870   
See Appendix 6 for details. 
 
Programs funded by the Netherlands were focused on mine and ERW clearance (manual and 
mechanical), mine clearance training, mine awareness, mine identification, mine survey, mine 
marking, evaluation, monitoring, and logistics (see Appendix 7 for details). The programs had taken 
place in nearly all provinces. Funds were channelled mainly via (UN)OCHA/UNMAS (UNMAS took over 
the responsibilities concerning HMA of OCHA in 2003), but also to ICRC and HALO Trust. HMA had 
been carried out by the MACA (OCHA/UNMAC), ICRC, and HALO Trust.  
 
The UN produced annual appeals for the coordination of aid and assistance for Afghanistan. The 
Netherlands was in favour of multilateral funding above bilateral funding (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, 
p.7-8), and the fact that the UN founded and were still responsible for MACA and MAPA, made the 
channelling of funds via UNOCHA/UNMAS a logical choice. The Netherlands was often funding 
several humanitarian programs from the appeals together. The reason to fund programs in 
Afghanistan was the fact that the country hugely suffered for decades from various armed conflicts, 
which caused a harrowing humanitarian situated. The communication and coordination for the MFA 
was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for 
advice, control and support (MvBZ 1999a). 
5.3.2 Angola 
 
Basic information 
 
The population of Angola is growing rapidly, despite the high number of IDPs, and the economic 
growth is quite high. The economic growth is varying, from 3 to 19% annually. Appendix 5 shows 
some key basic indicators about Angola. 
 
Mine-related history 
 
Angola officially gained independence from Portugal in 1975. The civil war started already in 1974, 
official ending in 2002 (despite the earlier 1994 Lusaka Protocols), with some cease-fire periods in 
between. It has been one of the real battle field directly related with the Cold War between the 
communists and western world. Three groups along racial and ideological lines were involved in the 
civil war: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA; links with communists), the 
National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA; anti-communist and supported by Zaire/Mobutu and the 
U.S. playing a minor role), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA; 
supported by apartheid South Africa and the U.S.). Before the independence, the FNLA, UNITA and 
MPLA fought against the Portuguese in a colonial war. Cuban, South-Africa and U.S. intervened in 
the conflict in different periods (Meredith 2006, p.312-319; MvBZ 2006b). 
 
The size of the landmine problem 
 
Angola had a total of 4,28 million IDPs in 2002, what is more than one quarter of the total 
population. Many of them live in the DR Congo and Zambia, and suffered under bad and inhuman 
conditions. It was difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach the IDPs, and they were not top 
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priority for the authorities. Of all mine accidents, in 75% of the cases IDPs were involved when 
entering unfamiliar areas (HRW 2003, p.1-2; ICBL 1999: Angola; ICBL 2002: Angola). 
 
HMA programs 
 
In 2001 the Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) was setup 
by the government for the regulation and coordination of HMA, as a successor of the National 
Institute for Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROEE), which was reformed and reorganized into the 
National Demining Institute (IND) for implementation of HMA. The CNIDAH set three strategic 
priorities (ICBL 2005a: Angola): 
1. To consolidate CNIDAH as national authority and strengthening coordination with provincial 
authorities and decentralizing HMA; 
2. To develop capabilities of relevant institutions; 
3. To support sustainable expansion of operational capacity. 
 
Funded programs 
 
The Netherlands was the second large contributor to HMA programs in Angola (see Table 5-4), only 
the U.S. funded more. The Netherlands provided US$ 100,44 million of ODA for the period 2000-
2004, where US$ 5,84 million was spent on HMA, about 6%. Emergency and humanitarian aid, human 
rights and good governance were the other financed issues, where HMA was an important factor. 
The official development assistance and official aid for Angola of all donors together was about US$ 
2,35 billion for the period 2001-2004, with US$ 40,9 million or less than 2% for HMA. An explanation 
for the relatively very large contribution to HMA by the Netherlands could be the long civil war with 
the use of many landmines which brought a huge humanitarian problem, and the HMA-activities that 
made the provision of humanitarian aid easier. The communication and coordination for the MFA 
was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for 
advice, control and support (MvBZ 1999b; MvBZ 2001a; MvBZ 2006b; OECD 2006). 
 
Table 5-4: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Angola 
Countries Total 1996-2004 (US$) Share Ranking 
Canada 2.474.931 1,9% 10 
Denmark 3.484.868 2,7% 9 
European Union 13.085.118 10,2% 5 
Finland 6.615.728 5,2% 7 
Germany 17.114.792 13,3% 3 
Italy 8.179.591 6,4% 6 
Japan 4.604.855 3,6% 8 
Netherlands 19.916.200 15,9% 2 
Norway 16.704.386 13,0% 4 
United States 25.313.038 19,7% 1 
Total (all countries) 128.356.578   
See Appendix 6 for details. 
 
The programs focused on mine clearance in order to make the return of IDPs and the recovery of 
rural infrastructure possible, mine clearance training, mine survey, victim assistance and social 
rehabilitation (see Appendix 7 for details). Nearly all provinces are somehow affected by the 
programs. The funds are provided mainly to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Menschen gegen 
Minen (MgM), who were also the executers of most programs. Especially NPA turned out to be a 
reliable partner, with a very good record. Others are Handicap International (HI), UNICEF, and the 
UN World Food Programme (WFP). The Angolan government was seen as too weak for properly 
undertaking HMA activities, therefore only INGOs were funded (MvBZ 2001a). 
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5.3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Key basic information 
 
The institutional framework of the country itself was still under development. The HDI and GDP per 
capita were much higher and the growth of the population much lower than in the other selected 
countries. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Mine-related history 
 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) collapse after the end of the Cold War, into the 
countries Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Macedonia, and recently 
Montenegro. This collapse was not without rumours, euphemistically speaking, especially in the case 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country declared independence in March 1992, followed by a war, 
officially lasting until December 1995. The facts about the war were nearly 3 million IDPs, over 
250.000 people died or missing, and 170.000 wounded (with a population of 3,9 million in 2005!). 
The country became contaminated with landmines and UXO, and has a destroyed social 
infrastructure. Three armies were involved, the Bosnian Government Army (ARBiH), the Bosnian 
Croat Army (HVO), and the Bosnian Serb army (VRS). Landmine skills were widely available, due to 
the universally attended military service in the former army of the SFRY, who heavily relied on 
landmines (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 
There was a Bosnia and Herzegovina government for the whole country, there were two (ethnic) 
entities formed, the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina (FBiH; Bosnians and Croats), and the 
Republika Srpska (RS). The Brčko District (BD) is jointly controlled. A NATO army, the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) arrived in 1996, who was responsible for training and supervising the demining teams 
for each entity army. Over 4% of the country and over 1.400 settlements were affected by 
landmines (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; IMF 2004a, p.251). 
 
Figure 5-4: Map with landmine contamination in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Source (The World Bank Group) 
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The size of the landmine problem 
 
Landmines and UXO still claim casualties (43 in 2004), both fatal and non-fatal, and numbers are 
slowly declining. Some of the victims were de-miners (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; ICBL 
2005a: Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 
HMA programs 
 
The responsibility for HMA went from the UN to the three governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 
July 1, 1998. Since then three MACs were operating, two entity MACs (FEDMAC, RSMAC), and the 
coordinating BHMAC, but were not un-problematically merged in one MAC later. In 2002 the 
Demining Commission was established for state-level responsibility and coordination, as an 
international representative and oversight for the BHMAC. The long-term national capacity-building 
Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) was initiated in 2004, funded by Canada, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. The new Mine Action Strategy for 2005-2009 (and the 2004 PRSP) 
emphasizes the link with overall national development, although this interferes with obligations 
from the Ottawa Treaty, e.g. the deadline of March 1, 2009 for destructing all APMs. Surveys were 
planned to reduce suspected hazardous areas. More than 40 organizations were involved with HMA 
activities (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; ICBL 2005a: Bosnia and Herzegovina; IMF 2004a, 
p.251; Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.865). 
 
Funded programs 
 
The Netherlands was a medium contributor to the Bosnian HMA programs with 4,6% of the total for 
1996-2004 (see Table 5-5). The Dutch ODA budget information was only available for 2003-2004, 
when it was about € 33 million, and in which period HMA counted for US$ 499.500, so less than 2%. 
Other funds went to macro-economic support, support for the return of IDPs, and peace 
implementation. Especially the latter two subjects benefited from HMA. For the period 2001-2004 
the amount of official development assistance and official aid for all donors in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was US$ 2,14 billion, with US$ 37,6 million for HMA which is also less than 2% (MvBZ 
2006c; OECD 2006). 
 
Table 5-5: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Country Total 1996-2004 (US$) Share Ranking 
Canada 12.925.180 9,1% 4 
European Union 29.137.218 20,5% 2 
Finland 3.166.242 2,2% 9 
Germany 10.268.620 7,2% 5 
Italy 6.873.614 4,8% 7 
Japan 7.694.665 5,4% 6 
Netherlands 6.528.745 4,6% 8 
Norway 19.696.074 13,9% 3 
Slovenia 2.748.866 1,9% 10 
United States 35.673.000 25,1% 1 
Total (all countries) 141.996.122   
See Appendix 6 for details. 
 
The focus of the programs was on mine/UXO clearance, mine clearance training, mine awareness, 
mine information, mine survey and marking, and institution building. Funds were mostly contributed 
to BHMAC activities, via UN’s DHA and UNDP. There was also a contribution to NPA (see Appendix 7 
for details). The Netherlands Ministry of Defence provided in-kind support at least from October 
2002 to June 2004. 
 
The UN produced annual appeals for the coordination of aid and assistance for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Netherlands was in favour of multilateral above bilateral funding, and the fact 
that the UN founded the MACs, made the channelling of funds via UNDP a logic choice. The 
Netherlands was often funding several humanitarian programs from the appeals together. The 
reason to fund programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the fact that the country hugely suffered of 
the war of 1991-1995, which caused a harrowing humanitarian situated with many IDPs and 
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refugees. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the 
humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 
1999e). 
5.3.4 Cambodia 
 
Basic information 
 
Cambodia has a low growth of population, compared to Angola, Eritrea, and Laos. Appendix 5 shows 
some key basic indicators about Cambodia. 
 
Mine-related history 
 
Cambodia gained independence from France in 1954. In 1970 a coup d’état was committed, 
followed by a civil war. In 1975 Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge came into power, with a horrible reign 
causing the death of many people. In 1978, Vietnam attacked Cambodia and put a communist 
government in place. A coalition of Khmer Rouge, the National United Front for an Independent. 
Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and others resisted in a guerrilla war. In 
1991 the ‘Paris Peace Accords’ were signed. In 1997 there was another coup d’état. Landmines were 
laid by all factions. Cambodia also suffered from bombings during the Vietnam War (CMAC 2004, 
p.1; ICBL 1999: Cambodia; MvBZ 2006d). 
 
The size of the landmine problem 
 
About 4.446 km2 (slightly smaller than the province of North-Brabant) was suspected to be 
contaminated with landmines or UXO, counting for 2,5% of the country. The provinces of 
Battambang, Banteay Manchey, Otdar Meanchey and Preah Vihear, and the municipality of Pailin, 
were among the most heavily contaminated areas, counting for 61% of the  4.446 km2. It was 
estimated that Cambodia had 4-6 million pieces of landmines and over 1 million pieces of UXO. 
Landmines and UXO still claim many victims. The rate dropped from 12 casualties per day in 1996 to 
two to three per day since 2000. Casualties were related to daily livelihood activities such as 
farming, herding, clearing new land, fishing, collecting food and wood (54%), or travelling (26%). 
Mine clearance activities also claimed victims (CMAC 2004, p.1; ICBL 2005a: Cambodia; Kingdom of 
Cambodia 2002, p.122). 
 
Figure 5-5: Potential UXO Contamination in Cambodia 
 
Source (JMAS 2005) 
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HMA programs 
 
In 1992 the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established by the Royal Government of 
Cambodia as a successor of the HMA activities of the United Nations Transitional Authority of 
Cambodia (UNTAC). A joint program of CMAC, UNDP, and UNDHA was launched in 1993. The 
coordination and regulation of HMA was transferred from CMAC to Cambodian Mine Action Victim 
Assistance Authority (CMAA) in 2000. The CMAA was also responsible for integration of HMA into 
development plans and strategies. The CMAA was however not appreciated by the donors, due to its 
weakness and ineffectiveness. In 2004 Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU; under auspices of the 
Provincial MACs) were created in order to prioritize HMA at local level and integrate HMA with 
development priorities. MAPUs were funded by UNDP and UNOPS. The Cambodian HMA standards 
were finished by CMAA in 2004 (CMAC 1996a, p.1; ICBL 2005a: Cambodia). 
 
Funded programs 
 
With the Dutch contribution to HMA in Cambodia it was the third largest contributor, after Japan 
and the U.S. (see Table 5-6). The total ODA provided by the Netherlands to Cambodia was US$ 40,71 
million for the period  2000-2004, when HMA was US$ 2,50 million or about 6%. Cambodia was on 
the Dutch funding list for democratization, good governance, and human rights, where the removal 
of landmines plays an important role. For all donors world wide, the total provided sum was US$ 
1,89 billion for the period 2001-2004 and HMA counted for US$ 65,8 million or about 3%. Reasons for 
this relatively high contribution for HMA by the Netherlands can be the very severe threat that 
landmines cause for the development of Cambodia and the IDPs. The communication and 
coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the 
embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1996; MvBZ 2004c; OECD 2006). 
 
Table 5-6: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Cambodia 
Country Total 1996-2004 (US$) Share Ranking 
Australia 8.571.000 5,6% 7 
Canada 9.945.627 6,5% 5 
European Union 9.457.000 6,2% 6 
Finland 12.092.428 7,9% 4 
Germany 7.559.287 4,9% 8 
Japan 51.926.840 33,8% 1 
Netherlands 13.901.174 9,1% 3 
Norway 5.988.793 3,9% 9 
United Kingdom 5.409.076 3,5% 10 
United States 18.241.500 11,9% 2 
Total (all countries) 153.550.561   
See Appendix 6 for details. 
 
The main focus of the programs was mine and ERW clearance, besides mine awareness (see 
Appendix 7 for details). Funds were provided to CMAC, first via UNDP and later via NPA, due to 
problems at CMAC and problems with the supervision of the UNDP. NPA and HALO Trust also 
undertook activities themselves. Activities took place in a.o. Kampong Cham (3), Kratié (11), Svay 
Reang (23), Prey Veng (19), Banteay Meanchey (1), Battambang (2), Kampot (7) and Kampong Thom 
(6) by CMAC, Oddar Meanchey (13), Banteay Meanchey (1) and Siem Reap (21) provinces by HALO 
Trust, and the Banteay Meanchey (1) province by NPA (see Figure 5-6). The Netherlands Ministry of 
Defence provided in-kind support from November 1993 until at least the beginning of 1998. 
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Source: (Wikipedia 2006a) 
Figure 5-6: Map with the provinces of Cambodia 
5.3.5 Eritrea 
 
Basic information 
 
The economic growth is the lowest of all countries discussed in this chapter. The HDI is among the 
lowest of the world. The growth of the population is quite high. The economic growth is low, 3% or 
less. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Eritrea. 
 
Mine-related history 
 
Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after thirty years of war, led by the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), in which landmines were used by both sides. There was a war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, where both sides used landmines again, at 
least Eritrea confessed (ICBL 1999: Eritrea; ICBL 2000: Eritrea). 
 
The size of the landmine problem 
 
There were many IDPs that used to live in the area that is now the TCZ5, which was contaminated 
with landmines. The number of casualties was between 30 and 90 per year (ICBL 2004: Eritrea; ICBL 
2005a: Eritrea). 
 
HMA programs 
 
In 2000 the UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre was established, which supported the Eritrean 
Mine Action Plan (EMAP). The EMAP was one-sided, and without discussion with donors and UNMEE, 
replaced by the Eritrean government with the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) in 2002. The 
international HMA activities in Eritrea were two times taken to a halt by the Eritrean government 
and restructured, in July 2002 and in April 2005. After the first time the UN continued operating in 
2004, but the second time Eritrea indicated that the help of the UN was not needed anymore. 
Equipment was confiscated, and almost all foreign technical advisors were forced by the EDA to 
leave the country. An evaluation of the HMA in Eritrea was undertaken. Problems were encountered 
with mandates, and peace-keeping in combination with the development of HMA capacity seemed 
                                                 
5 UN Temporary Security Zone, 25 km wide and 1000 km long, between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
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not always appreciated by the Eritrean government (GICHD 2005, p.vi, 69-73; ICBL 2003: Eritrea; 
ICBL 2004: Eritrea). 
 
Funded programs 
 
The Netherlands has been the large contributor to HMA in Eritrea in the period 1996-2004, counting 
for over two-fifth of the total funds (see Table 5-7). The other large contributor was U.S., this 
contribution was halve of that of the Netherlands. Eritrea received US$ 61,08 million from the 
Netherlands in the period 2000-2004, where HMA counted for US$ 9,75 million, which counted for 
about 16%. The Netherlands supported humanitarian aid and peace-building via unilateral channels 
and NGOs. Both subjects took advantages of HMA. Official development assistance and official aid 
for all donors provided to Eritrea was US$ 1,09 billion in the period 2001-2004, HMA for the same 
period was US$ 17,0 million or only about 1,6%. The Netherlands sent troops to Eritrea in 2000 
under the UNMEE peace-keeping mission. UNMEE set up the MACC. The Netherlands had a wish for a 
more flanking policy to help the refugees and IDPs of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The 
presence of landmines was seen as a major threat for their save return, therefore HMA was seen as 
an important factor. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The 
Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and 
support (MvBZ 2000c; MvBZ 2006e; OECD 2006). 
 
Table 5-7: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Eritrea  
Country Total 1996-2004 (US$) Share Ranking 
Canada 1.607.692 6,8% 4 
Denmark 2.199.000 9,3% 3 
European Union 1.551.228 6,5% 5 
Germany 1.112.826 4,7% 7 
Italy 114.610 0,5% 10 
Japan 563.385 2,4% 8 
Netherlands 9.747.512 41,2% 1 
Norway 333.333 1,4% 9 
Switzerland 1.175.500 5,0% 6 
United States 5.182.000 21,9% 2 
Total (all countries) 23.686.086   
See Appendix 6 for details. 
 
Mine clearance, mine awareness, capacity building and evaluation were the undertaken activities of 
the programs that were funded (see Appendix 7 for details). Funds were provided to HALO Trust, 
UNDP, and UNMAS/GICHD for the evaluation. The HALO Trust was the largest NGO working on HMA 
in Eritrea. The activities took place in the TSZ and adjacent areas in Eritrea. The communication 
and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where 
the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (ICBL 2004: Eritrea; MvBZ 2000a). 
5.3.6 Laos 
 
Basic information 
 
Laos has a one-party rule as one of the last five communist countries in the world. The UXO 
contamination and rapid growth of the population and economy give pressure on the available land, 
blocking development and causing poverty. In Appendix 5 there are some key basic indicators on 
Laos (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.31). 
 
Mine-related history 
 
Laos gained independence in 1954. A coup d’état was committed by the army in 1959. The 
communists (Pathet Lao) started a guerrilla. Laos also suffered from the Vietnam or Indo-Chino War 
from 1964 until 1973, with heavy bombings by the U.S. on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The communist 
party (renamed in Lao People’s Revolutionary Party) came into power in 1975 and founded the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic (MvBZ 2006f). 
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The Americans dropped a large amount of bombs. Two million tons of bombs were dropt in 580.344 
bombing missions, which are more bombs than has been dropped on Germany, Italy and Japan 
together in WW II. This was the equivalent of a full B52 (31,5 tons), every 8 minutes for 9 years. It 
was estimated by experts that an average of 30% of the bombs failed, and became UXO. Bombs 
were dropt on infrastructure such as roads, rivers and paths, and as economic repercussion on 
valuable areas for farming or settlement. A part of the bombs were not directly meant for Laos, but 
were dropped on Laos as remainder after bombing in Vietnam, before returning to airbases in 
Thailand. The U.S. still keep the details of some bombs secret. (Lovering 2000; UXO Lao 2003a: 
sheet 3 & 4) 
 
The size of the UXO problem 
 
Landmines only count for 4% of the problem. In the most heavily bombed provinces three tons of 
bombs per capita were thrown. The most used bomb was the anti-personnel cluster bomb, which 
detonates sending high-velocity fragments. The UXO casualty numbers were as follows: over 200 
victims per year, some figures claim that 45% of the victims are children (mistaking the bombies6 for 
toys), other figures claim that 61% of the victims are men, 23% is boys, 12% is women, and 3% is 
girls. Of the accidents 52% is deadly. An area of 87.213 km2 (12.427 km2 high risk, 74.786 km2 
moderate risk) was contaminated by UXO, what is about 38% of the country and more than two 
times the Netherlands (Government of Lao PDR 1995; HI 1997; Lovering 2000).  
 
Figure 5-7: UXO contamination in Laos 
 
Source: (Sisavath 2006) 
 
HMA programs 
 
In 2001 all HMA activities were nationalized. The primary responsibility for mine and UXO clearance 
laid with the national Lao Uxo program (UXO Lao). Until 2004 UXO Lao was also responsible for the 
coordination of all mine/UXO action, but that was transferred to the newly established National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA). There have been some troubles with the NRA in the beginning. The goal 
was to bring mine/UXO action in line with the National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy 
(NGPES). In the National Strategic Plan of 2003-2013 objectives and priorities were set for the 
coming years (ICBL 2005a: Laos). 
 
Funded programs 
 
The Netherlands was one of the medium contributors with a share of 5,8% of the total funds 
provided in the period 1996-2004 (see  
                                                 
6 Bombies is the word that the Lao use for the unexploded fragments of the cluster bombs 
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Table 5-8). Programs focused on UXO clearance, UXO awareness, and training and capacity building 
(see Appendix 7 for details). The funds were channelled through the UNDP towards UXO Lao, which 
was the only real option of funding HMA in Laos.  
 
Table 5-8: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Laos 
Country Total 1996-2004 (US$) Share Ranking 
Australia 2.528.000 6,0% 6 
Belgium 2.566.074 6,1% 5 
Canada 1.418.565 3,4% 9 
European Union 6.316.000 15,0% 3 
Finland 1.607.250 3,8% 8 
Germany 7.008.124 16,7% 2 
Japan 958.730 2,3% 10 
Netherlands 2.421.000 5,8% 7 
Norway 2.731.770 6,5% 4 
United States 12.321.000 29,3% 1 
Total (all countries) 42.048.879   
See Appendix 6 for details. 
 
For Laos the Netherlands provided US$ 9,96 million of ODA in the period 2000-2004, and US$ 1,85 
million of HMA funds, which is about 19%. Funds were also used for sustainable forest management 
and human rights programs. The total official development assistance and official aid for Laos for 
the period 2001-2004 was US$ 1,09 billion, and total HMA funds were US$ 10,77 million for the same 
period, which is about only about 1%. The Dutch funding of HMA is not high compared to other 
donors, but the total ODA for Laos is low compared to other donors. The communication and 
coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the 
embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 2004b; MvBZ 2006f; OECD 2006).  
 
Activities took mainly place in the provinces of Luang Prabang (8), Xieng Khouang (18), Houaphan 
(5), Khammouane (6), Savannakhet (12), Sekong (17), Attapeu (1), and Champassak (4) (see also 
Figure 5-8). 
 
 
Source: (Wikipedia 2006c) 
Figure 5-8: Map with the provinces of the Laos where HMA programs were undertaken 
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5.3.7 Mozambique 
 
Basic information 
 
Mozambique has a low growth of population in relation with the HDI, if compared to Angola, Eritrea, 
and Laos. The HDI is the lowest of the selected countries, and among the lowest of the world. The 
economic growth is high, 7-10%. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Mozambique. 
 
Mine-related history 
 
A guerrilla war was started in 1964 by Frelimo, who used ATMs. The Portuguese decided in 1974 to 
hand over power exclusively to Frelimo. Before the independence in 1975, a white exodus removed 
Mozambique of its existing civil machinery. Frelimo had a Marxist-Leninist ideology causing wide-
spread resistance, which was fuelled by Renamo. Renamo was backed first by Rhodesia and later by 
South Africa, and used landmines on airstrips, for route denial and ambushes. Rhodesia and South 
African forces laid landmines in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as did Tanzanian, Malawian, and 
Zimbabwean forces on moments. The Frelimo government defensively used landmines along the 
borders with Rhodesia and South Africa. Mozambique has been an important place for the South 
African ANC for a long time. A rapprochement to South Africa was made by Mozambique in 1984. 
Despite the halted support to ANC by Mozambique, South Africa kept on secretly supporting 
Renamo. More than 1 million of people died and 5 million became IDPs in the civil war (where the 
total population was estimated to be 19,6 million in 2005) which ended in 1992 (ICBL 1999: 
Mozambique; Meredith 2006, p.311-312, 426-428, 609-610). 
 
The size of the landmine problem 
 
It was estimated that landmines claimed 50-60 victims per month in 1995. Rates dropped enormous 
to 30 casualties for 2004. People enter unfamiliar area because of the need for enlarging farming 
land and resettlement (ICBL 1999; ICBL 2005a). 
 
HMA programs 
 
In 1999 the Mozambican MFA set up the National Demining Institute (IND), to replace the low 
trusted National Mine Clearance Commission (CND). NGOs and commercial companies were the 
executers of the HMA. The target for a mine impact-free country was changed from 2012 to 2009. 
After a lobby by the IND and UNDP, HMA became a cross cutting issue in the final version of the 
2005 PRSP. Technical survey clearance of high and medium impact areas, and civic education and 
support for victim assistance programs became the priorities for the IND in 2005 (ICBL 2005a: 
Mozambique; IND 2001). 
 
Funded programs 
 
The Netherlands was the third largest contributor with 11,7% for the period 1996-2004, just after 
the U.S. and Norway (Table 5-9). The Netherlands funded US$ 302,18 million of ODA for the period 
2000-2004, and US$ 5,48 million of HMA, counting for about 2%. Other funds were used for programs 
on education, health, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and poverty alleviation. Especially poverty 
alleviation can take advantages of HMA. The total official development assistance and official aid 
for Mozambique for the period 2001-2004 was US$ 5,40 billion, where HMA counted for US$ 25,36 
million or less than 1%. Mozambique was one of the 36 partner countries of the Netherlands, 
therefore Mozambique receives a large amount of funding (MvBZ 2006g; OECD 2006). 
 
Mine clearance (manual, mechanical, and MDD) and capacity building were the core businesses of 
the funded programs (see Appendix 7 for details). The funds are mainly received by the HALO Trust 
and NPA, who were also the executors, and one mine survey program of Handicap International (HI). 
The HALO Trust was seen as an NGO with much experience in Mozambique, and their presence in  
the Nampula province was beneficial for other humanitarian programs funded by the Netherlands. 
NPA was seen as very well organized and professional. The communication and coordination for the 
MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked 
for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1997b; MvBZ 2000b). 
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Table 5-9: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Mozambique 
Country Total 1996-2004 (US$) Share Ranking 
Australia 3.492.000 4,3% 10 
Canada 8.257.114 10,2% 4 
Denmark 4.053.475 5,0% 9 
Finland 6.852.300 8,4% 6 
Germany 6.944.968 8,6% 5 
Japan 4.149.153 5,1% 8 
Netherlands 9.456.394 11,7% 3 
Norway 10.718.670 13,2% 2 
Switzerland 4.749.000 5,9% 7 
United States 12.101.999 14,9% 1 
Total (all countries) 81.110.582   
See Appendix 6 for details. 
 
Affected provinces by HMA are Zambezia (11), Niassa (8), Nampula (7) and Cabo Delgado (1) by 
HALO Trust, and Tete (10), Manica (4) and Sofala (9) by NPA (see Figure 5-9). In the southern 
provinces no HMA activities were undertaken by the programs financed by the Netherlands. 
 
 
Source: (Wikipedia 2006b) 
Figure 5-9: Map with the provinces of Mozambique with HMA programs 
5.4 Funding Channels 
 
According to the Dutch Policy Framework for HMA, the following organizations are seen as reliable 
partners: the various UN Mine Action Centres, the HALO Trust, Handicap International (HI), the 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA). Organizations that were funded 
were all non-commercial, and not involved with illegal trade of anti-personnel landmines and/or 
arms, as was strictly demanded in the policy framework. The other expectation from the framework 
were more or less met by the organization, and never violated (see also §2.5.4) (MvBZ 2004e). 
5.4.1 Non‐governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
 
In this sub paragraph only the NGOs that were in at least involved in two or more funded programs 
are discussed, in alphabetic order. Only Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) was not on the list of the 
Dutch HMA policy framework. 
 
HALO Trust 
 
The HALO Trust (Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation Trust) was an American/British NGO, 
specialized in the removal of the remnants of war. The HALO Trust undertakes HMA in the following 
countries and areas: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Central African Republic, Chechnya, Croatia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, 
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Nagorno Karabakh, Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. 
The activities that were provided are mine clearance (manual, mechanical and MDD), mine survey, 
mine awareness and mine risk education, local capacity building, casualty evacuation, and medical 
training. Donors are governments, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, UK, Ireland, Japan, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, U.S., other donors include the European Commission, 
Fondation Pro Victimis, The Association to Aid Refugees (Japan), Tokyo Broadcasting Services, The 
Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, United Nations, and numerous private donators (HALO Trust 
2006). 
 
Handicap International 
 
Handicap International (HI) is a French NGO with sections in Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Luxemburg, Switzerland, UK, and U.S. HI is specialized in prevention, rehabilitation, and 
(re)integration of the disabled, and does useful work in the field of HMA in developing countries: 
provision of support to landmine survivors through orthopaedic and rehabilitation programs; 
implementation of mine risk education and humanitarian demining programs; participation in 
landmine impact surveys; and advocacy and research. This is done in a.o. Angola, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cambodia, DR Congo, and Mozambique. Donors are for a large share public, from IGOs, 
Australia, Belgium, EU, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, U.S., 
and the rest private (a.o. the Dutch NGO Stichting Vluchteling) (HI 2005; HI 2006a; HI 2006b). 
 
Menschen gegen Minen 
 
Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) is a German NGO, founded in January 1996. Mine clearance (manual, 
mechanical, and MDD) is the only activity, which takes place in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia. 
Donors are public, E.U., WFP, Germany, The Netherlands and U.S., and private (MgM 2006). 
 
Mine Advisory Group 
 
The Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is a British NGO, and has the following HMA activities: mine risk 
education, mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, mine & explosive detection dogs, peace 
building, and community liaison. Activities are undertaken in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, 
Cyprus, DR Congo, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam, and in the past in Azerbaijan, 
Kosovo and Somaliland. The donor are a.o. Australia, U.S. (MAG 2006a, p.2-11; MAG 2006b). 
 
Norwegian People’s Aid 
 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA; Norsk Folkehjelp) is a Norwegian NGO, known for its rights-based 
approach. The NPA has also activities besides HMA activities. NPA has activities with regard to 
partnership policy, landmines, land and resource rights, indigenous people, democratic rights, 
violence against women, and HIV/AIDS. The HMA activities are mine survey, mine clearance, and 
mine risk education. Affected countries are Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, 
Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Northern Iraq and Sudan. Public sources 
count for about 90% of the funds, 45% by Norway (via NORAD), the rest by UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, 
EU, and the governments of Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and U.S. (Bottomley 2005, p.3, 7; NPA 
2006). 
5.4.2 International Organizations 
 
International Committee of Red Cross 
 
The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) is an international umbrella organization with 
national based sections. The HMA activities were HMA in general, mine clearance, mine risk 
education, and landmine stockpile destruction. The focus is on preventive HMA operations since 
2005, not primarily on awareness anymore. The countries that are affected by ICRC activities are 
nearly all mine and/or UXO contaminated countries in the world. Activities are mine clearance 
(indirectly) and mine risk education through National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 25 
countries around the world. Donors are many national governments, E.U., WHO, WFP, UN, (I)NGOs, 
Project Report  Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004) 
Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)  42  September 28, 2006 
a few Swiss cantons and municipalities, individual donations, and in-kind contributions (ICRC 2004, 
p.378-385; ICRC 2006a; ICRC 2006b). 
 
United Nations 
 
Several departments and missions of the UN are involved in HMA. Most important are: 
− UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA; reorganized into OCHA in 1998); 
− United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA); 
− United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), taking care of several Trust Funds, for the 
channelling of funds; 
− United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the main responsible for HMA in the UN 
organization and the coordinator of HMA world wide (see also §2.4.2). Afghanistan, Burundi, 
Cyprus, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo (Serbia), Lebanon and Sudan are directly supported 
by UNMAS (UNMAS 2005, p.19); 
− United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), for landmine awareness; 
− World Food Programme (WFP). Aid programs are obstructed by the presence of landmines. 
 
The UN makes annual portfolios on HMA programs worldwide, and annual appeals for certain 
countries (e.g. Afghanistan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) for a broad range of humanitarian 
programs. The influence that donors can put on the programs of their interest is not strong, 
compared to programs at NGOs. 
5.5 Available Information 
 
The archives and accounting systems contain dossiers and files about the funded programs. The 
dossiers contain at least the following documents: 
− A work plan, appeal or proposal from the NGOs, UN, and MACs, with information about 
objectives, targets, planned activities, duration, budget etc.; 
− A policy memorandum (beoordelingsmemorandum), made by the responsible civil servant at the 
MFA; 
− Progress reports and final reports with achievements and indicators. 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
The funded programs were mainly in line with the Dutch HMA policy priorities. Mine/ERW clearance 
and institution/capacity building have been massively undertaken, and many programs were funded 
for a couple of years. Mine clearance was often done manually, although also mechanical devices 
and MDD were used in several programs. The Netherlands funded HMA programs in 20 countries 
during the period 1996-2004. Some findings that are not in line with the Dutch priorities are: 
− Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Laos and Somalia did not signed the Ottawa Treaty yet, nor did 
Azerbaijan, Iraq and Somalia ratified (the original or amended Protocol II of) the CCW;  
− With Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kosovo, Laos, Somalia, 
Sudan and Yemen, the Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation. 
 
The funded programs in the selected countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cambodia, Eritrea, Laos, and Mozambique) contained mine and ERW clearance (manual, 
mechanical, and MDD), mine and ERW clearance training, mine and ERW awareness, mine 
information, mine identification, mine survey, mine marking, institution and capacity building, 
victim assistance and social rehabilitation, evaluation, monitoring, and logistics. Funds were 
provided to DHA, HALO Trust, HI, ICRC, MgM, NPA, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS, and WFP. HMA 
activities have been carried out by BHMAC, CMAC, HALO Trust, HI, ICRC, MACA, MgM, NPA, UNICEF, 
UNMAS/GICHD, UXO Lao, UNOPS, and WFP. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence provided in-kind 
support in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eritrea (sub question 1). 
 
Table 5-10 gives the Dutch funding for the period 1996-2004 per recipient country, the share of this 
funding for all the HMA funds in the recipient country and the ranking, and the share of the Dutch 
HMA funding compared to the total Dutch ODA funding in the recipient country. There was a (though 
Project Report  Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004) 
Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)  43  September 28, 2006 
not very strong) relation of being a partner country and HMA being a small share of the ODA, except 
for Eritrea. Eritrea was a partner country, but HMA is an important share of the ODA (16%), which 
means that there are less funds for activities besides HMA compared to the other countries (2-3% is 
HMA there).  For Angola and Cambodia too there was relatively much money spent on other 
activities, although they were not a partner country. 
 
Table 5-10: Qualitative comparison of the recipient countries 
Recipient 
country 
Dutch funding 
1996-2004 
(US$) 
Official 
partner aid 
relation 
(‘36’) 
Share NL of 
total HMA 
donor funds 
1996-2004 
Ranking of 
total HMA 
funds 1996-
2004 
Share HMA of 
total Dutch  
ODA 2000-
2004 
Afghanistan* 16.437.779 yes 5,5% 6 3% 
Angola 19.916.200 no 15,9% 2 6% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina* 6.528.745 yes 4,6% 8 2% 
Cambodia 13.901.174 no 9,1% 3 6% 
Eritrea* 9.747.512 yes 41,2% 1 16% 
Laos 2.421.000 no 5,8% 7 19% 
Mozambique* 9.456.394 yes 11,7% 3 2% 
Total 78.408.804     
* partner country 
 
In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Laos the Netherlands was a medium contributor, in 
Angola (huge humanitarian problems and solving problems with delivering of humanitarian aid), 
Cambodia and Mozambique (partner country of the Netherlands) the Netherlands was among the 
largest and in Eritrea (flanking policy to help the refugees and IDPs) the Netherlands was the largest 
of all. The Netherlands spent a relatively large share of its ODA to HMA in Eritrea and Laos 
(relatively low funding besides HMA). Other large contributors (where the Netherlands was among 
the largest) were the U.S. for Angola, Japan and the U.S. for Cambodia, U.S. for Eritrea, and U.S. 
and Norway for Mozambique. Overall, the U.S. was the largest contributor of HMA, but this country 
was also involved in many of the mine/ERW-related conflicts in the selected countries. The Dutch 
funding was not stable at all over there years, but this is also the case for other donors (sub 
question 2). 
 
The accounting system of the MFA gives information about which programs were funded, what the 
HMA activities of the program were, and what the payments were. For every funded program, a 
work plan/appeal/proposal, memorandum of judgment, and a progress and/or final report exists 
(sub question 3). 
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6 Embeddedness of HMA  
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable 
development. The definition of embeddedness is given in §3.3.2. The basis of the information comes 
for a major share from the programs, because this was the only source with enough information and 
easy access. Also the PRSPs of countries, if existent, are discussed. The difficulty with the PRSPs 
was that they are quite recent, so their information is not always about (at least a part of) the 
period 1996-2004. 
 
It was not possible to make two clear separated groups, one of programs without embeddedness, 
and another with clear embeddedness. It would have been interesting to compare those two groups 
and test the hypothesis that programs with embeddedness do perform better. Every program had 
more of less a degree of embeddedness, and it was difficult to assess the exact social benefits of 
embeddedness. Therefore it is chosen to assess how embeddedness works in practice. The criteria 
are applied to the programs, but with emphasize on the embeddedness of the programs.  
 
This chapter will provide the answers on the sub questions 4-9. 
 
4. What was the role of the Netherlands as a donor (descriptive)? 
5. Were the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development 
(descriptive)? 
6. To which extend and in which way was it embedded (descriptive)? 
7. What were the goals, circumstances and conditions, instruments and resources of the programs 
that are embedded (descriptive)?  
8. How are those programs to be valued in terms of relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, 
coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact, taken into the account the 
circumstances, instruments and resources (evaluative)? 
9. What were the good and what are the bad practices (evaluative)? 
 
For every country, if relevant, in §6.3-6.9 are applied: 
− Development policies of the recipient country are assessed on HMA issues, mostly this is the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, 
Eritrea, Laos and Mozambique have made an (I)PRSP-like document until now. It should be 
noted that most documents are quite recent, so newly proposed strategies did not always affect 
the period 1996-2004; 
− The funded programs with emphasize on broader development. Not all programs of §0 could be 
discussed due to lacking information; 
− Achievements of the funded programs; 
− How are those programs to be valued, with regard to the criteria relevance/appropriateness, 
connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. This is done by the 
use of the ALNAP (2006) guide for evaluating HMA using the OECD-DAC criteria and the OECD-
DAC (2002) “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management”. 
6.2 Embeddedness in Donors’ HMA policies 
 
The Netherlands is of course discussed in this paragraph. Denmark, the European Union and Sweden 
see HMA as very important too (see Table 2-2), and those countries have widely available 
information on their HMA policy. 
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6.2.1 The Netherlands 
 
As already stated in §2.5.2, embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable 
development was not seen as top-priority, but coherence with existing plans for the socioeconomic 
rehabilitation of the post-conflict community was requested. 
 
In 2003, the new macro policy on development cooperation was formulated under the name “Aan 
elkaar verplicht, Ontwikkelingssamenwerking op weg naar 2015”, by the Minister of Development 
Cooperation Agnes van Ardenne-van der Hoeven. HMA was not mentioned in this policy report. 
Indirectly HMA can be brought in relation with several issues of the policy (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, 
p.9-10, 24-25): 
− Integrated foreign policy. The Stability Fund was found recently, which objective is fast and 
flexible support of activities on the intersection of peace, security and development. Examples 
are support to peace processes and dialogues (conflict prevention), reintegration of 
combatants, destruction of small arms, and sending of Dutch experts; 
− Coherence in development policies; 
− Poverty alleviation and sustainable development. The economic and social aspect are definitely 
incorporated in HMA, the environmental aspect is quite neutral; 
− The PRSPs and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are seen as important guidelines. 
6.2.2 Denmark 
 
The Danish policy paper on HMA formulated in 2001 was far more detailed than the official Dutch 
HMA policy. The paper had not a specific emphasize on embeddedness though. Nevertheless 
attention was given in some other subjects (Danida 2001b, p.19-22):  
− Concerning general objectives, HMA activities will be where the most acute need is for 
humanitarian assistance, and geographically where there are possibilities for synergy with other 
Danish activities. For new activities in-depth socio-economic analyses have to be done, in order 
to identify priority areas with highest cost-effectiveness and greatest benefit to the local 
population; 
− Great importance is put on partnership with the recipient countries, and planning of HMA with 
national priorities;  
− Cooperation with local actors with long-term involvement: where economic, environmental and 
development plans exist in a certain area, and where established developmental priorities for 
cleared land in cooperation with the recipient country exist. Both are seen as necessary;  
− Bilateral sector programs can be used in countries where landmines pose a serious barrier to 
development; 
− When landmines cause serious environmental problems the Environment, Peace and Stability 
(MIfresta) budget can be used for HMA; 
− Under the subjects cooperation, quality and effectiveness there is nothing found related to 
embeddedness. 
 
The relevance of HMA for the local population is without any doubt, but as the policy paper says: 
“The problem here is that immediately measurable results, e.g. the number of mines or the extent 
of the area cleared, are not in themselves an indication of the usefulness of the activities for the 
local population.” (Danida 2001b, p.14). 
6.2.3 European Union 
 
Also the EU HMA policy paper is more detailed than the Dutch one. The paper states that a broad 
range of humanitarian, economic, developmental, technical, legal, social and political instruments 
is required. A broad strategy takes into account the local populations in the context, the most 
pressing and immediate needs in full coherence with a long term approach. There are specific 
priorities on embeddedness (European Commission 2004, p.18, 22, 23): 
− In moderately to lightly affected countries/territories socioeconomic development needs to be 
fully integrated into national development programs; 
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− Long term sustainability and coherence with wider assistance program are requested, i.e. HMA 
should form part of long term, sustainable solutions to the local landmine problems, coherence 
with national HMA frameworks, and integration into wider long term geographic and horizontal 
socio-economic development and rehabilitation programs. 
6.2.4 Sweden 
 
Sida concluded in the 2002 policy paper on HMA that in the 1990s HMA was developing into a new 
responsibility for the donor community. A small number of specialists implemented the programs, 
isolated from other forms of development cooperation. Sida defined the mine issue as a 
rehabilitation and development problem after a conflict. Embeddedness was an important issue in 
the policy paper. Priorities concerning embeddedness were (Sida 2002, p.1-6): 
− Integration of the HMA programs in all other development cooperation activities in the partner 
country; 
− Integration of the HMA programs in existing national structures and development plans as far as 
possible; 
− The coordination function has to be secured for the integration of HMA programs with other 
activities. This is both about coordination between parties within the HMA sector and 
coordination between HMA and other sectors within development cooperation; 
− Focus lies on integrating HMA with other development cooperation programs. HMA is seen as a 
method to eliminate a serious obstacle to development. 
6.2.5 Millennium Development Goals 
 
The development cooperation policy of many donors is directly linked to the Millenium Development 
Goals (MDG) (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.3). HMA itself is not part of a MDG. But HMA can directly and 
indirectly be linked to several MDGs: 
MDG 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger: The contamination of landmines and UXO blocks 
access to agricultural areas, which lowers the possibilities to raise crops. Also access to 
nearby markets can be blocked, thus no food can be bought, or commodities can not be sold 
to raise income and escape poverty; 
MDG 2. Achieve universal primary education: Access to school buildings can be blocked by 
landmines and UXO, which hampers education; 
MDG 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases: HMA personnel can spread the HIV virus, this 
needs special attention; 
MDG 7. Ensure environmental sustainability: The HMA procedures have to be designed as 
environmental friendly as possible. Development programs, followed after de-mining has 
taken place, need to contain the principles of sustainable development. Access to drink 
water can improve after removal of landmines and UXO from water wells and pumps; 
6.3 Afghanistan 
 
The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is one of the 36 partner 
countries for development cooperation. The priorities of the Netherlands in humanitarian and 
development aid were put on the repatriation of refugees and IDPs (in conjunction with Denmark 
and the UK), channelling funds through multilateral channels, and humanitarian aid through the UN 
and ICRC (Danida 2005, p.1-2; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32). 
6.3.1 Development policy 
 
The only important document on development is the 2006 Interim Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (I-ANDS), which is published after the period 1996-2004 and is therefore not 
relevant for this research. 
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6.3.2 The HMA Programs 
 
HALO Trust 
 
The WW165531 program for 2000/2001 by HALO Trust aimed at clearing residential and agricultural 
areas. Farming is essential for the local population and the sustainable return of refugees and IDPs. 
The post-9/11 events had a very negative effect on the HMA activities. Land that was cleared was 
put to productive use (HALO Trust 2000b; HALO Trust 2002c, p.4-5). 
 
UNOCHA 
 
The AF006301 program for 1997 and WW135107 program for 1998 were part of broader program of 
UNOCHA. The HMA was undertaken to improve the delivery of humanitarian aid and the process of 
urban and rural rehabilitation and development. This was done to be supportive to other 
international agencies, NGOs, and local communities working on the repatriation of displaced 
persons, provision of food security poverty eradication, and poppy eradication. Immediate socio-
economic benefits for the local population were seen as important. The mine clearance activities 
were undertaken in agricultural fields, roads, residential and commercial areas, irrigation canals 
and grazing areas. There were many troubles is in 1998 with humanitarian aid programs, due to a.o. 
restrictions posed by the Taliban authorities and an earthquake. Though the HMA achievements 
were mainly above target (UNOCHA 1998, p.1, 11, 13; UNOCHA 1999, p.5-8, 13). 
 
The WW152709 program for 1999 was the successor of the previous programs. Mine awareness was 
linked here with the return of refugees (UNHCR), the health sector (WHO, ICRC and medical NGOs), 
the education sector (variety of NGOs) and other activities ran by the UN and other organizations. 
This program was funded in combination with six other humanitarian programs for Afghanistan 
(MvBZ 1999a). 
 
The WW165511 (for 2000) and WW185802/WW185518 (for 2001/2002) programs were again 
successors, and again part of multiple programs for Afghanistan co-financed by the Netherlands.  
The overall objectives of this combination of programs were relief of human suffering, improvement 
of the human rights situation, provision of elementary social facilities, empowerment for the 
creation of fundamental resources, and support for the return of refugees. The latter program was 
hindered by the post-9/11 events, which caused a.o. stolen and destroyed equipment. Socio-
economic pressure occurred on all sources of land and infrastructure. More funds were used for 
emergency clearing (MAPA 2003; MvBZ 2002, p.8-9). 
 
The 6411 (2003) and 9768 (2004) programs were successor under the control of UNMAS, again from a 
portfolio. The programs were undertaken after a 2002 initiated new strategy in order to accelerate 
the mine and UXO clearance. The 2003 Progress Report argued that HMA facilitates agriculture, 
household food security, farming and grazing, post-conflict reconstruction effort, and access to 
education and healthcare. The use of demobilized soldiers as de-miners was beneficiary to the 
peace-building process. HMA was associated with almost every ministry in Afghanistan, and 
effective inter-ministerial consultation and cooperation was necessary (Kenny 2004, p.4; MAPA 
2004, p.8, 18-19; MvBZ 2003a). 
 
The Study of the Socio-economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan (SIMAA) estimated the net 
socio-economic benefits of the 1999 MAPA mine clearance about US$ 40 million at a cost of about 28 
million. A Danida/DFID assessment in 2002 of MACA and MAPA stated that “MACA is well integrated 
to UN agencies working in HMA, in particular UNHCR.  Links to other agencies and development 
NGOs are less well developed, though this must change as Afghanistan moves from emergency to the 
development phase. There is currently minimal integration of strategic planning.” (Baric 
(Consultants) Ltd 2003, p.2; World Bank/UNDP 2001, p.58-62). 
 
The programs in Afghanistan were to a large extent embedded in a broader UN program for 
humanitarian assistance, in order to improve aid delivery, rehabilitation, repatriation, and 
development. The situation in Afghanistan deteriorated due to restriction by the Taliban 
authorities, an earthquake, and the US-led invasion. 
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6.3.3 Achievements 
 
In programs co-funded by the Netherlands during the period 1996-2004, a huge amount of square 
meters (according to the data over 690 km2 or about 100.000 football fields), landmines and UXO 
were cleared (over four million pieces), and area surveyed (723 km2) and marked (68 km2 or about 
10.000 football fields). Mine awareness and education reached over 9 million persons. As far as 
could have been reconstructed, the achievements were often exceeded the prior set targets (see 
Appendix 8). The OCHA programs were for about 4-16% co-financed by the Netherlands. There were 
no indicators on achievements concerning embeddedness. 
6.3.4 Value 
 
Relevance/appropriateness: The HALO Trust tried to get its operations in line with the needs of the 
local population. The operations funded via UNOCHA had a focus on the immediate socio-economic 
benefits for the local population. Large areas were cleared and can now safely be used by the 
population. The operations were also well in line with the Dutch donor policy. Emphasize was 
placed on mine clearance and institution building, and a clear embeddedness into broader 
humanitarian and development framework stimulated by UN agencies. Ownership, accountability, 
and cost-effectiveness were not especially emphasized. Overcoming the landmine and UXO problem 
was seen as an enormous undertaking and was a part of the National Security Policy. 
 
Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant here. The clearance of residential, 
commercial and agricultural areas, and (social) infrastructure made that in the future landmines 
can no longer cause a threat to the population, and delivery of humanitarian assistance. It removed 
a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development, and returning IDPs and refugees. The existing 
UN presence and structures stimulated the connectedness. Capacity was not specifically build on 
the local level, and there was still a high dependency on donors and UN agencies. 
 
Coherence: The humanitarian considerations of HMA were without any doubt, as were the human 
rights considerations (e.g. safe repatriation of refugees/IDPs, removing the serious threat of getting 
disabled, peace-building). This counts for every country and will not be repeated in the next 
paragraphs. The invasion of the US-led coalition negatively influenced coherence, but might have a 
positive effect in the long-term. The integrated appeals of UN agencies make that coherence were 
more easily carried out. Links to other agencies and development NGOs were said to be less well 
developed. 
 
Coverage: Afghanistan was the second largest receiver of Dutch HMA funds, and for worldwide funds 
the largest receiver for the period 1996-2004. This was legitimate when taking into account the 
magnitude of the problem. HMA was undertaken in nearly all provinces, due to the fact that mine 
and UXO contamination exist throughout the country. There was not much information on the exact 
local impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some groups were left out or neglected of HMA 
or development programs. Both refugees and IDPs were positively affected by the program. 
 
Efficiency: Only the economic efficiency of the HMA can be assessed here. The cost of clearance per 
m2 was calculated by MACA to be about US$ 0,60 which is very low compared to other countries. 
This number was brought down during several years and became stable. This was due to a strong 
organization of HMA. The efficiency on embeddedness is very difficult to assess, firstly due to lack 
of information. The net socio-economic benefits of the 1999 MAPA mine clearance were estimated 
to be about US$ 40 million at a cost of about 28 million. A good survey made that priority-setting 
and mine clearance with a great socio-economic impact went considerably smooth (Kjellman, 
Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.863). 
 
Effectiveness: Often the direct HMA achievements were exceeding the targets, due to good survey 
information and strong organization. The achievement of other and indirect (socio-economic) 
objectives were more difficult to measure. The post-9/11 events had a negative influence on the 
effectiveness of the program in 2001 and 2002. Coordination was the core-business of MACA (and 
the UN), both intra and cross sectional, in order to increase effectiveness. 
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Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and 
IDPs. They stimulated renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-
economic situation of the population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on 
aid. The post-9/11 events had a (temporal?) negative impact. A study estimated that socio-
economic benefits outweighed costs. 
6.4 Angola 
 
Angola was not one of the partner 36 countries for development cooperation. First local 
organizations were funded, but those organizations were weak and the government was unreliable. 
Therefore international NGOs were funded later. Emphasize was laid on clearance, and the 
humanitarian relevance was taking into account (MvBZ 1999b, p.2; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32). No 
documents on a development policy by the government of Angola could be found. 
6.4.1 The HMA Programs 
 
MgM 
 
The AO006803 program emphasized the safe return of IDPs, and stimulation of resettlement and 
cultivation of arable land by clearance of roads, bridges, water wells etc. It also stated the 
enablement for implementation of administrative structures by the government and NGOs. It was 
reported that the MgM mine clearance activities were not always followed by infrastructural 
projects in order to make the road accessibility sustainable. The WW152705 program was the 
successor and was also aiming at enabling private transport and trade. Despite a from time to time 
less stable environment caused by the temporal up rise of the civil war, the mine clearance 
activities had a very positive effect, a.o. the safe return of about 50.000 IDPs. Via MgM, in 
cooperation with Johanniter International, also basic medical equipment was provided. Expertise of 
(supporting) staff of de-miners is educated to local young people (MgM 1997, p.7-9; MgM 1998, p.4; 
MgM 1999a, p.2; MgM 1999b; MvBZ 1997a; MvBZ 1999b). 
 
NPA 
 
The AO005904 program and the 1997/1998 AO006802 program for the establishment of a MDD-
capacity were undertaken to clear mines on request of development NGOs. Refugee repatriation 
and emergency relief work was obstructed by the presence of landmines. NPA cleared roads and 
bridges to facilitate reconstruction work. Agricultural area, schools, hospitals, water wells and the 
surroundings of population concentrations were cleared for development, in order to achieve 
independence from external aid delivery and to establish a strengthen the local infrastructure. The 
AO006801 mine survey program provided useful information for supporting the clearance. The 
WW135102 program for 1998 was a survey in order to support priority setting of most necessary, 
efficient en effective clearance in social and economic terms. Continued was with the WW152703 
and WW152704 programs, both for 1999. Agricultural areas and grazing land, resettlement for IDPs, 
a landing strip, water sources, and secondary roads were cleared. WW165518 program for 2000 
delivered socio-economic benefits to about 21.000 people, especially women, by providing them 
access to agricultural land, grazing area and schools, drinking water supply, and suitable 
accommodation. Mine clearance priorities were set in participation with local authorities and 
humanitarian organizations. The WW185801 program for 2001 mentions that NPA cooperates with 
about 20 partner organizations, clearing bridges, roads, airports, agricultural, grazing land, paths 
and secondary roads, residential homes and urban communal areas. Demining was undertaken for 
providing access for the humanitarian support of WFP to a camp of 17.600 IDPs. Almost 32.000 local 
residents and IDPs were able to resume agricultural activities, coal production, reconstruction  of 
infrastructure and business, in order to become self-sufficient, which is often still difficult. For the 
4423 program for 2003, NPA stated that demining will facilitate the development of the local and 
regional economy, popular movement and political engagement, which causes stability. Also 
HIV/AIDS and gender awareness was seen as important (MvBZ 1998a; MvBZ 1999b, p.1; NPA 1996; 
NPA 1997a, p.4; NPA 1998a, p.4; NPA 1998b, p.8; NPA 1999a, p.8; NPA 2000c, p.4, 8-10; NPA 2000e, 
p.4, 6; NPA 2001b, p.4, 8, 13-14; NPA 2002b, p.6-9; NPA 2002c). 
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UNICEF 
 
The AO005903 mine awareness program incorporated the training of teachers for primary education, 
thereby also contributing to the overall education system of Angola (UNICEF 1998, p.12). 
 
WFP 
 
The AO005906 program was in cooperation with CMAO and INAROEE, executed by HALO Trust and 
NPA. The program is quite similar to the NPA’s AO005904 program: rehabilitation of roads and 
bridges, return and resettlement of IDPs, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, and 
provision of food aid are the objectives. Good results were reported: at least 15.000 IDPs returned 
and started agricultural production, due to MgM activities. WFP was working together with 
Swedrelief (bridge construction and road rehabilitation), NPA, and Santa Barbara Foundation 
(bridges and spot tasks). The succeeding program WW165516 in 2000 was undertaken by MgM. A 
social impact study concluded that cleared roads are suffering from the strain of vehicles and an 
extended wet season, making it difficult for the local population to reach the market, deforestation 
caused problems with coffee crops, and medical support collapsed after the de-miners left. Due to 
the politico-military situation, it made no sense to de-mine in order to let IDPs return, so other 
priorities were set (MgM 2000, p.2.0-3.2, 4.2; NPA 1999b, p.4; WFP 1998, p.3; WFP 2000; WFP n/a). 
6.4.2 Achievements 
 
A considerable area was cleared by the programs that were funded by the Netherlands, mainly 
bilateral. Area was cleared (8,0 km2, or over 1.100 football fields) of landmines and UXO (over 
150.000 pieces), surveyed (1.000 km), verified (2,4 km2, or about 350 football fields), and at least 
333.000 persons were positively affected by the programs (see Appendix 8). A few data shows that 
target were accomplished for only about 70-80%. 
6.4.3 Value 
 
Relevance/appropriateness: The programs heavily emphasized on the safe return of IDPs, 
emergency relief work, and development of the local population, especially women, and 
administration. Mine clearance priorities were set in participation with local authorities and 
humanitarian organizations. Large areas and roads were cleared and can now safely be used by the 
population. The operations were partly in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed 
on mine clearance, but not on institution building. Cost-effectiveness was achieved by priority 
setting of most necessary, efficient and effective clearance in social and economic terms. 
 
Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant. The clearance of agricultural area, roads, 
bridges and social infrastructure, and rehabilitation of roads and bridges had a very positive effect 
on the return and resettlement of IDPs, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, and 
provision of food aid. No long-term national capacity was built. Close cooperation existed between 
WFP and NPA/MgM, and MgM and NPA with other development NGOs. 
 
Coherence: There was a very close cooperation between WFP and NPA and MgM, and WFP, MgM and 
NPA with other development NGOs. 
 
Coverage: Angola was the largest receiver of Dutch HMA funds for the period 1996-2004, and one of 
the greater receivers worldwide. HMA was undertaken in nearly all provinces, due to the fact that 
mine contamination exists throughout the country. There was evidence of a positive impact on local 
level. There was an emphasize on HIV/AIDS and gender awareness. Both refugees and IDPs were 
positively affected by the program. 
 
Efficiency: The cost of clearance per m2 was calculated by MgM to be about US$ 1,55. Mine 
clearance activities were not always followed by infrastructural projects in order to make the road 
accessibility sustainable, so multiplier effects were not always reached. A survey was undertaken by 
NPA in order to make socio-economic priority-setting possible. 
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Effectiveness: A few data show that target were accomplished for only about 70-80%. Coordination 
went though WFP, both intra and cross sectional, in order to increase effectiveness. A social impact 
study concluded that cleared roads are suffering from the strain of vehicles and an extended wet 
season, making it difficult for the local population to reach the market, deforestation caused 
problems with coffee crops, and that medical support collapsed after the de-miners left. The 
instability that occurred from time to time, had a negative effect on the effectiveness of the 
programs, and disturbs the development of the population. 
 
Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and 
IDPs, and renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic 
situation of the population and level of human rights. The unstable politico-military situation had a 
negative impact. A social impact study concluded some severe negative impacts. 
6.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the 36 partner countries of the Netherlands in development 
cooperation since 2003 (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32). 
6.5.1 Development policy 
 
The Bosnia and Herzegovina PRSP was published in 2004, thus it does not cover much of the period 
1996-2004. The three goals were: create conditions for sustainable and balanced economic 
development; reduce poverty; and accelerate EU integrations. HMA is not an important issues in the 
paper, despite the fact that 4,2% of the country’s area is still inaccessible due to the landmines. 
The landmine and UXO threat was linked with IDPs, health sector (injuries), agricultural sector, and 
the forestry sector (rehabilitation) (IMF 2004a, p.10, 158, 174, 193, 196, 251-253).  
 
The following problems for the current operations were identified (IMF 2004a, p.251-252, quoted): 
1. Gap between real needs of BiH and limited resources; 
2. Weak cooperation with other sectors in vertical and horizontal line; 
3. Weak response of authorities at all levels of administration; 
4. Financial problems. 
 
HMA is a factor in the development policy, but does not have high priority. HMA fits in the first two 
goals of the PRSP. 
6.5.2 The HMA Programs 
 
DHA/UNDP 
 
The BA007101 (1997), the WW135106 (1998), the WW152707 (1999-2002), the WW185811 (2001-
2003), and the 9685 (2004) programs were undertaken to let refugees and IDPs return and for 
reconstruction. DHA provided coordination support with humanitarian programs, within a broader 
UN program (known as post Dayton programs) for social-economic development on the long term, 
emergency aid, and peace building and reconciliation. The Netherlands also funded some of the 
other programs. It was underscored that HMA could be an important factor in rehabilitation and 
redevelopment of the population. Activities were a.o. the clearance of houses for returning 
refugees and IDPs, and land for agriculture reconstruction and development activities. The 2004 
Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) of UNDP focused particularly on the restoration of socio-
economic activities, and embeddedness of HMA in the PRSP (ICRC/UNHCR 1997, p.5-6; MvBZ 1998b; 
MvBZ 1999c; MvBZ 2001c; MvBZ 2004a; UN 1996, p.41-42; UNDP 2001; UNDP 2004, p.4-5). 
6.5.3 Achievements 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina a huge area was cleared, due to significant contributions of the 
Netherlands during at least the period 1996-2004. The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed 
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between US$1,33 and US$ 1,93 depending on the type of HMA organization (see Appendix 8). 
Massive surveys (573 km2 or over 1% of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were undertaken in order to reduce 
suspected area, and area (21,6 km2 or over 3.000 football fields) was cleared of landmines and UXO 
(over 62.000 pieces). 
6.5.4 Value 
 
Relevance/appropriateness: The entities used to have their own MAC. The operations were also well 
in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed on mine clearance and institution 
building, and a clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework 
stimulated by UN agencies. The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed between US$ 1,33 and 
US$ 1,93 depending on the type of HMA organization. HMA was one of the issues in the PRSP, in 
combination with IDPs, injuries from landmines and UXO, agriculture, and forest rehabilitation. 
 
Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant here. The clearance of residential, 
commercial and agricultural areas, and (social) infrastructure made that in the future landmines 
can no longer cause a threat to the population, and delivery of humanitarian assistance, and 
removed a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development, and returning IDPs and refugees. The 
existing UN presence and structures stimulat the connectedness. Capacity was not specifically build 
on the local level, and there is still a high dependency on donors and UN agencies. The IMAP focused 
particularly on the restoration of socio-economic activities, and embeddedness of HMA in the PRSP. 
 
Coherence: The entities used to have their own MACs, and the entity armies were used for mine 
clearance. Cooperation was the responsibility of the BHMAC. The humanitarian considerations of 
HMA were without any doubt, as are the human rights considerations (e.g. safe repatriation of 
refugees/IDPs, removing the serious threat of getting disabled, peace-building). The PRSP identified 
weak cooperation with other sectors in vertical and horizontal line, and weak response of 
authorities at all levels of administration. The integrated appeals of UN agencies made that 
coherence should be more easily carried out. 
 
Coverage: HMA was undertaken in both entities. There was no information on the exact local 
impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some (ethnic) groups were left out or neglected of 
HMA or development programs. Both refugees and IDPs were positively affected by the program. 
 
Efficiency: The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed depending on the type of HMA 
organization. Massive surveys were undertaken in order to reduce suspected area, which greatly 
increased efficiency. Due to lacking information, few can be said about the efficiency of 
embeddedness. 
 
Effectiveness: There was a gap between real needs of BiH and limited resources. Massive surveys 
were undertaken in order to reduce suspected area. The achievements of other and indirect (socio-
economic) objectives were more difficult to measure. Intra sectional coordination was the core-
business of BHMAC, UN coordinates cross sectional coordination. 
 
Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and 
IDPs, and renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic 
situation of the population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid.  
6.6 Cambodia 
 
Cambodia was not among the 36 partner countries for development cooperation (TK 29 234 V 2003-
2004, p.32). 
6.6.1 Development policy 
 
Cambodia published an IPRSP in 2000, a PRSP in 2002, and a PRSP Progress Report. In the IPRSP the 
presence of landmines was identified as one of the factors for poverty, disability and insecurity. 
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Mine clearance was seen as top priority of the national policy in improving security. Important HMA 
activities were the clearance of agricultural areas, awareness, mine disposal training, and increased 
victim assistance (Royal Government of Cambodia 2000, p.9, 11, 33, 35). 
 
After the 1998 elections, the new Prime Minister Hun Sen launched “The Triangle Strategy” for the 
sustainable development of Cambodia (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.ii; quoted): 
− The building of peace, stability and security; 
− Cambodia’s full integration into regional and international relations; and 
− The promotion of economic and social development through the implementation of various 
reform programmes within the environment created by these policies. 
 
The priority poverty reduction actions in the PRSP were (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.iv; quoted): 
− maintaining macroeconomic stability; 
− improving rural livelihoods; 
− expanding job opportunities; 
− improving capabilities; 
− strengthening institutions and improving governance; 
− reducing vulnerability and strengthening social inclusion; 
− promoting gender equity; 
− priority focus on population.  
 
In the PRSP the landmine and UXO contamination was seen as one of the factors for vulnerability of 
people, which can cause poverty: discussed were that the people living in contaminated areas are 
vulnerable, the obstruction of landmines and vulnerability of people living in rural areas, the 
disabled due to mine/UXO-related accidents, and the return of IDPs to contaminated areas. The 
HMA activities to be undertaken were mine and UXO clearance, awareness education and victim 
assistance. The estimated costs were about US$ 30 million annually, in order to clear about 30 
million m2 (over 4.000 football fields) annually (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.26, 29, 31, 41, 122). 
 
Priorities in HMA, in order to reduce poverty, were (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.123, quoted): 
1. reducing the number of casualties which have negative economic consequences on affected 
families; 
2. providing access for the worst-affected communities to essential services and infrastructure 
such as water resources, schools, hospitals and roads; 
3. distributing safe land for settlement and agricultural purposes, contributing to the economic 
reintegration of landless populations in rural areas; 
4. marking contaminated areas and educating and raising awareness on the dangers of land mines 
and UXO’s among the populations of suspected areas; 
5. ensuring that the prioritisation and distribution of cleared land are monitored in a participatory, 
equitable and pro-poor manner at the provincial level;  
6. providing assistance to the reintegration and rehabilitation of victims of land mines and UXO's 
and their affected communities. 
 
The Five Year Mine Action Strategic Plan of 2003-2007 is supported, which contained the following 
objectives, with regard to poverty reduction (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.123-124): 
− Reducing poverty by providing safe access to productive resources and social services, clearing 
landmines and UXOs, and educating awareness by the population on the risks of landmines and 
UXOs; 
− The CMAA will help to achieve national development goals to contribute to sustainable 
economic growth by reducing the negative impact of landmines/UXO; 
− The CMAA will institute a specific unit essentially dedicated to the poverty reduction, on 
national and provincial level; 
− The adoption of new standards and technical regulations will improve HMA’s efficiency and 
effectiveness. Those standard are to be finalized in 2002 and to be applied as of 2003; 
− With the help of the national database on HMA, the prioritization of suspected mined areas with 
the highest risks will be done; 
− In order to decrease the number of UXO casualties, mine risk education will be developed; 
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− The ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training & Youth Rehabilitation is made 
responsible to carry out specific interventions for victims and affected communities and to 
continue to build on the work in victim assistance, in co-operation with all relevant NGOs. 
 
The relation of “The Triangle Strategy” with HMA is the building of peace, stability and security and 
the promotion of economic and social development through the implementation of various reform 
programs within the environment created by these policies. In the PRSP the following priority 
poverty reduction actions are related to HMA: improving rural livelihoods; reducing vulnerability and 
strengthening social inclusion; strengthening institutions and improving governance; and priority 
focus on population. HMA and the landmine and UXO threat did not play an important role in the 
PRSP.   
6.6.2 The HMA Programs 
 
CMAC/UNDP 
 
Repatriation of IDPs, national reconstruction and development, maximizing the socio-economic 
impact of demining, and a constant dialogue with NGOs were important issues. CMAC had four 
demining priorities: land for resettlement of IDPs or settled land with casualty rates; land for 
agriculture, land for humanitarian community development; and land for reconstruction and 
infrastructural development. The KH006801 (1996) program, the KH009201 (1997/1998) program, 
the WW135108 (1998/1999) program and the WW152711 (1999) program were undertaken with 
these priorities. Nevertheless the embeddedness of CMAC’s activities in development was 
questioned by donors. Besides that, in 1999 there were accuses of corruption and nepotism, which 
were not fully proved, and financial administrative and managerial weaknesses. Also the supervising 
of UNDP was lacking. A reorganization of CMAC and the responsible UNDP team followed (see also 
§5.3.4). Despite these development the funding via UNDP was stopped (CMAC 1996b, p.5, 7-8; MvBZ 
1999d; MvBZ 1999e). 
 
HALO Trust 
 
In the WW165532 program for 2001, HALO Trust supported 19 development NGOs and IGOs by 
clearing specific areas (e.g. for housing and agriculture), roads (e.g. for rehabilitation and health 
care), schools, hospitals etc., and by building roads and bridges. Development priorities were 
embedded in the demining priorities, and are in cooperation with the newly established Land Use 
Planning Units (LUPUs). The population greatly benefited, agricultural production, transport 
communications and water availability improved, and a health care and hygiene development 
project of the NGO CARE could be undertaken (HALO Trust 2000a, p.6-7, 9; HALO Trust 2002b, p.2, 
6; MvBZ 2003b). 
 
NPA/CMAC 
 
For the WW165534 (2001/2002) program, the WW192401 (2002/2004) program, and the 6476 
(2003/2005) program, NPA hired a CMAC de-miners platoon. In cooperation with CMAC, relevant 
provincial authorities and development NGOs, sustainable development of new communities was set 
as top priority. NPA also had its own community development activities. In the CMAC Strategic Plan 
for the period of 2003-2007 the most important objective was the development objective to 
stimulat reconstruction, re-integration and development activities, by a.o. providing access for the 
worst-affected communities to essential services and infrastructure and safe land for settlement 
and agriculture. NPA phased out its own development activities since 2003, and put emphasize on 
mine clearance for the local population and other development organizations (CMAC 2002, p.8; 
MvBZ 2004d; NPA 2000a, p.6-9, 11; NPA 2001a, p.5, Annex 12: p. 2-3; NPA 2002a, p.5). 
6.6.3 Achievements 
 
In Cambodia a huge area has been cleared during the period 1996-2004 and before, where the 
Netherlands was one of the more important contributors. Most of the work undertaken was on  
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clearance (69 km2 or almost 10.000 football fields) of mines and UXO (almost 92.000), and 
awareness/education (over 22.000 participants) (see Appendix 8). 
6.6.4 Value 
 
Relevance/appropriateness: The embeddedness of CMAC’s activities in development was 
questioned. There were accuses of malpractices, financial administrative and managerial 
weaknesses, and a lack in supervising by the UNDP. Later funding via NPA strongly improved the 
situation and a stronger emphasize on development issues occurred. The presence of landmines 
became one of the most important issues in the PRSP and national policy. The proposed operations 
in the PRSP are in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize on mine clearance and institution 
building, and a better embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework is.  
 
Connectedness: Repatriation of IDPs, reintegration and reconstruction were relevant for the long 
term sustainable development. The population greatly benefited from development projects 
possible due to HMA. The PRSP focused on clearance of agricultural areas, awareness, mine disposal 
training, and increased victim assistance. 
 
Coherence: The embeddedness of CMAC’s activities in development was questioned by donors. Later 
programs emphasized the need for better embeddedness of development priorities in demining 
priorities. Mine clearance was seen as top priority of the national policy in improving security in the 
PRSP. The CMAA will institute a specific unit essentially dedicated to the poverty reduction. The 
ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training & Youth Rehabilitation was made responsible 
to carry out specific interventions for victims and affected communities and to continue to build on 
the work in victim assistance, in co-operation with all relevant NGOs. 
 
Coverage: HMA was undertaken throughout the country. There was not much information on the 
exact local impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some (ethnic) groups were left out or 
neglected of HMA or development programs. IDPs and landmine victims were positively affected by 
the programs. 
 
Efficiency: The PRSP aimed at the adoption of new standards and technical regulations in order to 
improve HMA efficiency. Due to lacking information, few can be said about the efficiency of 
embeddedness. The PRSP aimed at about US$ 1 per m2 cleared area. 
 
Effectiveness: The PRSP aimed at the adoption of new standards and technical regulations in order 
to improve HMA effectiveness. Financial administrative and managerial weaknesses could have 
undermined effectiveness. The achievements of other and indirect (socio-economic) objectives 
were more difficult to measure. 
 
Impact: HMA and development programs helped declining poverty, improve the situation of the 
disabled, stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed 
development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic situation of the 
population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid. 
6.7 Eritrea 
 
Eritrea was one of the 36 partner countries, and was already a partner country before the 2003 
policy change. Eritrea received € 16,3 million for all humanitarian programs, were HMA consisted 
for the mayor share (about € 10 million, see §5.3.5) (MvBZ 2006h, p.48; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, 
p.32). 
6.7.1 Development policy 
 
The 2004 IPRSP of Eritrea said little about the threat of landmines. The border war with Ethiopia 
with the use of landmines was seen as one of the many determinants of poverty. Many of sections 
fertile land were contaminated and with the drought of 2002/2003 this became very clear. No 
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policy on HMA or whatsoever was mentioned in the IPRSP (Government of the State of Eritrea 2004, 
p.11, 19). 
6.7.2 The HMA Programs 
 
HALO Trust 
 
For the WW165535 program (2001/2002) the HALO Trust was a partner of the Eritrean Humanitarian 
Demining Programme (EHDP). The objective was to let refugees and IDPs return to their homes. The 
need for a broader humanitarian policy was understood by the Netherlands MFA, UN organizations 
and NGOs. Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 2000, due to the 
political and strategic agenda of the Eritrean government (HALO Trust 2002a, p.2; MvBZ 2000a; 
MvBZ 2000c). 
6.7.3 Achievements 
 
A considerable area was cleared (5,6 km2 and over 8.000 pieces of explosives) in Eritrea by the 
WW165535 program financed by the Netherlands (see Appendix 8). Unfortunately there was no 
information available on other programs that were heavily funded by the Netherlands. 
6.7.4 Value 
 
The information on Eritrea was scarce, therefore it is impossible and inappropriate to give a full 
judgment. 
 
Relevance/appropriateness: The objective was to let refugees and IDPs return to their homes. Mine 
clearance was undertaken, which is in line with the Dutch donor policy. A clear embeddedness into 
broader humanitarian and development framework was stimulated by UN organizations and NGOs.  
 
Connectedness: A clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework was 
stimulated by UN organizations and NGOs. 
 
Coherence: The need for a broader humanitarian policy was understood. Communication and 
coordination was often failing at the time of 2000. 
 
Coverage: There is no information on coverage.  
 
Efficiency: There is no information on efficiency.  
 
Effectiveness: Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 2000, which might 
have reduced effectiveness. 
 
Impact: There is no information on impact.  
6.8 Laos 
 
Laos was not among the 36 bilateral partner countries of the Dutch development cooperation policy 
(TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32). 
6.8.1 Development policy 
 
In the IPRSP UXO contamination was seen as one of the important causes of poverty: UXO caused 
great human suffering for the victims and their families; agricultural production was blocked there 
by UXO contamination, preventing a sustainable living for the population of villages, which was an 
important cause of poverty and food shortages. UXO community education awareness was seen as 
successful in improving child protection. UXO decontamination was one of the major national 
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priorities for alleviating poverty, and was one of the criteria for risk assessment of rural areas. 
Infrastructure was also affected by the presence of UXO, causing substantial extra cost and time for 
essential services to contaminated communities. The need for co-ordination with development plans 
and the optimal use of resources was stressed. The UXO Decontamination Programme was seen as 
an important program (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.13, 16, 25, 28, 30-31, 47), which had the following 
long-term need for UXO clearance and awareness (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.46-47, quoted): 
1. Emergency response units, similar to the current roving teams as an “on call” service for 
reported or discovered UXO; 
2. Humanitarian clearance for life saving, high risk areas where accidents are likely to, or have 
occurred; 
3. Development clearance for community development where no other sources of funding are 
available; 
4. Commercial, private clearance, in support of gem/mineral mines, commercial factories, 
tourism, and electricity supplies; and 
5. Risk reduction education, to raise awareness of risks associated with UXO. 
 
The UXO Decontamination program was one of the three most important poverty-related subjects in 
the PRSP/NGPES, with the National Drugs Control program and the National Action Plan for 
HIV/AIDS/STD. The UXO problem was seen as a cause of poverty, as a source of vulnerability and as 
a threat. UXO awareness is incorporated with standard teaching schedules. Related with UXO 
decontamination were road construction in affected areas and gender issues. Coordination and 
capacity-building were seen as important (IMF 2004b, p.7, 9-10, 29-30, 37, 52, 78, 115, 122, 125, 
131, 146).  
 
As main challenge was seen the incorporation of UXO decontamination into development 
programming, in order to (IMF 2004b, p.125, quoted): 
− Ensure that the planning of operations relates closely to national priorities such as poverty 
reduction, phasing out shifting cultivation and opium elimination. 
− Increase the pace of clearance, thereby opening land for agricultural production. 
− Mobilise resources required for humanitarian UXO action programming. 
 
The goal of the PRSP/NGPES was to leave the group of Least Developed Countries by 2020 through 
sustained equitable economic growth and social development. The country’s social, cultural, 
economic and political identity must be protected. This is and will be done by the following ways 
(IMF 2004b, p.1): 
− Moving consistently towards a market-oriented economy; 
− Building-up the needed infrastructure throughout the country; 
− Improving the well-being of the people through greater food security, extension of social 
services and environment conservation, while enhancing the spiritual and cultural life of the Lao 
multi-ethnic population. 
 
The UXO problem was an important component of the Lao development policy. The UXO 
Decontamination Programme will sharply improve the well-being of the people. 
6.8.2 The HMA Programs 
 
UNDP/UXO Lao 
 
The LA001302 (1997/1998) program, the WW165509 (2000/2001) program, the WW185806 (2001) 
program, the WW192406 (2002) program and the 9686 (2004) program were financed via the 
UNDP/UNICEF/LAO PDR Trust Fund to UXO Lao, who contracts demining capacity from a.o. the 
NGOs Gerbera, HI, MAG, NPA, and WVI. UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects clearing 
housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development projects (e.g. 
construction of roads, schools, temples hospitals, airports, irrigation works, clean water, 
communication, national forest protection and conservation), assistance with provincial and district 
health services, and food security or income-generation assistance (e.g. markets, reduce slash-and-
burn farming by giving alternatives, tree plantations, tourism, industrial and handicraft 
development). UXO Lao supported the overall development goals of Laos and the broader socio-
economic development requirements of villages, districts and provinces, in a bottom up planning 
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process. The National UXO Steering Committee (NSC) was the policy-making body for UXO Lao and 
consists of members from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Security, UNDP, UNICEF, and representatives of 9 provinces. Donors 
and Implementing Partners can attend biannually. NGOs such as CARE, ACF and OXFAM, and Red 
Cross and WFP provide sustainable development programs. UXO Lao was recognized by the 
government as strategic support program, and the government identified four sectors for poverty 
alleviation, agriculture and forestry, education, road infrastructure, and health. Especially disabled 
are recognized as relatively benefiting very little. UXO clearance in Laos was one of the initiatives 
mentioned in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Lao PDR for the period 
2002-2006. In the National Strategic Plan 2003 – 2013 three priorities were set, high, medium and 
low. Despite already existing cooperation with development NGOs, the degree of cooperation was 
less than desired by donors (MvBZ 2004f; UNDP 1995, p.4; UXO Lao 1996, p.4; UXO Lao 1999, p.15-
17; UXO Lao 2000, p.4, 14, 16-17, 19, 23; UXO Lao 2001, p.11, 20-28; UXO Lao 2002a, p.6, 19; UXO 
Lao 2002b, p.8, 11, 14-15; UXO Lao 2003b, p.8; UXO Lao 2003c, p.7-12, 19; UXO Lao 2003d, p.17). 
6.8.3 Achievements 
 
Laos had massive programs on UXO clearance (almost 39 km2 and at least 256.000 pieces of 
explosives) and awareness (838 students and over 540.000 attendants). The Netherlands was a 
smaller contributor. UXO Lao was able to reach a price of US$ 0,34 per m2 and US$ 11,94 per 
beneficiary, which is very low (see Appendix 8). 
6.8.4 Value 
 
Relevance/appropriateness: UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects and a bottom up 
planning process. UXO Lao supported the overall development goals of Laos and the broader socio-
economic development. Especially disabled were recognized as benefiting very little. The 
operations were in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize is placed on UXO clearance and 
institution building, and a clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development. The 
degree of cooperation was lower than desired by donors. The National UXO Steering Committee was 
constructed for accountability. In the PRSP UXO contamination was identified as one of the aspects 
causing poverty and UXO decontamination was seen as one of the major national priorities. 
 
Connectedness: Both relief and sustainable development were relevant here. The clearance of 
housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development projects, 
assistance with provincial and district health services, and food security or income-generation 
assistance made that in the future landmines can no longer cause a threat to the population, and 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, and removed a barrier for sustainable development. Capacity 
was built on the local, provincial and national level. There was still a high dependency on donors 
despite the already long period of programs and financial assistance. 
 
Coherence: UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects and supports the overall 
development goals of Laos and the broader socio-economic development. In order to stimulate 
coherence, the National UXO Steering Committee was set up as the policy-making body for UXO Lao. 
UXO Lao was recognized by the government as strategic support program. UXO clearance in Laos 
was one of the initiatives of the UN for the period 2002-2006, thus the clearance programs were not 
independent from other programs. The degree of cooperation was lower than requested by donors. 
 
Coverage: Especially disabled were recognized as relatively benefiting very little and are in focus. 
UXO Lao tried to reach all groups in society and let them participate by a bottom-up planning 
process. The PRSP saw UXO community education awareness as successful in improving child 
protection. There was not much numerical information on the exact local impact.  
 
Efficiency: The cost of clearance was very low compared to other countries. The efficiency on 
embeddedness was more difficult to assess, a clue was given by the fact that the degree of 
cooperation was lower than requested by donors. The PRSP saw as one of the main issues the 
increase the pace of clearance. 
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Effectiveness: Often the direct HMA achievements were exceeding the targets. Information on the 
achievement on other and indirect (socio-economic) objectives was not widely available. Also here 
the low level coordination can be an indication of lack of effectiveness.  
 
Impact: HMA and development programs increased the socio-economic situation of the population 
and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid. Lives were saved due to clearance 
and awareness activities. 
6.9 Mozambique 
 
Mozambique was a partner country in the list of 36 (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32). 
6.9.1 Development policy 
 
The central objective in the PRSP of 2001 was substantial reduction of absolute poverty. As 
fundamental areas were seen: education; health; agriculture and rural development; basic 
infrastructure; good governance; macro-economic and financial management (Republic of 
Mozambique 2001, p.1, 3). 
 
For Mozambique, HMA is just sparsely mentioned in the PRPS documents. The Review of the 2003 
Economic and Social Plan mentions the completed demining undertaken by the defence sector (IMF 
2004c, p.107). In the Economic and Social Plan Evaluation 2004 the outcome of a summit for HMA 
was an important issue (IMF 2005b, p.84).  
 
In the PRSP there was no link with HMA at all.  
6.9.2 The HMA Programs 
 
HALO Trust 
 
The MZ014501 program for 1998-1999 was undertaken in Nampula (in cooperation with World Vision 
International), where the Netherlands already funded projects on sustainable development in 
sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, and market development. The clearance activities will 
strengthen those programs, and are part of the Preliminary Prioritised Provincial Work Plan (PPPWP) 
framework, containing 10 key sites including bridges, village centres, roads, power lines and water 
pipelines. Spin-off was increased mobility of the population, improved provision of services and aid. 
Not all projects were completely finished during the time of the program, and were finished in the 
WW165502 program for 2000. This program also supports the District Demining Initiative. A socio-
economic land use study on the period 1994-1999 shows that in the Nampula province areas were 
cleared, boosting agriculture, rehabilitation, transportation, and trade, but the handover of some 
areas to local communities was not always done well. The study concludes that HMA can boost 
development (HALO Trust 1997, p.8; HALO Trust 1998, p.4; HALO Trust 1999a, p.2; HALO Trust 
1999b, p.3; HALO Trust 1999c, p.104-113, 124; MvBZ 1997b). 
 
HI 
 
The 1996-1998 MZ003315 was about mine survey and mine clearance (although HI had other 
paramedic and social programs in Mozambique). The aim was to clear for villages and rural 
population to boost the daily economic and social activities (HI 1996, p.1, 7). 
 
NPA 
 
In the MZ003314 program for 1996-1997, NPA worked together with two NGOs providing food, and 
with other HMA organizations. The WW135105 program for 1998-1999, the WW165508 program for 
2000, WW185813 program for 2001, WW192405 program for 2002, and the 5809 program for 2003-
2004, took into account sustainable improvement of the socio-economic, political and democratic 
living conditions by clearing surroundings of rural communities, water supplies and path and road 
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clearance, provision of primary health awareness (HIV/AIDS awareness and basic courses on 
construction of improved traditional latrines) and educational programs, access to education, skills 
training and commercial opportunities. Some activities were only facilitated to stimulate ownership 
and sustainability. Women were seen as an important vulnerable group. NPA was also beware of 
environmental impacts of the activities, and tried to keep them as low as possible. NPA was 
reviewed for the period 1993-1998 (WW152103). Concluded was that the impact of the community 
services was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The 2003 NORAD review of the NPA 
activities emphasized that communities should not become too dependent on the community 
services provided. That also counts in overall, the presence of de-miners gives a temporal boost to 
the local economy. NPA itself should not get involved in long term development actions. It was 
believed that phasing out demining should be accompanied with a development program (Agenda 
Utredning & Utvikling 1999, p.65-66; NPA 1997b; NPA 1997c, p.1; NPA 1999c, p.13; NPA 2000b; NPA 
2000d, p.12, 15; NPA 2001c, p.14-15; NPA 2004, p.10-12; Scanteam 2003, p.16, 18, 20). 
 
UNDP 
 
The UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by CND. Part of 
the strategy was the determination of the impact of landmines on socio-economic development. 
The ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Education, Agriculture, Health, 
Social Welfare, and Police were involved. CND turned out to be a weak partner (UNDP 1997, p.8; 
UNDP 1999, p.6). 
6.9.3 Achievements 
 
During the period 1996-2004 an area of 14 km2 and over 220.000 pieces of explosives were cleared 
in Mozambique. The programs were over 10% co-financed by the Netherlands. There were no 
indicators on achievements concerning embeddedness. The cost per m2 was estimated to be US$ 
1,89 at an NPA program, which was a higher than other countries (except clearance by NGOs in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) (see Appendix 8). 
6.9.4 Value 
 
Relevance/appropriateness: The HALO Trust programs took into account sustainable improvement 
of the socio-economic, political and democratic living conditions. Some activities of NPA were 
facilitated to stimulate ownership and sustainability. The impact of the community services 
provided by NPA to the local population was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The 
population should not become too dependent on the community services (lack of ownership). Large 
areas were cleared and can now safely be used by the population. The operations were also well in 
line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed on mine clearance and institution building. 
Some programs were undertaken in Nampula, where the Netherlands already funded projects on 
sustainable development. The PRSP hardly mentioned the subject landmines. 
 
Connectedness: The clearance of the PPPWP framework sites, clearance surroundings of rural 
communities, water supplies and path and road clearance, provision of primary health awareness 
and educational programs, access to education, skills training and commercial opportunities made 
that in the future landmines can no longer cause a threat to the population, delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, and removed a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development. The 
link with other humanitarian programs funded by the Netherlands and the HMA program of HALO 
Trust in Nampula improved the connectedness.  
 
Coherence: In Nampula programs were undertaken in cooperation with WVI, and where the 
Netherlands already funded development projects on sustainable development in sectors such as 
agriculture, infrastructure, and market development. NPA worked together with two NGOs providing 
food, and with other HMA organizations. The PPPWP framework was launched to improve 
coherence. The UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by 
CND. Part of the strategy is the determination of the impact of landmines on socio-economic 
development. CND turned out to be a weak partner. 
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Coverage: Women were seen as an important vulnerable group. Primary health awareness was 
provided, e.g. HIV/AIDS awareness. There was not much information on the exact local impact. 
There was no evidence suggesting that some groups were left out or neglected of HMA or 
development programs.  
 
Efficiency: The estimated cost at a NPA program was quite high. The efficiency on embeddedness 
was  again very difficult to assess, due to lack of information. The PPPWP framework, containing 10 
key sites, helped improving efficiency. 
 
Effectiveness: The handover of some areas to local communities was not always done well. The 
UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by CND, but the CND 
turned out to be a weak partner. Spin-off of the PPPWP framework was increased mobility of the 
population, improved provision of services and aid. Sometimes the HMA achievements did not 
achieve the objectives that were set beforehand. On the socio-economic achievements there was 
little information.  
 
Impact: Spin-off was increased mobility of the population, improved provision of services and aid. 
NPA tried to keep environmental impacts of their activities as low as possible. The impact of NPA’s 
community services was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The presence of de-miners 
gave a temporal boost to the local economy, but made communities to dependent on them. 
6.10 Overview of Achievements of the HMA programs 
 
Table 6-1 gives an overview of the achievements of the programs. The extent in which the 
Netherlands funded the programs differ, some information is incomplete or non-existing and local 
differences in circumstances are not known. Thus straight conclusions can not always be drawn. The 
complete data can be found in Appendix 8. 
 
Table 6-1: Overview of the achievements of the HMA programs in the recipient countries for 
1996-2004  
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Afghanistan 16,4 5,5% 690 4.000.000 723  km2 - 68 9.000.000 0,60 
Angola 19,9 15,9% 8 150.000 1.000 km 2,4 - 330.000 n/a 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 6,5 4,6% 21,6 3.000 
573  
km2 - - - 
1,33-
1,93 
Cambodia 13,9 9,1% 69 92.000 - - - 92.000 n/a 
Eritrea 9,7 41,2% 5,6 8.000 - - - - n/a 
Laos 2,4 5,8% 39 256.000 - - - 540.000 0,34 
Mozambique 9,5 11,7% 14 220.000 - - - - 1,89 
6.11 Conclusions 
 
Some of the information were the conclusions are based on, comes from chapter 5. 
 
The Netherlands as a donor country 
 
The Netherlands did not see embeddedness of HMA in a broader framework for sustainable 
development as top-priority in the HMA policy. HMA was even not mentioned in the 2003 macro 
policy paper on development cooperation at all. Only indirectly it can be brought in relation with 
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several issues from the macro policy: integrated foreign policy on the field of peace, security and 
development (Stability Fund); coherence in development policies; poverty alleviation and 
sustainable development; and the PRSPs and the MDG as guidelines. To compare with other similar 
donors: Denmark’s policy and the MDGs can only be very indirectly linked with HMA within a broader 
framework. Embeddedness was more clearly incorporated in the HMA policy of the European Union 
and Sweden. In the Danish policy it was stated that the usefulness of HMA for local population was 
difficult to measure (sub question 4).  
 
Recipient countries 
 
For many of the programs that the Netherlands funded in the selected countries, embeddedness in a 
broader framework for sustainable development was an issue in different extents. Socio-economic 
data of outcomes were hard to find, therefore the criteria are assessed in a qualitative way. 
 
Afghanistan 
 
The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Afghanistan. Most programs in Afghanistan were 
to a large extent embedded in a broader UN program for humanitarian assistance, in order to 
improve aid delivery, rehabilitation, repatriation, and development. The situation in Afghanistan 
deteriorated due to restriction by the Taliban authorities, an earthquake, and the US-led invasion.  
The goal was to clear residential, commercial and agricultural areas, roads, irrigation canals, and 
grazing areas. Mine/ERW clearance, mine clearance training, mine identification, survey and 
marking, and mine awareness and education were undertaken. Afghanistan was a large receiver in 
the world of humanitarian funds, and the largest concerning HMA in the period 1996-2004 (sub 
questions 4-7). 
 
Angola 
 
The Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation with Angola. Clearance programs facilitated 
emergency relief work, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, safe return of refugees 
and IDPs, resettlement and cultivation of arable land, development, private transport and trade. 
Basic medical equipment and education were provided too. First local organizations were funded, 
but those organizations were weak and the government was unreliable. Therefore international 
NGOs were funded later. Emphasize was laid on clearance, and the humanitarian relevance was 
taking into account. The politico-military situation was not always prosperous during the period 
1996-2004. The programs focused on mine/ERW clearance (manual, mechanical, MDD, EOD), priority 
setting, mine clearance training, mine survey, victim assistance and social rehabilitation. Angola 
was a larger receiver of HMA funds (sub questions 4-7). 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HMA programs were 
part of a broader UN program. HMA was seen as an important factor in rehabilitation and 
redevelopment of the population. HMA was a factor in the development policy, but did not have 
high priority. Activities were clearance of houses for returning refugees and IDPs, and land for 
agriculture reconstruction and development activities. Mine/UXO clearance, mine clearance 
training, mine awareness, mine information, mine survey and marking, and institution building was 
undertaken. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a large receiver of HMA and other ODA (sub questions 4-7). 
 
Cambodia 
 
Cambodia was not among the 36 partner countries. HMA and the landmine and UXO threat did not 
play an important role in the PRSP.  Repatriation of IDPs, national reconstruction and development, 
maximizing the socio-economic impact of demining, and a constant dialogue with NGOs were 
important issues. The embeddedness of CMAC’s activities in development was questioned by donors. 
HALO Trust programs had development priorities embedded in the demining priorities. Sustainable 
development of new communities was set as top priority with the NPA/CMAC programs. The main 
focus of the programs was mine and ERW clearance (manual and mechanical). Cambodia received a 
large amount of HMA and humanitarian funds (sub questions 4-7). 
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Eritrea 
 
Eritrea was one of the 36 partner countries, and the Netherlands has been by far the large 
contributor on HMA in Eritrea. There was nothing on HMA in development policy. There was a need 
for a broader humanitarian policy. Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 
2000. Mine clearance, mine awareness, capacity building and evaluation were the undertaken 
activities (sub questions 4-7). 
 
Laos 
 
Laos was not among the 36 bilateral partner countries. Dutch ODA funds were also used for 
sustainable forest management and human rights programs. The UXO problem was an important 
component of the Lao development policy. UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects 
clearing housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development 
projects, assistance with provincial and district health services, and food security or income-
generation assistance. UXO Lao was recognized by the government as strategic support program. 
Programs focused on UXO and mine clearance, UXO survey, UXO awareness, and training and 
capacity building. Laos received a small amount of HMA funds compared to other donors (sub 
questions 4-7). 
 
Mozambique 
 
Mozambique was one of the partner countries. The Netherlands funded much on ODA, other funds 
were used for programs on education, health, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and poverty 
alleviation. There was nothing on HMA in the development policy. HMA activities took place in the 
Nampula province, where they had positive effects on other programs funded by the Netherlands. 
Most important in the HMA programs were mine clearance (manual, mechanical), mine survey and 
capacity building (sub questions 4-7). 
 
Overall 
 
The available information gives a clue that embeddedness became more important during the years, 
for both donors as recipient countries and NGOs. Exact information on socio-economic outcome and 
impact of the programs was usually not available, thus the valuing on the criteria was very 
qualitative and reliant on the smart reports of NGOs and UN organizations. Countries with a 
partnership with the Netherlands had some humanitarian programs funded that benefit from the 
HMA activities. 
 
Criteria 
 
In most countries the HMA programs were more or less in line with Dutch HMA policy. Embeddedness 
was quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice. UN programs showed a 
higher degree of embeddedness. Most embeddedness of HMA was on relief, recovery, repatriation, 
rehabilitation and sustainable development. IDPs and refugees benefited most from HMA. As far as 
could be assessed, no groups were left out of the HMA program and some vulnerable groups 
received extra attention. Efficiency and effectiveness were not always satisfactory. The impact of 
HMA was safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities, 
but the exact socio-economic numbers are often unknown (sub question 8). 
 
Good and bad practices 
 
Due to lack on good qualitative information it is difficult to give a fair judgement on good and bad 
practices. The relevance of HMA for the local population is without any doubt, since the removal of 
the threat of landmines and UXOs (sub question 9). 
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7 Discussion of Findings on Embeddedness 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the findings of the previous chapter will be compared with research by Denmark,  
Sweden, UNDP, and with two articles published in the magazine “Third World Quarterly” from a 
special thematic number about HMA. Other donors are more or less looking on the embeddedness of 
their HMA programs into the broader development framework. For Denmark and Sweden an 
evaluation of HMA activities has taken place. The term coordination (with other sectors) is often 
used, although embeddedness is more than just coordination (see also § 3.3.2). 
7.2 Denmark 
 
The Danish view from the 2005 Danida7 evaluation is that the HMA sector’s interaction (dialogue, 
co-ordination and collaboration) with other sectors stayed on a poor level, and HMA was an isolated 
sector. A couple of reasons were given (Danida 2003, p.62-63): 
− Insufficient understanding of aid policies, structures and practices among many HMA staff; 
− HMA is seen as highly specialized “add-on” by the rest, and is considered to be slow; 
− HMA is not appreciated despite the high importance of HMA assessments. The sector did not try 
hard enough to be understood by the aid community. 
 
The lack of coordination and collaboration between the HMA sector and the aid community caused a 
loss of resources and possible impact. Joint strategic planning should take place, e.g. in the United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and 
other development planning strategies. National governing structures were providing overall policy 
guidance to HMA in some countries, but did not have enough influence or did not shown enough 
interest to integrate HMA to get synergic effects. Organizations with a broader mandate on HMA, 
humanitarian aid and development assistance (such as UNDP, UNICEF, DanChurchAid and the World 
Bank) can stimulate strategic planning, but in practice it was minimal. Even within Danida HMA was 
not strongly connected at all to other development program (Danida 2003, p.63-64). 
 
The Danida policy described in §6.2.2 did not have a specific emphasize on embeddedness. Synergy 
and bilateral sector programs were emphasized, but this was not what was done in practice. 
7.3 Sweden 
 
The Sida8 evaluation of 2001 concluded that within the HMA sector, as in other fields of 
humanitarian aid, a common understanding of the most important goals and the best way in which 
to achieve objectives became more important. HMA is highly specialized and often includes large 
numbers of actors, while it is part of an integrated overall humanitarian effort. A larger 
coordination effort should improve HMA and humanitarian assistance (Sida 2001, p.41). 
 
Existing coordination between HMA and other humanitarian sectors was nonetheless not seen as 
satisfactory. Several reasons are given (Sida 2001, p.54): 
− The predominance of military expertise, personnel and organizational culture within the HMA 
sector is seen as a problem; 
− The type of imposed coordination within HMA may be a hindrance to coordination with non-HMA 
actors; 
− Focus on coordination within the HMA sector is stronger, since non-HMA actors can not sanction 
actors within the HMA-sector; 
− Coordination is far stronger with policy and strategic planning, compared to day-to-day 
operations in the field; 
                                                 
7 Danida is the Danish International Development Agency at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
8 Sida is the Swedish International Development Agency at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Project Report  Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004) 
Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)  65  September 28, 2006 
− UNMACs cause a difficult starting-point for the transfer of responsibility to national institutions.  
 
The policy paper in §6.2.4 was made later than evaluation where abovementioned information 
comes from. In the policy paper there was a clear wish for more embeddedness. 
7.4 Third World Quarterly 
 
In §3.3.2 the article of Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. (2003) was already used to explain the 
term embeddedness. The UN-led MACs had a rigid approach towards coordination. This article 
concluded too that embeddedness gained increasingly interest, among policy makers and 
governmental officials. The predominance of military expertise, personnel and organizational 
culture was seen as a threat for embeddedness in a broader institutional context/cross-sectoral 
coordination with non-HMA actors. Coordination inside the HMA sector was seen as smoother than 
cross-sectoral coordination. Flexibility and innovation had to be encouraged and facilitated. The 
sector must be aware that competition inside the sector can have negative side-effects in 
coordination. It can bring increasing hierarchy and authority. Another threat can be the pressure of 
donors or politicians on decisions, instead of decisions based on adequate information (Kjellman, 
Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.855, 868-869). 
 
Impact-assessment practices (Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), economic analysis, and community 
study) were seen as necessary in the article of Harpviken, Millard, Kjellman et al. (2003) for HMA to 
get a better notion on broader impact issues. Although becoming more accepted, impact is still see 
as an event and not as integral part of HMA (Harpviken, Millard, Kjellman et al. 2003, p.889). 
7.5 UNDP /GICHD study 
 
The 2001 Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action by the UNDP/GICHD also signalized 
improvements during the years in the pursuit for more and better embeddedness in HMA programs. 
Focus was not only on numbers of cleared square meters or explosive devices, but on HMA output 
such as types of land cleared, reductions in accident rates, return of IDPs and refugees, and the 
number of development projects assisted, in order to get positive socio-economic outcomes. It was 
found that actors from the non-HMA development actors have to guide HMA actors to ensure 
embeddedness of HMA in broader development objectives, but also HMA actors have to be pro-
active to have HMA activities incorporated into the planning of development actors. When a country 
turns from conflict to normal development, national authorities have to incorporate socio and 
economic goals into their development strategy and plan. In practice many problems arise in the 
transition between post-conflict to normal development. It is better to work together with other 
willing development actors, than operating independently (UNDP/GICHD 2001, p.3-10). 
7.6 Comparison 
 
As in the Netherlands, embeddedness became more important in Denmark and Sweden. Also the 
article of Kjellberg et al. and the UNDP/GICHD study saw the increasing interest of embeddedness 
of HMA in a broader development framework. The evaluations of Denmark and Sweden emphasized 
on that embeddedness/coordination between sectors failed, and possible solutions, and why. In this 
research on the Netherlands it was found that embeddedness was quite clear in most recipient 
countries on paper, but not always in practice. One reason was that socio-economic data of 
achievements was hard to find. Therefore it was difficult to give reasons for the lack of 
embeddedness. All sources saw problems and threats for a smooth cross-sectoral co-ordination. 
Both the Sida evaluation as Kjellberg et al. pointed out the distinct military background of HMA and 
the strong role of the MACs, which made embeddedness with other development sectors difficult.  
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8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Conclusions Based on the Research 
 
In this paragraph the main conclusions of this research will be drawn. The conclusions answer the 
main research question: 
 
How are the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development? 
 
The most important findings are: 
− Embeddedness was not seen as top-priority in the Dutch HMA policy, but coherence with 
existing plans for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the post-conflict community was 
requested; 
− HMA and its embedding were not mentioned in the 2003 Dutch macro policy paper on 
development cooperation. Only indirectly it can be brought in relation with several issues; 
− Embeddedness became more important during the years, for both donors, as recipient countries 
and NGOs. This was also found in other research; 
− Embeddedness was quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice; 
− Most embeddedness of HMA was on relief, recovery, repatriation, rehabilitation and sustainable 
development; 
− The impact of HMA was often safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed 
development opportunities. The exact socio-economic numbers are often unknown, which was 
also found in Danish research; 
− Therefore it was not possible to give a genuine judgment on the value of the embeddedness; 
− Other research concluded that embeddedness has failed to some extent. 
8.2 Recommendations for Future Policy 
 
From the conclusions, recommendations for future HMA policy are drawn. This answers the last sub 
question 10: 
 
10. Which recommendations can be made based on the conclusions of the research (explanative)? 
 
The conclusions show that there is uncertainty on the utility of embeddedness. Therefore no well-
grounded recommendations can be made. The only recommendation therefore is:  
 
It is necessary to get better insight into the socio-economic impact of HMA activities. A good 
strategy and/or method should be sought in cooperation with other donors, relevant UN 
organizations, and NGOs. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
APM Anti-personnel mine 
ATM Anti-tank mine (synonym of ATM) 
AVM Anti-vehicle mine (synonym for ATM) 
AXO Abandoned Explosive Ordnance 
BHMAC Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre 
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CCW Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
CMAA Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority 
CMAC Cambodian Mine Action Centre 
CMAO Central Mine Action Office 
CND Commissão Nacional de Desminagem, International De-mining Commission of 
Mozambique 
CNIDAH Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance 
CPAU Cooperation for Peace and Unity 
CWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
DAC Development Assistance Committee of the OECD 
Danida Danish International Development Agency, part of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
DDI/ST Dienst Documentaire Informatievoorziening/Semi-statisch archief, Documentary 
Information Systems Department/Semi-current Records Division 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
DFID UK Department for International Development 
DGIS Directoraat-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking, Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation 
DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs (changed into OCHA) 
DMV Directie Mensenrechten en Vredesopbouw, Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department 
EC European Commission 
EDA Eritrean Demining Agency 
EHDP Eritrean Humanitarian Demining Programme 
EMAP Eritrean Mine Action Programme 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
ERW Explosive Remnants of War. ERW is UXO plus AXO. 
EU European Union 
FEDMAC Federation Mine Action Center (BiH) 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
HALO 
Trust 
Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation Trust 
HDI Human Development Index 
HI Handicap International 
HMA Humanitarian Mine Action 
HOM Humanitair Ontmijnen, humanitarian de-mining 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDP Internally Displaced Person 
IGO Inter Governmental Organization 
IMAP Integrated Mine Action Programme 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards 
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action 
INAROEE Instituto Nacional de Remocao de Obstaculor e Engenhos Explosivos, Angolan National 
Institute for the Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Ordnance 
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IND Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, International De-mining Institute of Mozambique 
IOB Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie, Policy and Operations 
Evaluation Department of the Directorate-General for International Co-operation of the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
ITF International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims 
KZA Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (Committee for Southern Africa) 
LM Landmine Monitor 
LUMU Land Use Management Unit 
LUPU Land Use Planning Unit 
MAC Mine Action Capacity 
MACA Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan 
MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 
MAFP Mine Action for Peace 
MAG Mine Advisory Group 
MAPA Mine Action Program for Afghanistan 
MASG Mine Action Support Group 
MDD Mine Detection Dog 
META Mine Evaluation and Training Agency (Kabul) 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MgM Menschen gegen Minen 
MMT Mine Marking Team 
MvBZ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Coorperation 
NPA Norwegian People's Aid 
NRA National Regulatory Authority 
OCHA 
(UNOCHA) 
United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Ottawa 
Treaty 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
RSMAC Republika Srpska Mine Action Center (BiH) 
SAA Small Arms Ammunitions 
SIDA Swedish Development Agency 
St Vl. Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk 
TK Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Dutch lower house parliament 
TMF Thematische Medefinanciering, thematic co-financing 
TNO Nederlandse Organisatie voor toegepast-natuurwetenschappelijk onderzoek, Dutch 
organization for applied natural science research 
TSZ Temporary Security Zone 
UN United Nations 
UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNMAC United Nations Mine Action Centre (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
UNMACA United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan 
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services 
UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
UXO Lao Lao National UXO Programme 
VTF Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (United Nations) 
WFP World Food Programme 
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Appendix 2: Definitions 
 
Term Abbr Definition Source 
Abandoned 
explosive 
ordnance 
AXO Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, 
that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, 
and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or 
dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been 
primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use. 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2) 
Anti-handling 
device 
 A device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, 
attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an 
attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the 
mine. 
(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2) 
Anti-personnel 
mine 
APM A mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact 
of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more 
persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or 
contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with 
anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a 
result of being so equipped. 
(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2) 
Blinding Laser 
Weapons 
 Laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or 
as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to 
unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with 
corrective eyesight devices. 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 1995: Article 1) 
Existing 
explosive 
remnants of war 
 Means unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance that 
existed prior to the entry into force of this Protocol for the High 
Contracting Party on whose territory it exists 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2) 
Explosive 
ordnance 
 Conventional munitions containing explosives, with the exception of 
mines, booby traps and other devices as defined in Amended Protocol 
II of the CCW 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2) 
Explosive 
remnants of war 
ERW Unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. (Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2) 
Mine  A munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or 
other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or 
(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2) 
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contact of a person or a vehicle. 
Remotely-
delivered mine 
 A mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, 
rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines 
delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not 
considered to be "remotely delivered". 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2) 
Self-deactivating  Automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the 
irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example, a battery, that is 
essential to the operation of the munition. 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2) 
Self-destruction 
mechanism 
 An incorporated or externally attached automatically-functioning 
mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into which it 
is incorporated or to which it is attached. 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2) 
Self-
neutralization 
mechanism 
 An incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which renders 
inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated. 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2) 
Unexploded 
ordnance 
UXO Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise 
prepared for use and used in an armed conflict. It may have been 
fired, dropped, launched or projected and should have exploded but 
failed to do so. 
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2) 
    
Mine survey:    
General mine 
action 
assessment (IMAS 
8.10; previously 
called Level One: 
General Survey) 
 Aims are: assess the scale and impact of the landmine problem on the 
country and individual communities; investigate all reported and/or 
suspected areas of mine or UXO contamination, quantities and types of 
explosive hazards; and collect general information such as the security 
situation, terrain, soil characteristics, climate, routes, infrastructure 
and local support facilities, to assist the planning of future mine 
action projects. 
(GICHD 2006, p.48) 
Technical survey 
(IMAS 8.20; 
previously called 
Level Two: 
Technical 
Survey) 
 The primary aim of a technical survey is to collect sufficient 
information to enable the clearance requirement to be more  
accurately defined, including the areas to be cleared, the depth of 
clearance, local soil conditions and the vegetation characteristics. 
(GICHD 2006, p.51) 
Post-clearance 
documentation 
 All post-clearance inspections should be completed and any corrective 
action carried out. Permanent survey markers should be put down and 
(GICHD 2006, p.54) 
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(IMAS 8.30; 
previously called 
Level Three: 
Completion 
Survey) 
accurately recorded for future reference. And all necessary 
information such as monitoring and inspection reports should be 
collated and made available for the formal handover. 
Land use - 
Transport 
 Actual land use after clearance is for transport infrastructure, such as 
roads, bridges, railways or airstrips. 
(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11) 
Land use - 
Communal 
Infrastructure 
 Actual land use after clearance is for communal infrastructure, such as 
schools, health centres, churches or wells. 
(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11) 
Land use - 
Agriculture 
 Actual land use after clearance is for agriculture, including crops such 
as cassava, maize, rice and fruit. Excluded are smaller scale gardens 
inside any housing plots. 
(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11) 
Land use - 
Settlement 
 Actual land use after clearance is for housing plots, including smaller 
scale gardens inside the plots. 
(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11) 
Land use - Other  Actual land use after clearance is for does not fall into any other 
definition. 
(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11) 
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Appendix 3: States Parties of the Ottawa Treaty 
 
 
Source: (ICBL 2006a) 
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Appendix 4: Overview of the Financial Support on HMA by the Netherlands 
 
Table 0-1: Amount of the financial support by the Netherlands 
Country-related 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total % R*5 Y*6 
Afghanistan 750.000 2.500.000 1.500.000 1.350.000 3.434.180 2.000.000 2.090.000 1.468.561 1.345.038 16.437.779 13,7 2 9 
Albania     177.165     177.165 0,1 20 1 
Angola 4.670.500 4.008.815 4.101.000 1.800.000 1.095.508 1.143.170 500.000 1.096.631 2.000.076 19.916.200 16,6 1 9 
Azerbaijan*1     572.422  518.181 650.000 500.307 2.240.910 1,9 10 4 
BiH 250.000 500.000 2.100.000 1.179.245 1.000.000 1.000.000   499.500 6.528.745 5,5 6 7 
Cambodia 2.553.000 2.450.000 2.502.000 300.000 776.786 565.654 2.912.810 675.489 1.165.435 13.901.174 11,6 3 9 
Congo         252.000 252.000 0,2 19 1 
Eritrea     4.200.000 500.000 3.500.000 1.547.512 50.000 9.797.512 8,2 4 5 
Ethiopia      1.000.000    1.000.000 0,8 14 1 
FRY*2    2.892.948 364.998 376.761  697.072  4.331.779 3,6 8 4 
Georgia    190.101 446.905  376.015 300.000 123.543 1.436.564 1,2 13 5 
Guinea-Bissau      500.000 500.000   1.000.000 0,8 14 2 
Iraq 276.088    692.249 997.587  975.000 1.625.000 4.565.924 3,8 7 5 
Laos  100.000 470.000  500.000 500.000 500.000  351.000 2.421.000 2,0 9 6 
Mozambique 2.433.928  1.343.000 194.990 1.275.628 1.199.544 1.230.862 973.568 804.874 9.261.404 7,7 5 8 
Russian Federation 272.030         272.030 0,2 18 1 
Sudan         400.050 400.050 0,3 17 1 
Somalia    100.000  159.776 535.000 457.445 596.704 1.848.925 1,5 11 5 
Sri Lanka        465.987  465.987 0,4 16 1 
Yemen     80.000 500.000 500.000 300.000 198.000 1.578.000 1,3 12 5 
Other 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total    
HALO Trust       570.000 324.592 200.000 1.094.592 0,9   
ICBL      120.000 120.000  120.000 360.000 0,3   
ICRC    1.600.000 2.153.846 454.000 454.000 454.000 n/a. TMF*4 5.115.846 4,3   
HOM*3   10.000.000       10.000.000 8,4   
UNMAS VTF     1.730.770 1.500.000 1.500.000 600.000 n/a. TMF*4 5.330.770 4,5   
Total 11.205.546 9.558.815 22.016.000 9.607.284 18.500.457 12.516.492 15.806.868 10.985.857 10.231.527 120.428.846 100   
% 9,3 7,9 18,3 8,0 15,4 10,4 13,1 9,1 8,5 100    
*1 In Azerbaijan the program was undertaken in the Nagorno-Karabkh region 
*2 In the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) the program was undertaken in the Kosovo province, in nowadays Serbia 
*3 HOM = Humanitair OntMijnen (humanitarian de-mining). This fund was largely spent on research of the TNO research institute on mechanical mine 
clearance 
*4 TMF = Thematische Mede-Financiering (thematic co-financing) 
*5 R  = ranking of countries 
*6 Y  = number of years that programs were funded in the specific country 
Sums in US$ 
Source: (UNMAS 2006: The Netherlands) 
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Table 0-2: Funding by the Netherlands per HMA category 
Category 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total % 
Advocacy & Prevention:         1.090.440 1,0 
Campaign Support 110.000    100.000 120.000  120.000 450.000 0,4 
Conference Support  50.000   295.275    345.275 0,3 
General / Unspecified     177.165  120.000  297.165 0,3 
Coordination         10.347.198 9,3 
General / Unspecified   1.050.000     300.000 1.350.000 1,2 
Mine Action Centre Core Support 246.428  1.050.000  1.730.770 1.500.000 1.500.000 1.470.000 7.497.198 6,7 
Multilateral / Regional Core Support      1.500.000   1.500.000 1,3 
Information         2.297.000 2,1 
Surveys  1.297.000    1.000.000   2.297.000 2,1 
Integrated Mine Action 5.053.000 5.550.000 5.978.000 4.229.245 9.314.749 5.883.241 1.500.000  37.508.235 33,6 
Mine Awareness         6.183.972 5,5 
General / Unspecified 647.500  175.000  677.203  4.518.181  6.017.884 5,4 
Training 166.088        166.088 0,1 
Mine Clearance         36.691.612 32,9 
De-mining 2.873.000 1.510.598 2.177.000 4.050.069 3.528.951 1.801.735 5.913.825  21.855.178 19,6 
Dogs  1.201.217     570.000 324.592 2.095.809 1,9 
Equipment     364.998    364.998 0,3 
General / Unspecified 1.150.000      1.230.862 9.307.265 11.688.127 10,5 
Training 687.500        687.500 0,6 
Research & Development         10.000.000 9,0 
Equipment Development   10.000.000      10.000.000 9,0 
Victim Assistance         7.391.862 6,6 
General / Unspecified   1.761.000 1.600.000 2.153.846 711.516 454.000 454.000 7.134.362 6,4 
Prosthetics / Orthotics     257.500    257.500 0,2 
Total: 10.933.516 9.608.815 22.191.000 9.879.314 18.600.457 12.516.492 15.806.868 11.975.857 111.512.319 100 
PS: This table is without data for the year 2004. Total numbers differ slightly from the previous table. 
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: The Netherlands) 
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Appendix 5: Basic Key Indicators for the Analyzed Countries 
 
Table 0-3: Some key basic indicators about Afghanistan  
Subject  Value Year 
Continent  Asia  
Official name  Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
Capital  Kabul  
Type of government  Islamic republic  
Population inhabitants 31,1 million 2006 
Growth of population  2,67% 2006 
Area km2 647.500 (15,6x NL)  
Density inhabitants/km2 48,0 2006 
Development HDI n/a  
Life expectancy at 
birth years 43,34 2006 
Income GDP (PPP) per capita $800 2004 
Economy Real GDP growth/year 8,0-28,6% 2002-2005 
Sources: (CIA 2006: Afghanistan; EIU 2006a: Afghanistan) 
 
Table 0-4: Some key basic indicators about Angola  
Subject  Value Year 
Continent  Africa  
Official name  Republic of Angola  
Capital  Luanda  
Type of government  Unitary republic  
Population inhabitants 12,1 million 2006 
Growth of population  2,45% 2006 
Area km2 1.246.700 (30,0x NL)  
Density inhabitants/km2 9,7 2006 
Development HDI 0,445 (160th/177) 2003 
Life expectancy at 
birth years 38,62 2006 
Income GDP (PPP) per capita $3.200 2005 
Economy Real GDP growth/year 3,2-19,1% 2001-2005 
Sources: (CIA 2006: Angola; EIU 2006a: Angola; UNDP 2005, p.222) 
 
Table 0-5: Some key basic indicators about Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Subject  Value Year 
Continent  Europe  
Official name  Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Capital  Sarajevo  
Type of government  Emerging federal democratic republic  
Population inhabitants 4,5 million 2006 
Growth of population  1,35% 2006 
Area km2 51.129 (1,2x NL)  
Density inhabitants/km2 88,0 2006 
Development HDI 0,786 (68th/177) 2003 
Life expectancy at 
birth years 78 2006 
Income GDP (PPP) per capita $6.800 2005 
Economy Real GDP growth/year 4,0-5,7% 2001-2005 
Sources: (CIA 2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina; EIU 2006a: Bosnia and Herzegovina; UNDP 2005, p.220) 
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Table 0-6: Some key basic indicators about Cambodia 
Subject  Value Year 
Continent  Asia  
Official name  Cambodia  
Capital  Phnom Penh  
Type of government  Constitutional monarchy  
Population inhabitants 13,9 million 2006 
Growth of population  1,35% 2006 
Area km2 176.520 (4,3x NL)  
Density inhabitants/km2 78,6 2006 
Development HDI 0,571 (130th/177) 2003 
Life expectancy at 
birth years 59,29 2006 
Income GDP (PPP) per capita $2.200 2005 
Economy Real GDP growth/year 5,2-7,7% 2001-2005 
Sources: (CIA 2006: Cambodia; EIU 2006b: Cambodia; UNDP 2005, p.221) 
 
Table 0-7: Some key basic indicators about Eritrea 
Subject  Value Year 
Continent  Africa  
Official name  Eritrea  
Capital  Asmara  
Type of government  Unitary state  
Population inhabitants 4,8 million 2006 
Growth of population  2,47% 2006 
Area km2 121.320 (2,9x NL)  
Density inhabitants/km2 39,5 2006 
Development HDI 0,444 (161st/177) 2003 
Life expectancy at 
birth years 59,03 2006 
Income GDP (PPP) per capita $1.000 2005 
Economy Real GDP growth/year 0,7-3,0% 2002-2005 
Sources: (CIA 2006: Eritrea; EIU 2006a: Eritrea; UNDP 2005, p.222) 
 
Table 0-8: Some key basic indicators about Laos 
Subject  Value Year 
Continent  Asia  
Official name  Lao People’s Democratic Republic  
Capital  Vientiane  
Type of government  One-party rule  
Population inhabitants 6,4 million 2006 
Growth of population  2,39% 2006 
Area km2 230.800 (5,6x NL)  
Density inhabitants/km2 27,6 2006 
Development HDI 0,545 (133rd/177) 2003 
Life expectancy at 
birth years 55,49 2006 
Income GDP (PPP) per capita $1.900 2005 
Economy Real GDP growth/year 5,0-10,6% 2001-2005 
Sources: (CIA 2006: Laos; EIU 2006b: Laos; UNDP 2005, p.221) 
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Table 0-9: Some key basic indicators about Mozambique 
Subject  Value Year 
Continent  Africa  
Official name  Republic of Mozambique  
Capital  Maputo  
Type of government  Unitary republic  
Population inhabitants 19,7 million 2006 
Growth of population  1,38% 2006 
Area km2 784.090 (18,9x NL)  
Density inhabitants/km2 25,1 2006 
Development HDI 0,379 (168th/177) 2003 
Life expectancy at 
birth years 39,82 2006 
Income GDP (PPP) per capita $1.300 2005 
Economy Real GDP growth/year 7,2-13,0% 2001-2005 
Sources: (CIA 2006: Mozambique; EIU 2006b: Mozambique; UNDP 2005, p.222) 
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Appendix 6: HMA Funding by the Different Donors 
 
The tables in this appendix show the funds that different countries provided in the years 1996-2004 for HMA per recipient country. This data comes from 
the UNMAS Mine Action Investments website, which is an important database, which is annually updated by many HMA donors, including the Netherlands. 
 
Table 0-10: Donors that funded HMA programs in Afghanistan 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Share 
Australia   700.000  300.000     1.000.000 0,3% 
Austria     200.000 200.000 1.238.324 104.453 622.837 2.365.614 0,8% 
Belgium  250.000        250.000 0,1% 
Canada 24.386 1.492.426 337.150 984.599 94.262 3.811.910 5.939.500 7.296.780 7.822.356 35.575.906 12,0% 
Denmark    350.000  2.460.000   3.290.913 8.915.157 3,0% 
European Union 14.000.000  1.748.000 564.000  5.389.514    21.701.514 7,3% 
Finland 435.000 367.000 500.000 541.000 488.000 458.000 1.000.000 1.108.333 1.222.500 8.695.000 2,9% 
France  135.250        135.250 0,0% 
Germany  2.639.464 2.999.999 2.715.000 2.107.000 1.641.708 6.444.530 3.509.661 3.825.470 29.940.111 10,1% 
Italy   855.818 545.786 778.792 2.280.000 1.003.500  114.610 6.206.963 2,1% 
Japan  1.000.000 210.000 1.500.740 1.031.460 799.477 24.169.044 10.501.849 13.220.632 68.433.202 23,1% 
Korea, Republic 
of          75.000 0,0% 
Lithuania          100.000 0,0% 
Netherlands 750.000 2.500.000 1.500.000 1.350.000 3.434.180 2.000.000 2.090.000 1.468.561 1.345.038 16.437.779 5,5% 
Norway 706.212 1.375.000 4.258.500 1.362.500 705.654 1.264.700    12.582.435 4,2% 
Sweden    2.100.000      2.100.000 0,7% 
Switzerland       101.000 75.000 174.500 581.000 0,2% 
United Kingdom 1.640.000 3.200.000 1.744.000       11.300.939 3,8% 
United States   2.200.000 4.615.000 3.000.000 2.800.000   42.794.000 69.809.000 23,6% 
Total 17.555.598 12.959.140 17.053.467 16.628.625 12.139.348 23.105.309 41.985.898 24.064.637 74.432.856 296.204.870  
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Afghanistan) 
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Table 0-11: Donors that funded HMA programs in Angola 
Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Share 
Australia   750.000  62.000     812.000 0,6% 
Austria       158.180 147.583  305.763 0,2% 
Belgium  1.370.000 140.000       1.510.000 1,2% 
Canada 13.201 654.314 168.575 208.630 168.325 129.164 401.592 342.549 152.597 2.474.931 1,9% 
Denmark    1.250.000     993.262 3.484.868 2,7% 
European Union 7.240.000  1.607.000 4.060.000 178.118     13.085.118 10,2% 
Finland 98.000 367.000 500.000 541.000  422.000 833.200 1.108.333 1.222.500 6.615.728 5,2% 
France 600.370 1.237.123     239.400   2.076.893 1,6% 
Germany  1.531.122 2.531.391 1.105.000 326.000 518.111 1.628.969 2.784.300 4.188.806 17.114.792 13,3% 
Ireland    266.099      266.099 0,2% 
Italy    3.550.873   2.805.200 869.120 954.398 8.179.591 6,4% 
Japan 1.400.000 400.000  82.412  130.000  1.351.354 1.241.089 4.604.855 3,6% 
Netherlands 4.670.500 4.008.815 4.101.000 1.800.000 1.095.508 1.143.170 500.000 1.096.631 2.000.076 19.916.200 15,9% 
New Zealand  852.200 362.800 159.150      1.374.150 1,1% 
Norway 2.150.077 3.067.977 1.396.262 2.714.500 1.750.939 2.259.999    16.704.386 13,0% 
Switzerland       400.000 320.000 658.000 2.016.000 1,6% 
United Kingdom          2.002.666 1,6% 
United States   2.417.038 3.033.000 3.096.000 3.844.000   6.100.000 25.313.038 19,7% 
Total 16.172.148 13.488.551 13.974.066 18.770.664 6.676.890 8.446.444 6.966.541 8.019.870 17.510.728 128.356.578  
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Angola) 
 
Table 0-12: Donors that funded HMA programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Share 
Austria    518.171 474.743 130.658 115.544 481.654 459.240 2.180.010 1,5% 
Belgium  710.000        710.000 0,5% 
Canada 11.184 1.184.986 1.665.521 2.421.358 1.158.076 1.168.059 979.146 1.330.618 1.983.947 12.925.180 9,1% 
Denmark   400.000 400.000      800.000 0,6% 
European Union 12.290.000  2.583.000 5.640.000 3.330.806 5.293.412    29.137.218 20,5% 
Finland 457.000  196.000 541.000 327.000 540.000 709.000 188.417 207.825 3.166.242 2,2% 
France  274.916 274.916       549.832 0,4% 
Germany  450.371 724.136 577.500 911.500 748.825 1.692.937 1.386.528 1.736.823 10.268.620 7,2% 
Ireland    229.618      229.618 0,2% 
Italy  3.445.187    420.000 1.829.587 496.640 682.200 6.873.614 4,8% 
Japan 1.300.030  1.195.644 1.095.750 3.100.000 832.061 171.180   7.694.665 5,4% 
Korea, Republic 
of     60.000     60.000 0,0% 
Netherlands 250.000 500.000 2.100.000 1.179.245 1.000.000 1.000.000   499.500 6.528.745 4,6% 
Norway 4.882.250 2.936.030 3.734.463 2.629.375 3.015.716 1.663.241    19.696.074 13,9% 
Slovenia   1.300.000 298.042 102.087 225.346 171.168 222.296 156.299 2.748.866 1,9% 
Switzerland    1.120.000 398.000 345.000 267.070 120.000 135.000 2.706.070 1,9% 
United Kingdom 24.000         48.368 0,0% 
United States   9.400.000 7.739.000 5.500.000 5.661.000   3.500.000 35.673.000 25,1% 
Total 19.214.464 9.501.490 23.573.680 24.389.059 19.377.928 18.027.602 5.935.632 4.226.153 9.360.834 141.996.122  
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
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Table 0-13: Donors that funded HMA programs in Cambodia 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Share 
Australia   2.900.000 3.648.000 2.023.000     8.571.000 5,6% 
Austria    546.166 133.300 71.283    750.749 0,5% 
Belgium  850.000 2.025.000 1.159.210 284.000 337.931    4.656.141 3,0% 
Canada 537.766 529.553 664.492 535.708 1.599.761 1.409.164 690.208 1.188.485 2.790.490 9.945.627 6,5% 
European Union 3.666.000  4.889.000 902.000      9.457.000 6,2% 
Finland 218.000 2.298.000 757.000 751.200 3.150.600 1.328.000 1.109.900 1.232.778 1.246.950 12.092.428 7,9% 
France 796.592    754.426 323.669 1.104.603   2.979.290 1,9% 
Germany  443.616 321.839 1.275.000 1.535.000 1.383.695 1.018.489 697.248 884.400 7.559.287 4,9% 
Ireland    128.963      128.963 0,1% 
Italy    485.143      485.143 0,3% 
Japan 2.778.510  1.726.921 7.446.881 5.893.396 3.030.932 9.494.634 3.242.891 18.312.675 51.926.840 33,8% 
Korea, Republic 
of  50.000 25.000 25.000 80.000 70.000    250.000 0,2% 
Netherlands 2.553.000 2.450.000 2.502.000 300.000 776.786 565.654 2.912.810 675.489 1.165.435 13.901.174 9,1% 
New Zealand 75.000 376.550 275.500 283.500  120.000 40.000 37.000  1.207.550 0,8% 
Norway 1.216.602 1.607.732 1.632.625 562.500 861.557 107.777    5.988.793 3,9% 
United Kingdom 1.693.920 1.103.497 2.611.659       5.409.076 3,5% 
United States   2.900.000 3.000.000 3.119.500 4.591.000   4.631.000 18.241.500 11,9% 
Total 13.535.390 9.708.948 23.231.036 21.049.271 20.211.326 13.339.105 16.370.644 7.073.891 29.030.950 153.550.561  
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Cambodia) 
 
Table 0-14: Donors that funded HMA programs in Eritrea 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Share 
Canada      1.072.063 68.175 150.000 317.454 1.607.692 6,8% 
Denmark      2.199.000    2.199.000 9,3% 
European Union      1.551.228    1.551.228 6,5% 
Finland      99.000    99.000 0,4% 
Germany      727.851 99.989  284.986 1.112.826 4,7% 
Italy         114.610 114.610 0,5% 
Japan       563.385   563.385 2,4% 
Netherlands     4.200.000 500.000 3.500.000 1.547.512  9.747.512 41,2% 
Norway      333.333    333.333 1,4% 
Switzerland      75.000 488.000 287.500 325.000 1.175.500 5,0% 
United States   2.025.000  500.000 1.205.000   1.452.000 5.182.000 21,9% 
Total 0 0 2.025.000 0 4.700.000 7.762.475 4.719.549 1.985.012 2.494.050 23.686.086  
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Eritrea) 
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Table 0-15: Donors that funded HMA programs in Lao PDR 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Share 
Australia   630.000 1.008.000 890.000     2.528.000 6,0% 
Belgium  425.000 810.000 417.500 417.500 496.074    2.566.074 6,1% 
Canada 10.719 10.555 306.807 100.950 100.995 228.621 173.650 171.593 314.675 1.418.565 3,4% 
Denmark  360.000        360.000 0,9% 
European Union 3.271.000  3.045.000       6.316.000 15,0% 
Finland  283.000   325.000  300.000 332.500 366.750 1.607.250 3,8% 
Germany  991.294 1.183.908 1.085.000 884.000 827.967 745.212 705.734 585.009 7.008.124 16,7% 
Italy       150.225   150.225 0,4% 
Japan  250.000 33.582 200.000 75.148  200.000 200.000  958.730 2,3% 
Korea, Republic 
of     50.000 50.000    100.000 0,2% 
Netherlands  100.000 470.000  500.000 500.000 500.000  351.000 2.421.000 5,8% 
New Zealand  239.250 232.250 224.100      695.600 1,7% 
Norway  187.500 312.500 687.500 877.605 666.665    2.731.770 6,5% 
United Kingdom 237.291 101.250 528.000       866.541 2,1% 
United States   4.630.000 3.300.000 1.486.000 993.000   1.912.000 12.321.000 29,3% 
Total 3.519.010 2.947.849 12.182.047 7.023.050 5.606.248 3.762.327 2.069.087 1.409.827 3.529.434 42.048.879  
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Laos) 
 
Table 0-16: Donors that funded HMA programs in Mozambique 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Share 
Australia   140.000 2.652.000 700.000     3.492.000 4,3% 
Austria     373.300  270.389 400.000  1.043.689 1,3% 
Canada 18.335 25.277 438.296 1.728.937 2.212.417 1.066.661 1.317.342 873.600 576.249 8.257.114 10,2% 
Denmark    2.000.000 2.000.000    53.475 4.053.475 5,0% 
European Union 2.871.000   81.000      2.952.000 3,6% 
Finland 98.000 1.000.000 2.802.000 1.351.000 195.000 1.070.000 336.300   6.852.300 8,4% 
France  41.234 2.611.522    687.240   3.339.996 4,1% 
Germany  416.051 1.628.063 525.000 986.000 1.277.287 912.007 1.004.560 196.000 6.944.968 8,6% 
Italy       903.150   903.150 1,1% 
Japan   1.000.000 264.000 600.000 932.402  690.273 662.478 4.149.153 5,1% 
Korea, Republic 
of     50.000     50.000 0,1% 
Netherlands 2.433.928  1.343.000 194.990 1.275.628 1.199.544 1.230.862 973.568 804.874 9.456.394 11,7% 
New Zealand  254.250 195.750 162.500  54.000    666.500 0,8% 
Norway 2.546.000 1.974.125 1.966.375 937.500 1.628.004 1.666.666    10.718.670 13,2% 
Slovenia     20.174     20.174 0,0% 
Switzerland    82.000 1.124.000 950.000 1.160.000 705.000 728.000 4.749.000 5,9% 
United Kingdom  780.000 580.000       1.360.000 1,7% 
United States   2.600.000 3.000.000 3.839.999 2.480.000   182.000 12.101.999 14,9% 
Total 7.967.263 4.490.937 15.305.006 12.978.927 15.004.522 10.696.560 6.817.290 4.647.001 3.203.076 81.110.582  
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Mozambique)
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Appendix 7: Programs Funded by the Netherlands 
 
The tables in this appendix shows activities funded by the Netherlands. The numbers of the tables in this and previous appendix may differ, due to the 
difference in Euro (guilder) and US$ rate, and difficulties finding certain information from archives and databases.  
 
Table 0-17: Funded programs in Afghanistan 
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AF005601 Mine clearance, management support, and co-ordination of OCHA activities 
01/01
/1997 
31/12
/1998 DHA OCHA  1.247.896        1.247.896 
AF006301 
Mine awareness, mine clearance training, 
mine identification, mine survey, mine 
clearance (manual and mechanical), and 
support for management, monitoring and 
logistics of the Mine Action Plan. 
01/01
/1997 
31/12
/1998 OCHA OCHA  1.361.341        1.361.341 
WW131501 Mine clearance 01/01/1997 
31/12
/1998 ICRC ICRC  453.780        453.780 
WW135107 
Mine awareness, mine clearance training, 
minefield survey and marking, and mine 
clearance 
01/01
/1998 
31/12
/1999 OCHA OCHA   907.560       907.560 
WW152709 Mine and ERW clearance, mine survey, evaluation and training, mine awareness 
01/01
/1999 
31/12
/2000 OCHA OCHA    1.361.341      1.361.341 
WW165511 
Mine clearance, mine identification and 
marking, mine awareness, and mine 
clearance training 
01/01
/2000 
30/06
/2001 OCHA OCHA     3.176.462     3.176.462 
WW165531 Mine clearance 01/10/2000 
31/12
/2001 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust     434.784 129.685 125.611   690.080 
WW185802 Mine clearance 01/01/2001 
31/12
/2001 OCHA OCHA      1.123.028    1.123.028 
WW185818 Mine and ERW clearance 01/01/2001 
31/12
/2002 OCHA OCHA      1.132.567 1.135.912   2.268.479 
6411 Mine and ERW clearance 01/01/2003 
31/12
/2003 UNMAS UNMAS        600.000  600.000 
9768 Mine and ERW clearance, mine survey and marking, and mine awareness 
01/01
/2004 
31/12
/2005 UNMAS UNMAS         499.500 499.500 
Total      0 3.063.017 907.560 1361.341 3.611.246 2385.280 1.261.523 600.000 499.500 13.689.467 
* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases) 
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Table 0-18: Funded programs in Angola 
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AO005903 Mine awareness 01/06/1996 
31/12
/1998 UNICEF UNICEF 587.645         587.645 
AO005904 
Mine clearance, to make 
humanitarian aid programs 
possible 
01/10
/1996 
30/09
/1998 KZA NPA 1.211.593 340.335 1.007.392 84.071      2.643.392 
AO005906 
Mine clearance, to make the 
return of IDPs and the recovery of 
rural infrastructure possible 
01/08
/1996 
31/10
/1999 WFP WFP 1.043.920         1.043.920 
AO006801 Mine survey, priority setting for mine clearance 
01/01
/1997 
31/12
/1997 NPA NPA  928.199  119.556      1.047.755 
AO006802 Mine clearance training, and mine clearance with MDDs 
01/07
/1997 
30/06
/1998 NPA NPA  537.485 329.882 213.008      1.080.375 
AO006803 
Mine clearance, to make the 
return of IDPs and the recovery of 
rural infrastructure possible 
01/10
/1997 
30/06
/1998 MgM MgM  1.224.768 71.725 51.873      1.348.365 
WW135102 Mine survey 01/01/1998 
31/12
/1998 NPA NPA   720.403 188.250      908.652 
WW152703 Mechanical mine clearance, to make the return of IDPs possible 
01/01
/1999 
31/12
/1999 NPA NPA    278.418   40.893   319.311 
WW152704 ERW clearance 01/01/1999 
31/12
/1999 NPA NPA    175.658   45.223   220.881 
WW152705 
Mine clearance, to make the 
return of IDPs and the recovery of 
rural infrastructure possible 
01/01
/1999 
31/12
/1999 MgM MgM    869.636   41.811   911.447 
WW165516 
Mine clearance to support 
humanitarian programs of WFP 
programs 
01/01
/2000 
31/12
/2001 WFP MgM     595.085     595.085 
WW165517 Victim assistance and social rehabilitation  
01/01
/2000 
30/09
/2001 St Vl. HI NL     229.023  44.198   273.220 
WW165518 EOD and mechanical mine clearance 
01/01
/2000 
31/12
/2000 NPA NPA     368.350  52.306   420.656 
WW185801 
De-mining of infrastructure 
(bridges, roads) in order to make 
the population more mobile, 
facilitating humanitarian 
programs, clear agricultural area 
in order to increase ability to live, 
rebuild social infrastructure 
01/01
/2001 
31/12
/2001 NPA NPA      608.792    608.792 
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WW185810 De-mining 01/01/2001 
31/12
/2001 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust      428.541 95.657   524.198 
WW192402 De-mining 01/01/2002 
31/12
/2002 NPA NPA       408.000   408.000 
WW207102 De-mining 01-jan-03 
31-
dec-04 NPA NPA        372.000  372.000 
4423 De-mining 01/01/2003 
31/12
/2004 NPA NPA        400.000 49.674 449.674 
6466 De-mining 01/01/2001 
31/12
/2004 NPA NPA        129.426  129.426 
6478 De-mining 01/01/2002 
31/12
/2004 NPA NPA        100.000  100.000 
Total      2.845.154 3.030.787 2.129.402 1.980.470 1.192.458 1.037.333 728.008 1.001.426 49.674 13.994.712 
* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases) 
 
Table 0-19: Funded programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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BA002801 Set up a school for mine clearance training for demobilized soldiers, mine clearance 
01/05/
1996 
30/04/
1997 NPA NPA 181.512   17.205      198.717 
BA007101 
Mine awareness, mine information and 
minefield marking, mine/UXO clearance.  
training 
01/01/
1997 
31/12/
1997 DHA DHA 453.780         453.780 
WW135106 Mine survey and marking, mine awareness, mine clearance, training 
01/01/
1998 
31/12/
1998 UNDP UNMAC   952.938       952.938 
WW152707 De-mining, institution building of national MAC 
01/01/
1999 
31/12/
2002 UNDP UNDP    1.118.825      1.118.825 
WW185811 De-mining 01/06/2001 
31/05/
2003 UNDP UNDP      688.787 389.937   1.078.724 
9685 
Mine awareness, mine information and 
minefield marking, mine/UXO clearance.  
training 
01/01/
2004 
31/12/
2004 UNDP UNDP         499.500 499.500 
Total      635.292 0 952.938 1.136.030 0 688.787 389.937 0 499.500 4.302.484 
* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases) 
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Table 0-20: Funded programs in Cambodia 
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KH006801 De-mining 01/07/1996 
31/12
/1996 UNDP CMAC 2.317.361         2.317.361 
KH009201 De-mining 01/10/1997 
31/03
/1998 UNDP CMAC  2.217.103        2.217.103 
WW135108 De-mining 01/10/1998 
30/06
/1999 UNDP CMAC   1.089.164 1.181.406      2.270.570 
WW152711 De-mining 01/07/1999 
31/12
/1999 UNDP CMAC    292.688      292.688 
WW165532 
De-mining for safety of civilians, 
facilitating the return of IDPs and 
recovery of agriculture 
01/12
/2000 
31/12
/2001 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust     300.667 16.648 59.007   376.322 
WW165534 
Mine clearance aimed at IDPs and 
landless, agriculture, rehabilitation 
and social infrastructure 
01/03
/2001 
30/04
/2002 NPA CMAC     424.937 579.106 47.281   1.051.324 
WW192401 De-mining, ERW clearance, and mine awareness 
01/05
/2002 
30/04
/2004 NPA NPA       681.607   681.607 
WW207101 Mechanical mine clearance, mine risk education 
01/01
/2003 
31/12
/2004 NPA NPA        372.000  372.000 
6476 De-mining 01/05/2003 
31/12
/2005 NPA NPA        969.093 189.435 1.158.528 
Total      2.317.361 2.217.103 1.089.164 1.474.094 725.604 595.754 787.895 1.341.093 189.435 10.737.503 
* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases) 
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Table 0-21: Funded programs in Eritrea 
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WW165535 Mine clearance 01/12/2000 
31/12/
2001 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust     2.918.678 1.536.679 216.203   4.671.559 
WW185819 Mine action centre core support, mine awareness 
01/01/
2001 
31/12/
2002 UNDP UNOPS      559.754    559.754 
WW192404 Mine awareness 01/01/2002 
31/12/
2002 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust       3.570.000   3.570.000 
6323 Mine clearance 01/01/2003 
31/12/
2005 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust        1.547.512  1.547.512 
10093 Evaluation of HMA 01/01/2004 
31/12/
2004 UNMAS GICHD         50.000 50.000 
Total      0 0 0 0 2.918.678 2.096.433 3.786.203 1.547.512 50.000 10.398.825 
* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases) 
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Table 0-22: Funded programs in Laos 
M
F
A
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
H
M
A
*
1
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
 
S
t
a
r
t
 
E
n
d
 
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
n
g
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
E
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
4
 
LA001301*2 
UXO awareness, training and capacity 
building for mine and UXO clearance and 
UXO survey 
01/01
/1996 
31/12
/1996 UNDP UNDP 265.129         265.129 
LA001302 
UXO awareness, training and capacity 
building for mine and UXO clearance and 
UXO survey 
01/01
/1997 
31/03
/1998 UNDP UNDP  88.487        88.487 
WW135109*2 UXO awareness, training and capacity building, mine clearance 
01/04
/1998 
31/03
/2000 UNDP UNDP   426.553       426.553 
WW165509 UXO awareness, training and capacity building, mine clearance 
01/04
/2000 
31/03
/2001 UNDP UNDP     555.881     555.881 
WW185806 UXO clearance 01/04/2001 
31/12
/2001 UNDP UNDP      540.161    540.161 
WW192406 UXO clearance 01/01/2002 
31/12
/2002 UNDP UNDP       514.060   514.060 
9686 UXO awareness, training and capacity building, mine clearance 
01/01
/2004 
31/12
/2004 UNDP UNDP         390.000 390.000 
Total      265.129 88.487 426.553 0 555.881 540.161 514.060 0 390.000 2.780.271 
*1 see §2.4; *2 information is derived from other sources and could not be fully verified; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and 
Piramide databases) 
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Table 0-23: Funded programs in Mozambique 
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MZ003314 De-mining, creating de-mining capacity 
01/01
/1996 
31/12
/1997 NPA NPA 757.813 730.534        1.488.347 
MZ003315 De-mining, creating de-mining capacity 
01/09
/1996 
31/08
/1999 HI FR HI FR 234.164   194.218      428.382 
MZ006306 Capacity building, development of a national mine action plan 
01/01
/1996 
31/12
/1997 UNDP UNDP 246.428?         246.428 
MZ014501 De-mining, creating de-mining capacity 
01/01
/1998 
31/12
/1999 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust   249.179 83.794  7.245    340.218 
WW135105 De-mining, creating de-mining capacity 
01/01
/1998 
31/12
/1999 NPA NPA     459.887 82.967    542.854 
WW152103 Review of de-mining activities 01/02/1999 
30/04
/1999 DGIS 
Agenda
*2    12.388      12.388 
WW152706 Manual and mechanical mine clearance 
01/01
/1999 
31/12
/1999 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust    147.235      147.235 
WW152718 Manual and mechanical mine clearance 
01/01
/1999 
31/12
/1999 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust     19.613     19.613 
WW165502 Manual, MDD and mechanical mine clearance 
01/01
/2000 
31/01
/2001 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust     373.017 226.983    600.000 
WW165508 Mine clearance 01/01/2000 
31/12
/2000 NPA NPA     474.524  35.726   510.250 
WW165513 Mine survey 01/05/2000 
30/04
/2001 HI FR HI FR     147.313  35.795   183.108 
WW185807 De-mining 01/02/2001 
31/01
/2002 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust      607.869 137.719   745.588 
WW185813 De-mining 01/01/2001 
31/12
/2001 NPA NPA      459.856  25.651  485.507 
WW192404 De-mining 01/01/2002 
31/12
/2002 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust       614.170   614.170 
WW192405 De-mining 01/01/2002 
31/12
/2002 NPA NPA       408.000 88.933  496.933 
5809 De-mining 01/01/2003 
31/12
/2004 NPA NPA        240.000 26.529 266.529 
6323 De-mining 01/01/2003 
31/12
/2005 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust        673.568  673.568 
6607 De-mining 01/09/2003 
31/12
/2008 
HALO 
Trust 
HALO 
Trust         454.387 454.387 
6608 De-mining 01/09/2003 
31/12
/2008 NPA NPA         270.000 270.000 
Total      1.238.405 730.534 249.179 437.635 1.474.354 1.384.920 1.231.410 1.028.152 750.916 8.525.505 
*1 see §2.4; *2 Agenda Utredning & Utvikling AS; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases) 
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Appendix 8: Achievements of the HMA Programs 
 
Table 0-24: Achievements in Afghanistan 
General information Activity  [unit] Target Achievement % 
AF006301 DHA/OCHA Clearance  m2 28.000.000 33.620.930 120% 
01/01/1997 31/12/1997  landmines   33.752  
   UXO   192.639  
Netherlands:  € 1.361.341   cost/m2  US$0,60  
Total:  $ 20.166.000 Survey  m2 20.000.000 130.200.000 651% 
  Survey/clearing  battlefield m2 20.000.000 49.230.514 246% 
  Marking  m2 2.500.000   
  Awareness  people 600.000 986.000 164% 
WW135107 OCHA Clearance  minefield m2 42.000.000 n/a  
01/01/1998 31/12/1999  battle field m2 48.500.000 n/a  
  Survey  minefield m2 41.000.000 n/a  
Netherlands:  $ 1.087.000  battle field m2 51.500.000 n/a  
Total:  $ 25.644.282 Awareness  persons 1.075.000 n/a  
WW152709 OCHA Clearance mine m2 34.700.000 34.200.000 99% 
01/01/1999 31/12/2002  landmines   27.951  
   UXO m2 54.500.000 75.700.000 139% 
Netherlands:  € 1.361.341  UXO   265.344  
Total:  $ 24.000.000 Survey mine m2 33.000.000 37.100.000 112% 
   landmines   467  
   UXO m2 54.000.000 77.900.000 144% 
   UXO   1.046  
  Awareness  people 1.000.0000 1.500.000 150% 
WW165511 OCHA Clearance mine m2 27.200.000 24.000.000 88% 
01/01/2000 30/06/2001  landmines   13.975  
   UXO m2 73.500.000 80.300.000 109% 
Netherlands:  € 3.176.462   UXO  298.370  
Total:  $ 22.782.013 Survey mine m2 22.300.000 32.100.000 144% 
   landmines   202  
   UXO m2 67.500.000 90.200.000 134% 
    UXO  521  
  Awareness  people 1.270.000 1.080.000 85% 
WW165531 HALO Trust Manual clearance  m
2  729.761  
01/10/2000 31/12/2001 Landmines    431  
  UXO    270  
Netherlands:  $ 634.180 Mechanical clearance  m
2  301.397  
  Landmines    149  
  UXO    115  
  Survey  m2  > 463.435  
  Landmines    8  
  UXO    19  
WW185802/  OCHA Clearance mine m2 49.000.000 64.900.000 132% 
WW185818   UXO m2 104.500.000 169.200.000 162% 
01/01/2001 31/12/2002 Survey mine m2 61.800.000 33.400.000 54% 
   UXO m2 100.600.000 167.300.000 166% 
Netherlands:  € 2.268.479 Awareness  people 1.860.000 3.087.231 166% 
Total:   Total Mine/UXO*1    272.869  
  APM*2    36.793  
  ATM*2    2.769  
  UXO*2    882.323  
6411 UMNAS Clearance mine m2  33.900.000  
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01/01/2003 31/12/2003  UXO m2  69.200.000  
   APM   18.979  
Netherlands:  € 600.000  ATM   5.318  
   UXO   1.727.461  
  Survey mine m2  38.300.000  
   UXO m2  66.400.000  
   APM   522  
   ATM   31  
   UXO   510  
  EOD APM   829  
   ATM   2.913  
   UXO   565.510  
  Awareness    2.595.690  
9768 UNMAS Clearance high priority m2  21.400.000  
01/01/2004   reconstruction needs m
2  9.200.000  
Netherlands:  € 499.500  former battlefield m
2  73.900.000  
  Marking high priority m2  22.500.000  
   reconstruction needs m
2  11.300.000  
   former battlefield  m
2  34.000.000  
   grazing m2  120.000.000  
  Education school teachers   25.000  
   other teachers   5.000  
*1 2001 
*2 2002 
 
Project Report  Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004) 
 
Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)  XXXII  September 28, 2006 
 
Table 0-25: Achievements in Angola 
General information Activity  [unit] Target Achievement % 
AO005904 KZA/NPA Clearance manual m2  478.384  
01/10/1996 31/12/1998  APM   619  
   ATM   207  
Netherlands:  € 2.643.392  UXO   1.303  
AO005906 WFP Clearance manual m2  306.299  
01/08/1996 31/10/1999*1  mines   588  
   UXO   21  
Netherlands: € 1.043.920  mechanical m2  136.000  
Total: $ 3.000.000  mines   3  
  EOD UXO   40.000  
  Survey  m  1.000.000  
AO006803 MgM Clearance road m  66.050  
01/10/1997 30/06/1998   m2  432.989  
   APM   30  
Netherlands: € 1.348.365  ATM   20  
   UXO   198  
    cost/m2  $1,55  
    cost/explosive  $19.630  
WW152703 NPA Clearance mechanical m2 3.750.000 2.918.173 78% 
01/01/1999 31/12/1999  APM   254  
   ATM   24  
Netherlands: € 319.311  UXO   70.544  
  Verified  m2  611.224  
WW152717 MgM Clearance manual m2  4.190  
01/01/1999 31/12/1999  MaD *2 m2  5.027  
   MaM *2 m2  1.627  
Netherlands: € 911.447  mechanical m2  559.200  
Total: $ 1.680.000  road m  61.700  
   mines   38  
   UXO   832  
WW165516 WFP/MgM Clearance road m  42.300  
01/01/2000 31/12/2001  area m2  211.400  
   mines   691  
   UXO   449  
WW165518 NPA Clearance mechanical m2 500.000 335.163 67% 
01/01/2000 31/12/2000  EOD m2  125.205  
   APM   29  
Netherlands: € 420.656  ATM   1  
   UXO   69.817  
  Verification mechanical m2  596  
   EOD m2  525.674  
4423 NPA Clearance area m2  1.899.615  
01/01/2003 31/12/2004  road m  n/a  
   APM   586  
Netherlands: €400.000  ATM   219  
   UXO   6.393  
  Verification  m2  1.087.260  
  Affected  people   301.787  
6466 NPA Clearance area m2  558.661  
01/01/2001 31/12/2004  road m  1.049.400  
   APM   149  
Netherlands: € 129.426  ATM   9  
   UXO   745  
  Verification  m2  188.325  
  Affected  people   31.941  
*1 Achievements for 22/06/1998 – 31/12/1998 
*2 MaD = Mechanically assisted Dog Demining; MaM = Mechanically assisted Manual Demining  
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Table 0-26: Achievements in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
General information Activity  [unit] Target Achievement % 
BA007101 DHA Clearance  m2  4.500.000  
01/01/1997 31/12/1997  houses   3.144  
   mines    28.245  
Netherlands: € 453.780  UXO   19.572  
  Personnel    1.460  
WW135106 UNDP/UNMAC Clearance  m2  6.446.380  
01/01/1998 31/12/1998  houses   701  
   APM   3.815  
Netherlands: € 952.938  ATM   229  
   UXO   2.722  
WW152707 UNDP Clearance*1  m2 14.500.000 6.001.392 41% 
01/01/1999 31/12/2002  houses/facilities   300  
   APM   1.532  
Netherlands: € 1.118.825  ATM   251  
   UXO   1.575  
  Survey*1  m2  55.594.000  
  Efficiency NGO Cost/m2  $ 1,93  
   commercial Cost/m2  $ 1,33  
   governmental Cost/m2  $ 1,56  
WW185811 UNDP Clearance*2  m2 7.250.000 2.000.395 27% 
01/06/2001 31/05/2003  houses/facilities   152  
   APM   700  
Netherlands: € 1.078.724  ATM   93  
Total: $ 6.407.985  UXO   869  
  Survey*2  m2 52.160.000 44.861.800 86% 
9685 UNDP Clearance  m2  2.612.000  
01/01/2004 31/12/2004  mines   3.226  
  Survey  m2  472.340.000  
Netherlands: € 499.500       
Total: $ 4.722.188       
*1 Achievements for 2002 
*2 Achievements for 01/01/2002 – 30/06/2002 
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Table 0-27: Achievements in Cambodia 
General information Activity  [unit] Target Achievement % 
KH006801 UNDP/CMAC Clearance  m2  56.300.000  
01/07/1996 31/12/1996  mines   4.205  
   UXO   16.810  
Netherlands: € 2.317.361       
KH009201 UNDP/CMAC Clearance  m2  7.371.849  
01/10/1997 31/03/1998  APM   7.204  
   ATM   121  
Netherlands: € 2.217.103  UXO   17.532  
   fragments   13.381.189  
  De-miners working days   116.014  
WW135108 UNDP/CMAC Clearance *1  m2  2.027.245  
01/10/1998 30/06/1999  APM   3.559  
   ATM   4  
Netherlands: € 2.270.570  UXO   6.932  
   fragments   6.714.002  
  De-miners working days   124.352  
WW165532 HALO Trust Clearance *2  m2  105.700  
01/12/2000 31/12/2001  APM   153  
   ATM   0  
Netherlands: € 376.322  UXO   159  
WW165534 NPA/CMAC Clearance platoon m2 1.140.000 1.720.437 151% 
01/03/2001 30/04/2002  APM   719  
   ATM   68  
Netherlands: € 1.051.324  UXO   550  
   MMT m2  42.626  
  EOD APM   1.178  
   ATM   63  
   UXO   5.369  
   total  6.200 6.610 107% 
  Marking MMT m 32.000 52.875 165% 
WW192401 NPA Clearance*4 platoon m2 1.272.000 1.033.361 81% 
01/05/2002 30/04/2004  APM   2.932  
   ATM   89  
Netherlands: € 681.607  UXO   11.287  
Total: $ 4.108.271*3  MMT m2 36.000 10.230 28% 
   mechanical m2 96.000 72.932 76% 
   MDD m2 384.000 409.587 107% 
  EOD*4 explosives  7.200 10.018 139% 
  Awareness*4 presentations  80 193 241% 
   participants   19.595  
WW207101 NPA Clearance mechanical m2  90.884  
01/01/2003 31/12/2004 EOD UXO   2.847  
  Risk education participants   2.460  
Netherlands: € 372.000       
*1 Achievements for 01/01/1998 – 31/03/1999 
*2 Achievements for 01/01/2001 – 31/12/2001 
*3 For the period 01/01/2002 – 01/07/2002 
*4 Achievements for 01/11/2002 – 31/10/2003 
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Table 0-28: Achievements in Eritrea 
General information Activity  [unit] Target Achievement % 
WW165535 HALO Trust Clearance  m2  1.026.892  
01/12/2000 31/12/2001  mines   1.638  
   UXO   109  
Netherlands: € 4.671.559  stray ammo   0  
  EOD  m2  4.554.505  
   mines   32  
   UXO   363  
   stray ammo   6.329  
  Personnel    465  
 
Table 0-29: Achievements of some HMA programs in Laos 
General information Activity  [unit] Target Achievement % 
LA001302 UNDP Clearance*1  m2 600.000 1.588.100 265% 
01/01/1997 31/03/1998  UXO  10.500 7.515 72% 
  Roving*1 villages visited  450 678 151% 
Netherlands: € 88.487  UXO  27.000 35.583 132% 
  Awareness*1 courses  24 n/a  
   students  374 327 87% 
WW165509 UNDP Clearance  m2 10.050.000 7.430.000 74% 
01/04/2000 31/03/2001  bombies  5.500 n/a  
   UXO  14.500 14.016 97% 
Netherlands: € 555.881 Roving villages visited  857 2.046 239% 
Total: $ 3.096.057  bombies  45.000 n/a  
   UXO  42.000 66.522 158% 
  Awareness villages  759 813 107% 
   people  190.000 256.582 135% 
  Training de-miners  158 127 80% 
   medics  17 21 124% 
   
surveyors and 
additional 
provincial 
support staff 
 20 20 100% 
   other   84  
   courses   18  
  Efficiency cost per m2   $ 0,34  
   cost per beneficiary   $ 11,96  
WW185806 UNDP Clearance*2  m2 9.500.000 8.730.000 92% 
01/04/2001 31/12/2001  UXO  80.000 82.724 103% 
  Roving*2 villages  927 2.107 227% 
Netherlands: € 540.161 Awareness*2 villages  847 766 90% 
Total: $ 6.080.660  people  324.631 181.963 56% 
  Training*2 courses   21  
   graduates   241  
WW192406 UNDP Clearance  m2 8.090.000 8.425.230 104% 
01/01/2002 31/12/2002  UXO  80.000 15.920 20% 
  Roving villages  1.392 1.454 104% 
Netherlands: € 514.161  Awareness villages  753 683 91% 
Total: $ 7.940.000  people  100.000 160.053 160% 
9686 UNDP Clearance  m2 11.316.000 12.550.000 111% 
01/01/2004 31/12/2004  UXO   50.203  
  Survey  m2 1.073 n/a  
Netherlands: € 390.000 Roving villages  1.108 1.570 142% 
Total: $ 4.255.000  UXO   50.203  
  Awareness villages  542 495 91% 
   people   125.341  
*1 Achievements for 1997 only; *2 Achievements for 2001 wholly 
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Table 0-30: Achievements in Mozambique 
General information Activity  [unit] Target Achievement % 
MZ003314 NPA Clearance  m2  3.552.733  
01/01/1996 31/12/1997  roads m  157.000  
   APM   7.883  
Netherlands:  € 1.488.347  ATM   10  
Total:  $ 12.591.940  UXO   540  
MZ003315 HI FR Clearance  m2  156.000  
01/09/1996 31/08/1999  APM   121  
   UXO   435  
Netherlands:  € 428.382       
Total:  $ 2.123.717       
MZ014501 HALO Trust Clearance  m2  133.539  
01/01/1998 31/12/1999  APM   1.066  
   UXO   487  
Netherlands:  € 340.218 Survey  m2  1.021.368  
WW135105 NPA Clearance  m2 4.400.000 2.964.334 67% 
01/01/1998 31/12/1999  roads m  151.000  
   APM   4.157  
Netherlands:  € 542.854  ATM   0  
   UXO   1.517  
   SAA   157.326  
WW165508 NPA Clearance  m2 2.200.000 2.624.231 119% 
01/01/2000 31/12/2000  APM   3.506  
   ATM   1  
Netherlands: € 510.250  UXO   458  
Total: $ 4.149.857  SAA   20.740  
   metal debris   447.336  
  Efficiency cost/m2   $1,89  
WW165514 HALO Trust Clearance  m2  106.120  
01/01/2000 31/01/2001  APM   198  
   ATM   0  
Netherlands: € 600.000  UXO   138  
   SAA   36  
   EOD   101  
WW185813 NPA Clearance*1  m2 2.800.000 1.321.342 47% 
01/01/2001 31/12/2001  APM   1.712  
   ATM   0  
Netherlands: € 485.507  UXO   85  
   SAA   1.052  
   fragments   113.127  
WW192405 NPA Clearance  m2 2.200.000 1.989.935 90% 
01/01/2002 31/12/2002  APM   468  
   ATM   4  
Netherlands: € 496.933  UXO   191  
Total: $ 3.489.418  SAA   21.911  
   fragments   418.971  
  Staff   570 n/a  
5809 NPA Clearance*2  m2 2.450.000 1.200.641 49% 
01/01/2003 31/12/2004  APM   94  
   ATM   0  
Netherlands: € 266.529  UXO   187  
   SAA   20.183  
   fragments   113.430  
*1 Achievements for 10/01/2001 – 26/10/2001 
*2 Achievements for 01/01/2003 – 31/12/2003 
 
 
